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panel discussion
41. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
Olga E. Stoliarova Ольга Евгеньевна Столярова
Can We Talk about the Fall of Science?
Можно ли говорить о грехопадении науки?

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The article analyzes the pessimistic scenario in relation to science, which characterizes contemporary science as regressing. It is shown that pessimism in relation to contemporary science is largely based on the formal-logical positivist image of science, which does not correspond to real scientific practice. It is shown, that postpositivist studies of science testifies in favor of the fact that science has never been “pure”. This approach allows us to rehabilitate technoscience and revise the pessimistic scenario.
42. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
Liana A. Tukhvatulina Лиана Анваровна Тухватулина
On the Alleged Contradiction in Scientific Rationality
О мнимом противоречии в научной рациональности

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The paper discusses value dimension of scientific research. The author claims that the most promising way here is to analyze scientific rationality as a set of interrelated attitudes within the institutional framework of the big science. She shows that there is no contradiction between the search for truth and the technological enhancement in science.
43. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
Alexander L. Nikiforov Александр Леонидович Никифоров
Let’s think together!
Будем думать вместе!

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The article provides answers to the critical remarks of my colleagues expressed about the ideas I presented in the first article. In general, it seems to me, we all agree that the image of science, created in the philosophy of science of the twentieth century, needs substantial change due to the rapid convergence of science and technology during the twentieth century.
epistemology and cognition
44. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
Timofey S. Demin Тимофей Сергеевич Демин
Gettier Problem: What Should We Do with the Puzzle of Analytical Epistemology?
Проблема Геттиера

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Theories, that answering the question “What is knowledge?” in analytic epistemology appears under the influence of Gettier cases – a way of refutation such theories of knowledge, that have truth and belief as constituent elements. In the paper were analyzed basic strategies of solving the Gettier problem. One way is to save the analysis of knowledge by changing the elements in order to avoid the Gettier problem. There are three possible ways of doing so: adding new elements to the justification, changing the justification on the other criteria or strengthen the justification in such a way, that it would resolve any possible Gettier cases. For each strategy analysis of the theories of knowledge is given. In the paper idea of the inescapability of Gettier cases for analysis of knowledge was supported by the argumentation of Linda Zagzebski. In that ground, the analysis of knowledge was refuted. From that perspective, two of the most influenced ways of answering the question “what is knowledge” was proposed. First, the irreducible theory of knowledge, where knowledge is a mere state of the mind. Second, rejection existence of the universal invariant of the knowledge in every case. There are multiple senses of what the knowledge is and none of them is prior to other. The author lives as the open question the right way to think about the knowledge. In the closing part of the paper, the author presents a perspective critique of the knowledge problem as the project of overrated significance, and argues for a need to create new arguments that supporting that problem.
language and mind
45. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
Roman A. Yuriev Роман Александрович Юрьев
A.J. Ayer and J.L. Austin: from “Ethical Judgements” to “Performative”
А. Айер и Дж. Остин: от «этических суждений» к «перформативу»

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The article considers the thesis about A. Ayer’s radical empiricism as one of the possible conceptual sources for the development of the theory of J. Austin’s speech acts. In contemporary research literature more attention is devoted to the inquiry of the discussion between A. Ayer and J. Austin on the matter of “sense-data”. At the same time it can be stated that few attention is devoted to the historical and philosophical reconstruction of their mutual influence. The importance of this kind of reconstruction is caused by the fact that contention between A. Ayer and J. Austin in Oxford during 1930s and 1940s can be viewed as preliminary work of reception of the idea of L. Wittgenstein’s “language-games”. By comparing A. Ayer’s “empirical / ethical” and J. Austin’s “conservative / performative” oppositions one could show that A. Ayer’s earlier views on ethics expressed in his work “Language, Truth and Logic “cannot be unconditionally attributed to the logical positivism. Ayer’s following statements were considered: 1) ethical judgements state as judgments of arousal of feelings and stimulation to action; 2) ethical judgements state as expression of ethical feelings; 3) ethical judgements add nothing in terms of factual meaning; 4) feelings are not a necessary condition for their expression. In conclusion one can say that in a certain sense Ayer’s approach to the ethical judgment is open to understanding that the meaning of a word is its use in the language. The results of its ethical analysis can be viewed as an important impulse to the development of ordinary language philosophy. Therefore, it is possible to consider logical positivism as including the inevitable premises for creation the ordinary language philosophy.
46. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
Andrei V. Nekhaev Андрей Викторович Нехаев
Yablo’s Paradox: Is the Infinite Liar Lying to Us?
Парадокс Ябло: лжет ли нам бесконечный лжец?

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In 1993, the American logic S. Yablo was proposed an original infinitive formulation of the classical ≪Liar≫ paradox. It questioned the traditional notion of self-reference as the basic structure for semantic paradoxes. The article considers the arguments underlying two different approaches to analysis of proposals of the ≪Infinite Liar≫ and understanding of the genuine sources for semantic paradoxes. The first approach (V. Valpola, G.-H. von Wright, T. Bolander, etc.) imposes responsibility for the emergence of semantic paradoxes on the negation of the truth predicate. It deprives the ≪Infinite Liar≫ sentences of consistent truth values. The second approach is based on a modified version of anaphoric prosententialism (D. Grover, R. Brandom, etc.). The concepts of truth and falsehood are treated as special anaphoric operators. Logical constructs similar to the ≪Infinite Liar≫ do not attribute any definite truth values to sentences from which they are composed, but only state certain types of relations between the semantic content of such sentences.
47. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
Vladimir I. Shalak Владимир Иванович Шалак
On “Yablo’s Paradox: Is the Infinite Liar Lying to Us?” by Andrei V. Nekhaev
О статье А.В. Нехаева «Парадокс Ябло: лжет ли нам бесконечный лжец?»

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It is believed that the paradoxes emerge due to self-reference. The interest to the Yablo’s paradox is caused by the fact that it does not contain direct or indirect self-reference. The analysis of this paradox has the following disadvantages: 1) incorrect retelling of cited sources, including the Yablo’s paradox; 2) attribution to the cited authors of provisions that they did not approve; 3) carelessness in the use of logical symbolism; 4) confusion in terminology related to the concepts of Truth and False; 5) insufficiently substantiated conclusions.
vista
48. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
Vitaly V. Ogleznev Виталий Васильевич Оглезнев
The “Open Texture” of Empirical Concepts and Linguistic Anti-Reductionism of Friedrich Waismann
«Открытая текстура» эмпирических понятий и лингвистический антиредукционизм Фридриха Вайсмана

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The article presents a careful analysis of the idea of the “open texture” of empirical concepts and the problems of verification in the way that they were formulated by Friedrich Waismann. The idea of the “open texture” means for Waismann a certain type of a linguistic indeterminacy or a sort of lack of definition, which must be distinguished from, and linked to, another types like vagueness or ambiguity. It is shown that empirical statements are not conclusively verifiable for two different reasons: the incompleteness of description of the material object and the open texture of the terms involved. We cannot conclusively verify statements in which the empirical concepts are used, because we cannot define these concepts in an exhaustive way because of their open texture. Thus, the definition of the concept will be incomplete. Waismann’s approach to definition plays here a key role, and it is directly related to the open texture of concepts. The author proposes interpreting the open texture as an immanent property of the concept, as something that is embedded in it a priori, and which can cause a vagueness. Nevertheless, an open texture must be distinguished form a vagueness. This leads to the conclusion that an open texture is a possibility of vagueness; vagueness can be remedied by giving more accurate rules, open texture cannot. In this sense, the “open texture” of a language allows for a more precise definition of concepts (by adjusting the definition) if appropriate circumstances arise. This justifies the thesis that the argument of the open texture is the ontological basis of the linguistic anti-reductionism of Friedrich Waismann.
49. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
Trevor Pinch Тревор Пинч
From Technology Studies to Sound Studies: How Materiality Matters
От исследования технологий к звуковым исследованиям

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In this paper I put in dialogue two areas of scholarship: Technology Studies and Sound Studies. Within Technology Studies I discuss the influential social construction of technology approach and illustrate it with the history of the moog electronic music synthesizer, the first commercial music synthesizer. I stress the role of standardization of keyboards and the key role played by users in the development of this technology. I examine certain iconic sounds that the moog synthesizer produces and discuss the stabilization of sound. It is argued that just as technologies can be traced as stabilizing over time, sounds also can be traced with certain sounds stabilizing and being taken up by users whilst other sounds fail to stabilize. The technology required to produce a sound, performance practice, and wider cultural concerns such as the naming of sounds are crucial ingredients in the stabilization of sound.
case-studies – science studies
50. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
Igor F. Mikhailov Игорь Феликсович Михайлов
Computational Knowledge Representation in Cognitive Science
Вычислительная репрезентация знаний в когнитивной науке

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Cognitive research can contribute to the formal epistemological study of knowledge representation inasmuch as, firstly, it may be regarded as a descriptive science of the very same subject as that, of which formal epistemology is a normative one. And, secondly, the notion of representation plays a constitutive role in both disciplines, though differing therein in shades of its meaning. Representation, in my view, makes sense only being paired with computation. A process may be viewed as computational if it adheres to some algorithm and is substrate-independent. Traditionally, psychology is not directly determined by neuroscience, sticking to functional or dynamical analyses in the what-level and skipping mechanistic explanations in the how-level. Therefore, any version of computational approach in psychology is a very promising move in connecting the two scientific realms. On the other hand, the digital and linear computational approach of the classical cognitive science is of little help in this way, as it is not biologically realistic. Thus, what is needed there on the methodological level, is a shift from classical Turing-style computationalism to a generic computational theory that would comprehend the complicated architecture of neuronal computations. To this end, the cutting-edge cognitive neuroscience is in need of а satisfactory mathematical theory applicable to natural, particularly neuronal, computations. Computational systems may be construed as natural or artificial devices that use some physical processes on their lower levels as atomic operations for algorithmic processes on their higher levels. A cognitive system is a multi-level mechanism, in which linguistic, visual and other processors are built on numerous levels of more elementary operations, which ultimately boil down to atomic neural spikes. The hypothesis defended in this paper is that knowledge derives not only from an individual computational device, such as a brain, but also from the social communication system that, in its turn, may be presented as a kind of supercomputer of the parallel network architecture. Therefore, a plausible account of knowledge production and exchange must base on some mathematical theory of social computations, along with that of natural, particularly neuronal, ones.
51. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
Olga V. Popova Ольга Владимировна Попова
Human and Human Death as a Neuroscience Ethics Problem
Человек и его смерть как проблема этики нейронаук

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The article deals with the philosophical problem field of modern neuroethics. The general idea of the state of modern neuroethics is given and it is shown that research in this area encompasses both fundamental problems that classically belonged to the field of philosophy research (for example, such as the problem of psychophysical dualism, the physical bases of consciousness, freedom of will and its interrelation with brain activity) and problems with applied orientation, explicating the ethical-social and legal dimension of innovation development in the field of neuroscience and actualizing the analysis of their social risks. It is shown that the development of neuro-ethics in the modern world became possible thanks to a special way of functioning of modern science, which was called the technology of science and to the development of the phenomenon of technological development ethification, which in practical terms was expressed in the study of the problem of the correspondence of the results of innovative scientific and technical projects to the interests of various social groups, their expectations and values, and also helped to determine the status of new technologies in relation to social reality. The article gives an idea of the existing normative field necessary for the development of neuro-ethics. On the basis of using the resource of discourse analysis of R. Harre, who singled out personal grammar (P-grammar), organism grammar (O-grammars) and molecular grammar (M-grammar), a philosophical analysis of such a problem of modern neuroethics as brain death was carried out. Also was given a structural description of new biotechnogenic identities of human being. The conclusion is drawn that the concept of brain death is an example of the conventional nature of scientific truth, the formation of which is influenced by various socio-cultural and economic factors. In the context of the development of neuroscience and the emergence of new methods of brain regeneration, it can be rethought.
52. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
Vladislav A. Shaposhnikov Владислав Алексеевич Шапошников
To Outdo Kuhn: on Some Prerequisites for Treating the Computer Revolution as a Revolution in Mathematics
Преодолеть Куна: о некоторых предпосылках рассмотрения компьютерной революции как революции в математике

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The paper deals with some conceptual trends in the philosophy of science of the 1980‒90s, which being evolved simultaneously with the computer revolution, make room for treating it as a revolution in mathematics. The immense and widespread popularity of Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions had made a demand for overcoming this theory, at least in some aspects, just inevitable. Two of such aspects are brought into focus in this paper. Firstly, it is the shift from theoretical to instrumental revolutions which are sometimes called “Galisonian revolutions” after Peter Galison. Secondly, it is the shift from local (“little”) to global (“big”) scientific revolutions now connected with the name of Ian Hacking; such global, transdisciplinary revolutions are at times called “Hacking-type revolutions”. The computer revolution provides a typical example of both global and instrumental revolutions. That change of accents in the post-Kuhnian perspective on scientific revolutions was closely correlated with the general tendency to treat science as far more pluralistic and transdisciplinary. That tendency is primarily associated with the so-called Stanford School; Peter Galison and Ian Hacking are often seen as its representatives. In particular, that new image of science gave no support to a clear-cut separation of mathematics from other sciences. Moreover, it has formed prerequisites for the recognition of material and technical revolutions in the history of mathematics. Especially, the computer revolution can be considered in the new framework as a revolution in mathematics par excellence.
interdisciplinary studies
53. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
Sergei Yu. Shevchenko Сергей Юрьевич Шевченко
Hierarchy of Technoscience Estimation: the Case of Drug Equivalence Dispute
Иерархия оценок технонауки

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Semantic framework of the discussion about the equivalence and interchangeability of the original drugs and generics is considered in the article. Generics are identical to the original drugs in terms of chemical structure, nevertheless some patients and doctors consider that generics are less effective and have more severe side effects than original drugs. These discussions are considered as an example of a public deliberation concerning the achievements of technoscience. The conflicting parties determined the identity either from the chemical structure of the drug (according to D. Chalmers – secondary intensional) or from the phenomenal characteristics of the situation of its application (primary intensional). In this regard, the method of resolving the conflict is the alignment of the hierarchy of methods for determining equivalence in biomedicine. The methodology of evidence-based medicine already has such a hierarchy, which makes it possible to determine the validity of outcomes of clinical trial. According to this hierarchy, the phenomenal characteristics of the outcome of treatment (quality and life expectancy of patients) are more important than instrumentally established indicators. Thus, new clinical data on the efficacy and safety of a generic should give the opportunity to cancel the recognition of drug equivalence. More generally, this means that technoscience achievement which directly affects a person can only be assessed by him/her. The recognition of such priority is the basis of the ‘division of linguistic labor’ during public deliberation concerning the achievements of technoscience.
archive
54. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
Alexander A. Pechenkin Александр Александрович Печенкин
The Concept of Probability in Mathematics and Physics (on the 1920–30 Discussions in Soviet Scientific Literature)
Понятие вероятности в математике и физике (дискуссии 20–30-х гг. в СССР)

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In the Soviet scientific literature of 1920‒30 the concept of probability was holly debated. The frequency concept which was proposed by R. von Mises became popular among Soviet physicists belonging to the L.I. Mandelstam community. Landau and Lifshitz were also close to this concept in their famous course of theoretical physics. A.Khinchin, a mathematician who cooperated with Kolmogorov, opposed to the frequency conception. In this paper we try to demonstrate that the frequency position was connected with the anthropomorphous approach to physics, whereas Khinchin’s positions implied the criticism of anthropomorphism and put forward the ideal of objective knowledge.
new trends
55. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
Evgeny N. Ivakhnenko Евгений Николаевич Ивахненко
Annmarie Mol on the Way to Multiple Ontologies
Аннмари Мол на пути к множественным онтологиям

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The article critically examines the ideas of the Dutch philosopher and ethnologist Annemarie Mol. Her main work, “The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice”, is mainly subjected to analysis. According to the author of the article, A. Mol managed to offer his own version of the “ontological turn” and, perhaps, change the accents in the entire theoretical repertoire of actor-network theory (ANT). She, carrying out a “police investigation” in hospital Z, was able to show the multiplicity of ontologies of the body and its disease / illness. What is called the illness is represented by a large number of actors – people, their relationships, tools, diagnostic methods, etc. – which together can be represented as an assembly or assemblage. The “choreography of the ontology” of such an assembly is contingent, since it may be different.
56. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
Alexander V. Mikhailovski Александр Владиславович Михайловский
Four Key Questions in Philosophy of Technology: On “Homo creator” by Hans Poser
Четыре основных вопроса философии техники

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This article discusses Hans Poser’s new book “Homo creator” (2016). It aims to open the philosophy of technology to ontological, epistemological and ethical problems. The keynote of the book serves the conviction that the technical creativity builds the core of the engineering. Modal concepts as possibility, necessity, contingency and reality are used in a systematic way to characterize technology. Technological artifacts essentially depend on a special type of interpretation (“technical hermeneutics”). The central ontological problem consists in the fact that technology is based on new ideas, which at the beginning are a mere possibility, because the intended artifacts and processes never existed up to that moment. The author shows that conditions of the real world, cognitive, social and cultural conditions constitute the realm of the technological possibility and influence our culture (“life world”) from the very beginning.
editorial
57. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 2
Vadim V. Vasilyev Вадим Валерьевич Васильев
Metaphilosophy: History and Perspectives
Метафилософия: история и перспективы

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In this paper I discuss a prehistory of the recent metaphilosophical research and provide an overview of its most important areas. I review the ways of understanding of philosophy by the authors of the Early Modernity and contemporary continental philosophers and outline a trajectory of metaphilosophical discussions in analytic philosophy of 20th century. I try to show that the recent surge of metaphilosophy research in it could be explained by a search for a new identity of analytic philosophy after wide disappointment in the “linguistic turn,” as well as after criticism of Quine and his followers of various aspects of the common method of conceptual analysis, and expansion of the field of inquiry. I argue that contemporary analytic philosophy is much closer to the classical and modern tradition than to the early analytic philosophy. And the most important question for contemporary metaphilosophers seems to be a question about possible substitutes of an old-fashioned conceptual analysis. Some authors propose to get rid of armchair methods at all and follow experimental line of research. This, however, could be destructive to the philosophy as a separate discipline. That’s why it is important to pay utmost attention to those philosophers who try to save armchair philosophy. As Timothy Williamson is one of the most interesting authors working in this vein, I asses his role in the recent metaphilosophical research. I give a brief review of his book “Doing Philosophy” (2018) and draw attention to the fact that its main ideas are briefly expressed in his paper “Armchair Philosophy”, published in this issue of the journal. I claim that the importance of Timothy Williamson’s work is best explained by its role in realizing that philosophers now have to make a hard choice between dissolving philosophical methodology in methods of experimental sciences and trying to find way of justification of armchair philosophy.
panel discussion
58. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 2
Timothy Williamson Тимоти Уильямсон
Armchair Philosophy
Кабинетная философия

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The article presents an anti-exceptionalist view of philosophical methodology, on which it is much closer to the methodology of other disciplines than many philosophers like to think. Like mathematics, it is a science, but not a natural science. Its methods are notprimarily experimental, though it can draw on the results of natural science. Likefoundational mathematics, its methods are abductive as well as deductive. As in the natural sciences, much progress in philosophy consists in the construction of better models rather than in the discovery of new laws. We should not worry about whether philosophy is a priori or a posteriori, because the distinction is epistemologically superficial.
59. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 2
Daniel C. Dennett Дэниел Деннет
Philosophy or Auto-Anthropology?
Философия или ауто-антропология?

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Timothy Williamson is mainly right, I think. He defends armchair philosophy as a variety of armchair science, like mathematics, or computer modeling in evolutionary theory, economics, statistics, and I agree that this is precisely what philosophy is, at its best: working out the assumptions and implications of any serious body of thought, helping everyone formulate the best questions to ask, and then leaving the empirical work to the other sciences. Philosophy – at its best – is to other inquiries roughly as theoretical physics is to experimental physics. You can do it in the armchair, but you need to know a lot about the phenomena with which the inquiry deals.
60. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 2
Joshua Knobe Джошуа Ноуб
Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Robust Across Demographic Differences
Философские интуиции на удивление устойчивы к демографическим различиям

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Within the existing metaphilosophical literature on experimental philosophy, a great deal of attention has been devoted to the claim that there are large differences in philosophical intuitions between people of different demographic groups. Some philosophers argue that this claim has important metaphilosophical implications; others argue that it does not. However, the actual empirical work within experimental philosophy seems to point to a very different sort of metaphilosophical question. Specifically, what the actual empirical work suggests is that intuitions are surprisingly robust across demographic groups. Prior to empirical study, it seemed plausible that unexpected patterns of intuition found in one demographic group would not emerge in other demographic groups. Yet, again and again, empirical work obtains the opposite result: that unexpected patterns found in one demographic group actually emerge also in other demographic groups. I cite 30 studies that find this sort of robustness. I then argue that to the extent that metaphilosophical work is to engage with the actual findings from experimental philosophy, it needs to explore the implications of the surprising robustness of philosophical intuitions across demographic differences.