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Displaying: 41-60 of 3874 documents


articles
41. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Anthony Rudd On Painting and its Philosophical Significance: Merleau-Ponty and Maritain
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Merleau-Ponty’s writings on the philosophy of painting, though widely influential and much discussed, remain enigmatic. In this paper I compare his views on painting with those of his older contemporary, Jacques Maritain, who also holds that painting can give us a non-conceptual insight into deep truths about things that are inaccessible to discursive thought. I argue that some ideas that are obscure and undeveloped in Merleau-Ponty are developed more clearly and fully in Maritain. Even where there are significant differences between them, these are not as great as it might at first seem. This comparison can help us to see the ways in which both philosophers’ theories of art are important for understanding their philosophies as a whole. Furthermore, the views they hold in common can continue to suggest a plausible and fruitful way to think about art today.
42. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Daniel Adsett Milbank and Heidegger on the Possibility of a Secular Analogy of Being
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Traditionally, analogical ontologies—ontologies that are hierarchically structured with beings participating in a primary being—have been defended by those who criticize secularism. Secularism, it is said, depends on the leveling out of being, the elimination of hierarchies in favor of ontologies in which beings differ only according to intensity. John Milbank, for example, argues that secularism became a possibility only once medieval analogical ontologies were supplanted by univocal accounts of being. In this paper, however, I argue that an endorsement of an analogical ontology is not restricted to pre-moderns and those critical of secularism. It is possible, I argue, to conceive of a secular version of analogical ontology. Martin Heidegger’s mid-career account of being offers us an example of such an ontology. In what follows, I attempt to reconstruct Heidegger’s mid-career ontology as analogically and secularly organized. In doing so, I challenge Milbank’s claim that secular ontologies are necessarily non-analogical.
43. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Yong Li Virtues and Human Dignity: Confucianism and the Foundation of Human Rights
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In this paper I argue that Confucianism provides a foundation for human rights. First, I will survey the current debates on the issue of whether Confucianism can embrace the idea of human rights. Second, I will focus on a “thin concept” of human rights and point out some historical developments pertinent to this idea and various aspects of the concept. Third, I will explain the type of interpretation of Confucianism on which I want to focus. Fourth, I will argue that Confucianism is not only compatible with human rights but also provides a foundation for human dignity, which is a basis for human rights. I argue that the Confucian virtue-based approach can overcome certain challenges that thwart an autonomy-based approach to human dignity and human rights. Finally, I will address some objections to this view.
44. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Samuel Kahn The Problem of the Kantian Line
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In this paper I discuss the problem of the Kantian line. The problem arises because the locus of value in Kantian ethics is rationality, which (counter-intuitively) seems to entail that there are no duties to groups of beings like children. I argue that recent attempts to solve this problem by Wood and O’Neill overlook an important aspect of it before posing my own solution.
45. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Ted Di Maria Kant on Practical Judgment
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Standard interpretations of Kant’s moral philosophy portray him as affording agents very little, if any, latitude to exercise practical judgment for determining the proper course of action. It is typically thought that Kant holds that because all moral duties are determinable a priori and in advance of particular circumstances this leaves little to no room for agents to exercise practical judgment. In this paper I discuss two senses in which Kant does allow for the practical judgment of agents. The first is an interpretation of Kant’s view of practical judgment developed by Onora O’Neill and others. The second is an underappreciated dimension of practical judgment contained in Kant’s texts. It is to a defense and examination of the importance of the second sense of practical judgment that the majority of this paper is dedicated.
book reviews
46. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Glenn Statile Resisting Scientific Realism. By K. Brad Wray
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47. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. The Spark of Faith: Understanding the Power of Reaching Out to God. By Wojciech Giertych, O.P. and Considerations of the Essence of Man / Rozwaania o Istocie Człowieka. By Karol Wojtyła
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48. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Peter N. Bwanali, S.J. The Duplicity of Philosophy’s Shadow: Heidegger, Nazism, and the Jewish Other. By Elliot R. Wolfson
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49. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Jon K. Burmeister The Actual and the Rational: Hegel and Objective Spirit. By Jean-François Kervégan, translated by Daniela Ginsburg and Martin Shuster
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50. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Books Received
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51. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
About Our Contributors
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articles
52. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Ilaria Acquaviva Francisco Suárez on Metaphysics of Modality: An Actualist and Essentialist View on Real Possible Beings
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In this paper I explore modal metaphysics in regard to Francisco Suárez’s idea of real being (ens inquantum ens reale), in order to track down an early model of the relationship between synchronical alternative states of affairs and the temporal frequency paradigm. In doing so this article will offer an interpretation of Suárez’s doctrine of eternal truths as found in Disputationes Metaphysicae d. 31, c. 12, § 38–§ 47. I argue that Suárez’s modal theory of real possibilities and logical (im)possibilities should be regarded as an actualist and essentialist form of modalism.
53. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Jessy Jordan Natural Normativity and the Authority-of-Nature Challenge
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Proponents of natural normativity maintain that the moral evaluation of human beings shares a certain common conceptual pattern with the evaluation of other living things. The adequacy of this analogy has been challenged, with opponents arguing that because humans are rational, there is a gap between what is natural and what is normative for humans. Rational creatures, the argument goes, are importantly different from non-rational living things in that reason includes the ability to step back from what is natural and ask whether it is good that our nature is constituted as it is. Micah Lott has attempted a response to this challenge. After evaluating his proposal, I offer a reply that attempts to resolve an important dilemma, namely, that the naturalist either lacks a satisfying response to the authority-of-nature challenge or is forced to abandon naturalism.
54. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Dariusz Sagan The Nature of Design Inference and the Epistemic Status of Intelligent Design
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This article considers the main methodological objections against the theory of intelligent design. In general, they claim that it lacks a scientific character and they emphasize that design cannot be detected using scientific tools. The critics focus on showing that intelligent design violates various methodological criteria. In response to these objections, this article examines the methodological claim made by its proponents that the characteristic effects of the designer’s activity do provide a sufficient basis for inferring design. This paper also argues that the procedure of inferring that a certain feature has been designed by a supernatural being does not differ in principle from design-detection procedures in other spheres of research.
55. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
James Dominic Rooney, O.P. Grounding Relations Are Not Unified: Aquinas and Heil versus Schaffer
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Jonathan Schaffer, among others, has argued that metaphysics should deal primarily with relations of “grounding.” I will follow John Heil in arguing that this view of metaphysics is problematic, for it draws on ambiguous notions of grounding and fundamentality that are unilluminating as metaphysical explanations. I take Heil’s objections to presuppose that “grounding” relations do not form a natural class, where a natural class is one where some member of that class has (analytic or contingent a posteriori) priority among others and explains order among other members in the class. To strengthen Heil’s criticism that “grounding” is a non-natural class of relations, I will draw on an unlikely ally. Thomas Aquinas’s “analogy of being” doctrine, if accurate, offers reasons that no categorical relations (like grounding relations) form a natural class.
56. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
William M. Webb Petitionary Prayer for the Dead and the Boethian Concept of a Timeless God
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The practice of prayer for the dead has been criticized by some Christians on the grounds that it is useless (on the assumption that a postmortem change in spiritual state is impossible) and even sinful inasmuch as it wills a state of affairs contrary to that which God has already ordained. In this article, I challenge these arguments using a Boethian or Augustinian conception of God’s relationship to time. If prayers from all times are perceived by God in a tenseless present, I argue that prayer for the dead becomes no more problematic than petitionary prayer about the future.
contemporary currents
57. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Jeremy D. Wilkins Lonergan’s Isomorphism of Knowing and Being: A Reply to Gaven Kerr
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Gaven Kerr argues that Lonergan is a metaphysical realist but follows an inherently idealist method. Furthermore, Kerr claims, Lonergan’s isomorphism of cognitional and ontological elements does not hold, because ontological act is not parallel to cognitional judgment. In so arguing, however, Kerr conflates ontological act with efficient causality, misunderstands the nature of the parallel asserted by Lonergan’s isomorphism, and involves himself in a priori speculation about the implications of Lonergan’s method. An efficient cause is an extrinsic principle, whereas “act” names an intrinsic constituent of contingent being. The parallel between ontological and cognitional composition, moreover, and the isomorphism of ontological and cognitional elements, are subtler than Kerr appreciates. The suspicion, finally, that Lonergan’s method is somehow inherently idealist is idle and not borne out by the facts.
58. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Gaven Kerr A Response to Wilkins
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In my paper, ‘Lonergan, Aquinas, and the Isomorphism between Intellect and Reality’ I argued that Lonergan’s notion of the isomorphism between judgement and being cannot be correct if the being involved is Thomist esse. In his paper Wilkins criticises me for this and he disagrees with a number of my conclusions. In this response I engage with Wilkins’s criticism and defend my original position.
book reviews
59. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Silvia Carli Perception in Aristotle’s Ethics. By Eve Rabinoff
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60. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. Hippocrates’ Oath and Asclepius’ Snake: The Birth of the Medical Profession. By T. A. Cavanaugh
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