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Displaying: 41-60 of 847 documents


41. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Darrow Schecter System and Life-world, or Systems and Systemic Environments?: Reflections on the Social and Political Theories of Habermas and Luhmann
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42. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Stefan Müller-Doohm Are There Limits to Postmetap hysical Thought?: Jürgen Habermas’ Conception of Normativity in a secularised Society
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43. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Piet Strydom The Problem of Limit Concepts in Habermas: Toward a Cognitive Approach to the Cultural Embodiment of Reason
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This essay deals with Habermas’ concept of truth in his late theoretical philosophy. Assuming his suggestive yet highly inspiring inauguration of a cognitive turn in Critical Theory, it probes his use of the notion of limit concept against the background of the tradition of thought from which it originally derives with the intention of identifying the notion’s potential for taking this promising departure further. It brings to the fore a number of issues in his late writings that reveal the presence of what may be considered the problem of limit concepts in his thought. For present purposes, these issues are located in two areas: Habermas’ revision of his long-held concept of truth and the related criticism of Peirce; and his account of the role of limit concepts like truth and warranted assertibility or rational acceptability in processes of discursive justification. The analysis finds that there is a structural deficit in his presentation that could be filled by cognitively conceived cultural structures that not only correspond to the major types of limit concepts, but also answer to his undeveloped vision of the ‘cultural embodiment of reason’.
44. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Hauke Brunkhorst Democratic Self-Determination through Anarchic, Public Will-Formation: Towards a robust theory of deliberative democracy
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Aim is a robust theory of deliberative democracy. Therefore, three theses are explained by two historical examples, the revolution of 1848 in France (Chapter I), and the new social movements that emerged in the 1960s (Chapter II). The theses are that (1) democratic will-formation is related internally to truth. The foundation and justification of all legal norms in public will-formation presupposes (2) the sublation of the liberal dualism of democracy and rights and of the idealist dualism of rationality and reality in favor of (3) a continuum of public debates, social struggles, and legislative procedures.
45. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 4
Samuel Kahn Positive Duties, Maxim Realism and the Deliberative Field
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46. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 4
Luca Forgione Kant on the Reflecting Power of Judgment and Nonconceptual Content
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47. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 4
Joby Varghese Misguided Explanation by the Application of Screening Off Via the Principle of Common Cause
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The Principle of common cause (PCC) has its significance in providing explanations of phenomena in terms of causal theories. Though the principle has its own epistemological advantages, there can be certain situations where the principle might fail. In the first part of the paper, I offer a preliminary assessment of the PCC and then I turn to make an attempt to illustrate those scenarios where the PCC might misguide us in providing explanation of phenomena in terms of common cause.
48. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 4
Petros Damianos Non Conceptual Content And Observable, In Realism Debate
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In this article, I try to present some effects of the acceptance of nonconceptual content of perception in the realism problem. After having enhancement as main the problem of discrimination observable - unobservable into the conflict of realism with the constructive empiricism, I criticize a particular aspect, that nonconceptual content of perception strengthens the realistic position. Arguing that, while the starting point of the realist position is the existence of entities of common sense, there is nothing that assures us that the world of our daily life consists of objective, specific, unambiguous entities, that is made up the deep structure of the world - as realists believes - and entities are not just "relevant" objects, which are meant only for our own biological species. These “subjective for species” entities we are obliged, as a particular species, to percept with particular perceptual organs in order to satisfy specific needs, and manage to survive ourselves in a particular environment.
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49. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 4
Nikolaos Garipidis Democracy as Popular Sovereignty
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50. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 2/3
Theodore Scaltsas Sharing a Property
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The Socratic discussion in the Hippias Major, 300-303, is not a passing comment on plural reference; it is a theory of plural subjecthood. It has escaped attention because it is a small part of a larger complex argument on the topic of which pleasures are fine. Socrates’s theory is further concealed by the fact that it is presented as an antithesis between Hippias and himself, whereas in fact, Hippias’s position becomes part of Socrates’s theory. I begin by examining Hippias’s position, and subsequently Socrates’ criticism of it. I then turn to Socrates’s further proposal, and the development of a theory of plural subjects that incorporates elements of Hippias’s position, and Socrates’s own. At the end, I address the question of the ontology of plural subjects. I argue that the key to sharing a property between subjects is not in the way that the plural terms refer to these subjects, or in any decomposition of the commonly owned property instance into parts distributed to these subjects. Rather, I follow Socrates in finding the common ownership of a property instance central to plural subjecthood, and develop an account of how this metaphysical function can be performed by the plural subjects without threatening their distinctness and plurality.
51. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 2/3
Thomas Kjeller Johansen The Seperation of the Soul from Body in Plato’s Phaedo
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The view that the soul can exist separately from the body is commonly associated with dualism. Since Plato’s Phaedo (Phd.) argues that the soul is immortal and survives the death of the body, there seems to be reason to call Plato, in that dialogue at least, a ‘dualist’. Yet, as we know, there are many kinds of dualism, so we have thereby not said very much. Let me therefore start with some distinctions. First of all, we can distinguish between two kinds of dualism which say that the soul is a different kind of substance from the body. On one version, call it ‘strong’ substance dualism, no properties of mind can also be properties of body. Mind is defined as a kind of thing that uniquely has a certain property or set of properties, say consciousness, just as body is defined by its unique properties, say spatial extension. This would seem to be Descartes’ view. On another version, call it ‘weak’ substance dualism, no essential or defining properties of mind are also properties of body. This leaves it open whether the mind and body may share some accidental or non-defining properties. Finally, there is an even weaker kind of dualism which we may call property dualism. According to this view, there are mental properties which are distinct from and irreducible to bodily properties.4 However, these mental properties may or not be properties of an underlying substance that also has bodily properties. In other words, the same thing may have both mental and bodily properties, so having mental properties is not enough to make something a different kind of substance.
52. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 2/3
Lindsay Judson Hypotheses in Plato’s Memo
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I investigate the epistemic status of the hypotheses and other premises used in Socrates’ ‘arguments from a hypothesis’ in the Meno, and of the conclusions drawn from them, and argue that, while they are taken by Socrates to fall short of knowledge, he takes them all to have a positive epistemic status, and is not committed to advancing them only tentatively.
53. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 2/3
Christos Y. Panayides Aristotle on Casual Determinism and Fatalism
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54. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 2/3
Michail Peramatzis METAPHYSICS A.7, 988b16-21: Aristotle’s Conclusion about his Predecessors on Causes
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The last six lines of Aristotle's Metaphysics A.7 draw some important conclusions about Aristotle's predecessors' (the Presocratics' and Plato's) grasp of the four types of cause. Aristotle argues that his account of his predecessors supports his conception of the four causes and his claim that in first philosophy, too, we should seek to understand our subject-matter on the basis of these four causes. I offer a detailed textual and philosophical interpretation of these lines, connect them with Aristotle's argument in Metaphysics A.1-6, and examine their metaphysical, epistemological, and methodological presuppositions.
55. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 2/3
Christof Rapp Tackling Aristotle’s Notion of the Will
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Although Aristotle’s name is regularly mentioned when it comes to the question of where the notion of the will historically derives from and although one of the most influential exponents of philosophical theories of the will, Thomas Aquinas, seems to think that he is just applying the Aristotelian theory, many historians of philosophy explicitly deny that Aristotle had a notion of the will. If we think that the notion of the will is among the notions that have been gradually developed in the history of philosophy, nothing is strange about saying that some philosophers prior to this development lacked this particular notion. However, Aristotle’s case is peculiar, because the same historians, who are reluctant to describe such a notion to Aristotle, admit that he played some role in the formation of the same notion. The line-up of more or less recent philosophers and scholars who are of the opinion that Aristotle had no notion of the will is a very remarkable one. This could almost be called a standard or default position, while the list of exponents of the opposed position, i.e. that Aristotle did have a notion or theory of the will, is much shorter.
56. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 2/3
Gerhard Seel The Puzzles of the ‘Master Argument’ and their Solutions
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57. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 2/3
David Charles Aristotle’s Nicomachean Function Argument: Some Issues
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58. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 2/3
Charles Kahn Parmenides and the Origins of Greek Philosophy
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59. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 2/3
Vassilis Karasmanis CV, 105
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60. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1
Nicholas Rescher Kant’s Platonism
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