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Displaying: 41-51 of 51 documents


articles
41. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 1
Wojciech P. Grygiel Multiverse, M-theory, and God the Creator
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From a physical point of view, the no-boundary Hartle-Hawking model put forward in 1983 was an attempt to demonstrate that the incorporation of quantum effects into the general theory of relativity would solve the problem of singularities that make the theory of relativity incomplete. This was achieved by imposing the so called “no-boundary conditions” whereby the Universe could emerge with non-zero probability from a non-existing state. Stephen Hawking quickly turned this result into a metaphysical claim that physical laws explained away the necessity of the Divine intervention at the origin of the Universe. This paper offers an inquiry into the line of arguments presented by Hawking and Mlodinow in their book The Grand Design and supported with the claim that the yet unknown versionof the superstring theory, the M-theory, is an ultimate theory of the Universe. The upshot of the paper is that although the argument in the Grand Design relies on the newer achievements of physics embedded in the controversial multi-verse setting, it does not escape the question of the origin of the most general laws of physics that bring the Universe into existence.
42. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 1
Anders Kraal Is the Existence of the Best Possible World Logically Impossible?
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Since the 1960s an increasing number of philosophers have endorsed the thesis that there can be no such thing as “the best possible world.” In this paper I examine the main arguments for this thesis as put forth by George Schlesinger, Alvin Plantinga, Bruce Reichenbach, Peter Forrest, and Richard Swinburne. I argue that none of these arguments succeed in establishing the thesis and that the logical possibility of the best possible world is as yet an open question.
43. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 1
Mathew Lu Aristotle on Abortion and Infanticide
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Some recent commentators have thought that, if updated with the findings of modern embryology, Aristotle’s views on abortion would yield a pro-life conclusion. On the basis of a careful reading of the relevant passage from Politics VII, I argue that the matter is more complicated than simply replacing his defective empirical embryological claims with our more accurate ones. Since Aristotle’s view on abortion was shaped not only by a defective embryology but also by an acceptance of the classical Greek practice of exposure/ infanticide, substituting a more accurate embryology will not straightforwardly generate a strongly pro-life conclusion. In the end, this analysis reveals how different Aristotle’s ethical thought on this matter really is from the contemporary discussion of abortion.
44. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 1
John Zeis A Rawlsian Pro-Life Argument against Vegetarianism
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Animal rights and vegetarianism for ethical reasons are positions gaining in influence in contemporary American culture. Although I think that certain rights for animals are consistent with and even entailed by the Catholic understanding of morality, vegetarianism is not. There is a plausible argument for an omnivorous diet from a Rawlsian original position. It is in direct contradiction to the Rawlsian-influenced ethical vegetarianism espoused by Mark Rowlands. Vegetarianism is not the moral high ground: ethical vegetarianism is in fact contrary to a position on animals that is fundamentally pro-life.
45. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 1
Gregory S. Moss Hegel’s Free Mechanism: The Resurrection of the Concept
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In this paper I systematically reconstruct Hegel’s concept of “free mechanism” as developed in the Science of Logic. The term “free mechanism” appears absurd since each of the terms constituting it appears mutually exclusive. I argue that we may grasp it only on (1) the assumption of self-reference and (2) via a triad of syllogisms, which altogether constitute a process of alternating middle terms. On the whole, I employ Hegel’s account of “free mechanism” to illuminate the activity of objectivity, whereby the self-determining concept resurrects itself from its dormancy in an indifferent totality.
book reviews
46. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 1
Thomas Krettek, S.J. Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian Aspirations. By Thomas E. Hill, Jr.
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47. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 1
Margaret I. Hughes Dynamic Transcendentals: Truth, Goodness, and Beauty from a Thomistic Perspective. By Alice M. Ramos
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48. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 1
Dominika Dzwonkowska The Machine Question: Critical Perspectives on AI, Robots, and Ethics. By David J. Gunkel
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49. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 1
Deva F. Kemmis Hicks Exotic Spaces in German Modernism. By Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei
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50. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 1
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. Plato’s Moral Realism: The Discovery of the Presuppositions of Ethics. By John M. Rist
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51. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 1
Books Received
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