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Displaying: 41-60 of 1758 documents


articles
41. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Ben Page Arguing to Theism from Consciousness
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I provide an argument from consciousness for God’s existence. I first consider a version of the argument which is ultimately difficult to evaluate. I then consider a stronger argument, on which consciousness, given our worldly laws of nature, is rather substantial evidence for God’s existence. It is this latter argument the paper largely focuses on, both in setting it out and defending it from various objections.
42. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Elijah Hess, Alan Rhoda Is an Open Infinite Future Impossible? A Reply to Pruss
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Alexander Pruss has recently argued on probabilistic grounds that Christian philosophers should reject Open Futurism—roughly, the thesis that there are no true future contingents—on account of this view’s alleged inability to handle certain statements about infinite futures in a mathematically or religiously adequate manner. We argue that, once the distinction between being true and becoming true is applied to such statements, it is evident that they pose no problem for Open Futurists.
reviews
43. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
W. Matthews Grant Peter Furlong, The Challenges of Divine Determinism: A Philosophical Analysis
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44. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Simon Kittle W. Matthews Grant, Free Will and God’s Universal Causality: The Dual Sources Account
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45. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Benjamin J. Bruxvoort Lipscomb Anne Jeffrey, God and Morality
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46. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Kirk Lougheed John Pittard, Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment
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47. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Peter Furlong Leigh Vicens and Simon Kittle, God and Human Freedom
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articles
48. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Daniel M. Johnson How Puzzles of Petitionary Prayer Solve Themselves: Divine Omnirationality, Interest-Relative Explanation, and Answered Prayer
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Some have seen in the divine attribute of omnirationality, identified by Alexander R. Pruss, the promise of a dissolution of the usual puzzles of peti­tionary prayer. Scott Davison has challenged this line of thought with a series of example cases. I will argue that Davison is only partially correct, and that the reasons for this reveal an important new way to approach the puzzles of petitionary prayer. Because explanations are typically interest-relative, there is not one correct account of “answered prayer” but many, corresponding to a variety of reasons to care whether God might answer our prayers. It follows from this that the omnirationality solution can be vindicated and that puz­zles of petitionary prayer that are not dissolved thereby will typically contain within themselves the seeds of their own solutions.
49. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Kenneth L. Pearce Are We Free to Break the Laws of Providence?
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Can I be free to perform an action if God has decided to ensure that I do not choose that action? I show that Molinists and simple foreknowledge theo­rists are committed to answering in the affirmative. This is problematic for their status as theological incompatibilists. I suggest that strategies for pre­serving their theological incompatibilism in light of this result should be based on sourcehood. However, the path is not easy here either, since Leibniz has shown how theological determinists can offer an extremely robust form of sourcehood. Proponents of these views must identify a valuable form of sourcehood their theories allow that Leibniz’s theory doesn’t.
50. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Andrew M. Bailey Magical Thinking
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According to theists, God is an immaterial thinking being. The main question of this article is whether theism supports the view that we too are immaterial thinking beings. I shall argue in the negative. Along the way, I will also explore some implications in the philosophy of mind following from the observation that, on theism, God’s mentality is in a certain respect magical.
51. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Caleb Cohoe Accounting for the Whole: Why Pantheism is on a Metaphysical Par with Complex Theism
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Pantheists are often accused of lacking a sufficient account of the unity of the cosmos and its supposed priority over its many parts. I argue that complex the­ists, those who think that God has ontologically distinct parts or attributes, face the same problems. Current proposals for the metaphysics of complex theism do not offer any greater unity or ontological independence than pantheism, since they are modeled on priority monism. I then discuss whether the for­mal distinction of John Duns Scotus offers a way forward for complex theists. I show that only those classical theists who affirm divine simplicity are better off with respect to aseity and unity than pantheists. Only proponents of divine simplicity can fairly claim to have found a fully independent ultimate being.
52. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Justin Mooney How God Knows Counterfactuals of Freedom
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One problem for Molinism that critics of the view have pressed, and which Molinists have so far done little to address, is that even if there are true coun­terfactuals of freedom, it is puzzling how God could possibly know them. I defuse this worry by sketching a plausible model of the mechanics of middle knowledge which draws on William Alston’s direct acquaintance account of divine knowledge.
53. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Martin Jakobsen Determining the Need for Explanation
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Several theistic arguments are formulated as arguments for the best explana­tion. This article discusses how one can determine that some phenomenon actually needs an explanation. One way to demonstrate that an explanation is needed is by providing one. The proposed explanation ought to either make the occurrence of the phenomenon in question more probable than it occur­ring by chance, or it has to sufficiently increase our understanding of the phe­nomenon. A second way to demonstrate that an explanation is needed is to show that the phenomenon in question both violates our expectations and is particularly noticeable.
book reviews
54. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Michael Bergmann Nathan Ballantyne, Knowing Our Limits
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55. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Andrew W. Arlig Blake Hereth and Kevin Timpe, eds., The Lost Sheep in Philosophy of Religion: New Perspectives on Disability, Gender, Race, and Animals
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56. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Sameer Yadav John H. McClendon III, Black Christology and the Quest for Authenticity: A Philosophical Appraisal
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57. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
John A. Keller Elliot Sober, The Design Argument
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58. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Catherine Nolan Dietrich von Hildebrand with Alice von Hildebrand, Morality and Situation Ethics
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articles
59. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Christopher Hauser On Being Human and Divine: The Coherence of the Incarnation
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According to the doctrine of the Incarnation, one person, Christ, has both the attributes proper to a human being and the attributes proper to God. This claim has given rise to the coherence objection, i.e., the objection that it is impossible for one individual to have both sets of attributes. Several authors have offered responses which rely on the idea that Christ has the relevant human properties in virtue of having a concrete human nature which has those properties. I show why such responses should be rejected and, in light of that, propose an alternative response to the coherence objection.
60. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Chris Tucker Divine Satisficing and the Ethics of the Problem of Evil
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This paper accomplishes three goals. First, it reveals that God’s ethics has a radical satisficing structure: God can choose a good enough suboptimal option even if there is a best option and no countervailing considerations. Second, it resolves the long-standing worry that there is no account of the good enough that is both principled and demanding enough to be good enough. Third, it vindicates the key ethical assumption in the problem of evil without relying on the contested assumption that God’s ethics is our ethics (on steroids).