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Displaying: 41-60 of 344 documents


études
41. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Jean‑Claude Picot Penser le Bien et le Mal avec Empédocle
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A ready answer to the question of Empedocles’ thinking about Good and Evil is to be found in Aristotle, who provides us with this simple rule of thumb : Good is associated with Love, and Evil with Hate. Fundamentally obvious as that rule may be (it makes us think in particular of Love’s masterpiece in the cosmic cycle, the Sphairos), we need to go beyond Aristotle’s words. This article investigates several topics : fire, the sun, water, the hoard of divine thought, reincarnation, Empedoclean ethics, and, finally, the Blessed Ones. Complexity rules our quest to determine what belongs to the Good and what belongs to the Bad. There are times when Love takes advantage of Hate’s ability to cause separation. The sun, manifestation par excellence of fire, is loaded with ambivalence in Empedocles – even though the high value placed almost universally on light is a commonplace in Greek thought. Empedocles is torn between his sense of wonder at the works of Aphrodite and his pessimism on recognizing the infernal cycle in which mortals are involved.
42. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Rossella Saetta Cottone Le soleil comme reflet et la question de la connaissance dans la pensée d’Empédocle: aux origines d’une image
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Questo articolo argomenta in favore della tesi di una collaborazione tra sensi e ragione nella gnoseologia di Empedocle. Il primo difensore di questa tesi, Sesto Empirico, distingueva nel pensiero empedocleo due forme di ragione (λόγος), una umana e l’altra divina. Viene sostenuta qui l’identificazione della ragione divina menzionata da Sesto con il dio protagonista del fr. 134DK, a cui il suo citatore, Ammonio, attribuisce il nome di Apollo. L’analisi proposta cerca di mostrare in particolare 1) che il dio menzionato nel fr. 134 e il sole della comologia empedoclea conosciuto grazie alla testimonianza di Aezio (A56) ; 2) che la costituzione fisica di questo dio solare, immagine luminosa proiettata sulla volta dell’etere, ne fa una figura velata della conoscenza, come relazione necessaria di esperienze sensibili e di contenuti intellettivi. La tradizione pitagorica che identificava il sole con Apollo troverebbe un prolungamento nella divinizzazione empedoclea della ragione.
43. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Salvatore Lavecchia La luce del Bene : l’essere e la coscienza, la materia e lo spirito. Su ciò che Platone tralascia nell’analogia fra il Bene e il sole
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In Resp. 509c7 and 9 Socrates declares that he has omitted many things in the exposition of the analogy between the supreme Good and the sun. In fact Socrates’ exposition leaves some questions open which are seminal with regard to the interpretation of the aforesaid analogy : 1) Why Plato designates the sun as analogon of the Good ? 2) Why the original manifestation of the Good consists in a plurality of intelligible beings ? 3) Why the original manifestation of the Good consists not only in a purely objective intelligible being (νοητόν), but also in an intellect (νοῦς), that is in a form of consciousness ? 4) How can be explained the fact that Plato perceives the Good as origin not only of intelligible, but also of physical reality ? While the first question can be simply answered by referring to the infinite manifestativity of the Good, the other three questions require a significant effort in the field of speculation. Basing on some clues given by Plato in the exposition of the analogy between the Good and the sun, this article attempts to answer these questions by conjecturing that Plato could have presupposed the image of an infinite sphere consisting in intelligible light. This image, which could have already been presupposed by Parmenides, would offer a conceptual background capable of explaining on the one hand the unity of intelligibility (being) and intellect (consciousness) characterizing the original manifestation of the Good, on the other hand why in Plato’s perspective the Good can be perceived as origin not only of intelligible, but also of physical light.
44. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Maria Carmen De Vita ≪Figlio del Bene≫ e Re dell’universo: il dio Helios di Giuliano Imperatore
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This article aims to analyze the philosophical and religious message of Julian’s Hymn to King Helios. The emperor, using Iamblichean structures, shows how the First Cause, the Neoplatonic One, can interact with the layers or gradation below it, including the physical world ; his starting point is an original ‘pluralizing’ interpretation of the Sun analogy contained in Resp. VI 509b.However, Julian’s hymn has a political meaning, too ; it can be considered as a sort of manifesto of Julian’s imperial ideology. The parallel between the emperor and the sun – already present in the ancient rhetorical tradition – is reworked by the Apostate and is part of a complex metaphysical‑cosmological system, grounded on the principles of similarity (homoiotēs) and middleness (mesotēs). These concepts were subject to controversy between nicene and heterodox christians in the IV century. It is possible that these controversies were largely known by Julian and that he has consciously recalled them in his panegyric to Helios intellective, mediator and saviour.
45. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Izabela Jurasz Ce que les Gnostiques ont fait du Principe du Bien. Le cas de Basilide
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The article examines the metamorphosis of the Platonic Principle of Good in the doctrine of Basilides, the 2nd century Christian gnostic. The Basilidian doctrine represents a radical form of dualism, in which the universe ‑ physical and metaphysical ‑ is born from an encounter between Light (good) and Darkness (evil). In his effort to liberate the Light from all contact with Darkness, Basilide refers to several different mediators (eye, mirror, gleam, desire). Analysing the Basilidian myth in the light of the Platonic writings brings out the paradoxes inherent in any attempts to construct a dualistic metaphysics within the Platonic context.
46. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Laurent Lavaud Y a‑t‑il, selon Plotin, une energeia du Bien ?
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Is there an energeia of the Good according to Plotinus ? The aim of this paper is to shed light on the tension between two conflicting perspectives concerning the Good in the philosophy of Plotinus. According to the first perspective, Plotinus claims that the the first principle completely transcends the energeia, which is strictly limited to the Intellect. According to the second, he ascribes a kind of immanent energeia to the One. I will examine the two series of texts in which these two perspectives are present and advance two hypotheses to explain the divergence between these two viewpoints.Firstly, the meaning of the term energeia is not unequivocal, depending on whether it is strictly limited to the intelligible realm or ascribed to the One. Secondly, the competition between two models of causality in the Enneads can explain why Plotinus has two divergent views on the relation between the Good and the energeia. According to the first model, the Good ≪doesn’t have in itself what it gives≫. In line with this principle, Plotinus claims that the Good stands epekeina energeias. The second model of causality is inherited from the peripatetic school. According to it, the cause already contains eminently in itself that which it gives. This model of causality helps explain the ascription of energeia to the Good and the so‑called ≪double‑energeia theory≫.
47. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Sylvain Roux Quel nom pour le Principe ? Un problème chez Plotin et Proclus
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The question to know which name to attribute to the First principle is a difficult question in the Neoplatonic tradition. Indeed, as this one is situated beyond being, no term can apply to him and thus it is only in a negative way that it can be described. But the problem also settles about another aspect because, as first term, it performs a causal function. Thus it is advisable to know if certain terms turn out more appropriate than others to indicate this function. By what name to indicate the First one as being a principle ? We would like to show that this question is approached and answered differently throughout the Neoplatonic tradition. If Plotinus admits the existence of different names, he does not really consider that they indicate different causal functions. For Proclus, in particular in the Platonic Theology, different names refer to different manners in which the principle manifests.
48. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Marilena Vlad Denys l’Aréopagite et le principe donateur de bien
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In this article I discuss the perspective of Dionysius the Areopagite regarding the problem of the absolute Good. I begin with a short outline of the main Neoplatonic ideas concerning the identity between the One and the Good. I then try to show how, in Dionysius’ thinking, the role of the Good changes. The Good appears as the source of all procession and it aquires more and more names, as the procession advances. However, I also try to show the reverting manner in which these names (goodness, light, beauty and love) act.
49. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Franco Trabattoni Heidegger e l’idea platonica del bene: storia di una amicizia fallita
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Dans un travail anterieur j’ai essaye de montrer que Heidegger a finalement refuse de faire place, dans sa philosophie, a la notion platonicienne d’idee, bien qu’elle semblait, selon un certain point de vue, etre une figure capable de representer l’ouverture originelle de l’être qui était au coeur des recherches de Heidegger dans les annees qui entourent Etre et Temps. La raison de cela, a mon avis, est que l’approche aristotelicienne de la philosophie de Platon par Heidegger explicitement adoptee conduisait au bout du compte a interpreter l’idee de Platon comme une substance (et donc comme une figure de l’etant et non pas de l’etre). Mais qu’en est‑il de l’idee du bien, qui pour sa determination teleologique et pour sa collocation au‑dela de l’ousia d’un cote semblait repondre aux besoins propres a la pensee heideggerienne, et d’un autre cote etait plus refractaire a la substantialisation aristotelicienne (la Verdinglichung de P. Natorp) ? La these que je soutiens est que Heidegger, tout en ayant cultive pour longtemps le projet d’utiliser l’idee du bien comme un precedent important de son ontologie, a finalement decide que ce projet n’etait pas possible, parce que la connotation ethique de cette idee (qui non seulement ne l’interessait pas, mais qu’il detestait ouvertement) etait largement dominante sur l’aspect ontologique.
50. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Francisco J. Gonzalez The Aristotelian Reception of the Idea of the Good According to Heidegger and Gadamer
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Pendant l’ete de 1928 Heidegger a offert un seminaire sur le troisieme livre de la Physique d’Aristote et donc sur l’explication aristotelicienne de la nature du mouvement (kinesis). La derniere seance de ce cours, qui eut lieu le 25 juillet, est d’une grande importance parce que c’est a cette occasion que Heidegger va au livre neuf de la Metaphysique pour essayer de comprendre la notion ontologique qui est a la base de l’interpretation aristotelicienne du mouvement : l’energeia. Mais dans les protocoles de ce seminaire qui se trouvent parmi les papiers de Heidegger et qui ont ete publies recemment dans le volume 83 de la Gesamtausgabe, la seance du 25 juillet se trouve absente. Ce fait a conduit l’editeur a conclure que le seminaire avait pris fin le 23 juillet, sans s’apercevoir donc que la conclusion du seminaire manquait. Il existe heureusement une transcription preservee parmi les papiers de l’etudiante de Heidegger, Helene Weiss, et accessible aujourd’hui dans les archives de l’universite de Stanford. Cette transcription montre que la derniere session eut bien lieu le 25 juillet et nous offre la lecture heideggerienne de Metaphysique IX qui ne se trouve pas dans la version de la Gesamtausgabe. C’est dans le contexte de cette lecture que Heidegger fait la declaration etonnante qui nous concerne ici : ≪Dans la derniere instance, la Metaphysique Θ revient a Platon ; la priorite de l’energeia est fondamentalement la meme chose (im Grunde dasselbe) que l’epekeina des Idees. (Donc, pour cette raison aussi la these de Jaeger d’une evolution chez Aristote est fausse, parce que la Metaphysique Θ appartient a la periode tardive dans laquelle Aristote aurait [selon cette these] surmonte le platonisme.)≫La première tâche que je me propose ici sera d’expliquer cette déclaration qui suggère une relation tres etroite, ou meme une identite, entre la notion aristotelicienne de l’energeia comme ayant une priorite vis‑a‑vis de la dunamis et la notion platonicienne de l’Idee du Bien comme etant epekeina de l’ousia. Pour cette explication je ferai appel non seulement au contexte du seminaire de 1928, mais aussi aux textes plus tardifs comme les Beitrage et les cours sur Nietzsche dans lesquels Heidegger semble presupposer et développer sa déclaration de 1928. Ma seconde tâche sera de comparer cette thèse heideggerienne a la tentative de Gadamer de surmonter l’opposition traditionnelle entre les ontologies de Platon et d’Aristote en faisant appel a l’idee du bien chez les deux. Cette tentative se trouve dans le texte Die Idee des Guten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles. La comparaison que j’entreprends ici va montrer certaines affinites entre les interpretations de l’Idee du Bien chez Heidegger et Gadamer, mais aussi de profondes differences qui vont determiner leurs differents projets philosophiques.
51. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Fernando Rey Puente Simone Weil, Platon et le Bien
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The aim of this article is to provide an overview about Simone Weil’s interpretation of the Good in Plato. The article has two parts. In the first one, we focus on her exegesis of the ancient Greek civilization and of the Pythagorean tradition. We also signalize that her interpretation cannot be confused with the one done in Neoplatonism. After that, we investigate her interpretation of Plato’s philosophy with special emphasis on two dialogues : Republic and Timaeus. In the second part we research two main concepts of Simone Weil’s philosophy, i.e., the notions of value and of lecture and finalize our text with the question of how we should situate her appropriation of the Platonic tradition.
52. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Michel Narcy L’idée du bien chez trois platoniciens modernes: Alain, Pétrement, Weil
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This paper consists in three case studies of modern French philosophers who drew their inspiration from Plato : Emile Chartier (1868‑1951), known under his nom de plume Alain, famous as a teacher in the twenties of the last century, and two of his pupils, Simone Petrement (1907‑1992) and Simone Weil (1909‑1943). Great admirer of Plato, Alain taught the survival of his main thoughts through all the philosophical tradition and their agreement with the rationalistic mood of 19th‑20th century philosophy. This implied that these thoughts were stripped of the allegorical or mythological way in which Plato often expresses them. In particular, Plato’s allegory of the cave, one of his core images, turned out in Alain’s interpretation to be a metaphoric description of the difficult ascent of the mind up to scientific or at least rational knowledge. Consequently in this interpretation it was no longer question of any transcendency of the idea of the Good.Petrement and Weil remained faithful to their teacher and therefore to Platonic inspiration. Nevertheless, both of them, although in different ways, have reacted against this exhaustion of transcendence and come into conflict with modern interpretation of Plato. Petrement, even before specialising in the history of Gnosticism, worked out a dualistic system in which truth is absolutely transcendent because, as universal, it is unattainable for any particular mind inasmuch it is a subject’s mind. Truth, therefore, is unattainable throughout this life. On Weil’s part, the interest in Plato took place after a period of left wing militancy, following her discovery of Christianity and some personal experiences of mysticism. Platonism was for her a means of combining her new faith with a properly philosophical, i.e. rationalistic, way of thinking. Of course in this view transcendency was crucial to the idea of Good as much as to that of God. Whether this transcendency is more a matter of faith than of reason is at least uncertain.
codicologica
53. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Silvia Fazzo Le manuscrit Laurentianus 87.12 comme le témoin le plus ancien du Commentaire d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise à la Métaphysique d’Aristote
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Prolegomena pour une nouvelle modalite critique d’edition et de reference concernant le temoignage d’Alexandre sur le texte de la Metaphysique d’Aristote. Methode et cas d’etude : ‘Alexandre’ et le ‘telephone sans fil’ des apparats critiques in Metaphysique 1072b2‑3. Quel ‘Commentaire’ d’Alexandre ? Un texte a re‑etablir. Les editions du commentaire d’Alexandre au XIXe siecle (1836, 1847, 1891) : le role du manuscrit Monacensis gr. 81, a. 1550 env. (sigle M). L’edition Hayduck 1888 du commentaire d’Asclepius comme etude de cas parallele et comme source supplementaire. Le commentaire d’Alexandre selon la recensio laurentiana (AlL). L’independance des deux recensiones comme dilemme. La tradition indirecte de la tradition indirecte de la Metaphysique : le commentaire d’Asclepius. L’analyse des parties communes entre Asclepius et la recensio laurentiana sur Δ29 : un cas particulier. Les arguments de Hayduck 1891 pour l’athetese du texte du Laurentianus. L’argument de Hayduck 1891 sur la recensio laurentiana in Arist. 985a18‑20 et ses developpements recents : la suppression des mots d’Aristote concernant la fonction du νοῦς chez Anaxagore. La nouvelle athetese de la recensio laurentiana : arguments pro et contra. Discussions de nos jours sur l’edition d’Alexandre : l’hypothese du Paris. 1878 comme branche β. Tradition d’exegese, souci de legitimation, perte d’information, normalisation du langage. L’hypertexte possible et autres perspectives.
comptes rendus
54. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Franco Ferrari “Von hier nach dort”. Der Philosophiebegriff bei Platon
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55. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Graziano Lingua L’icône dans la pensée et dans l’art. Constitutions, contestations, reinventions de la notion d’image divine en contexte chrétien
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56. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Daniel Coman Robert Holcot
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57. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Anca Crivăţ Alexandre le Grand : histoire, image, interprétations
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58. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Auteurs
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59. Chôra: Volume > 14
Anca Vasiliu Note liminaire
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la mediation discursive dans le neoplatonisme
60. Chôra: Volume > 14
Marilena Vlad Présentation du dossier
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