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41. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Mikkel Gerken Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony
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42. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Tatjana Von Solodkoff, Richard Woodward Noneism, Ontology, and Fundamentality
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In the recent literature on all things metaontological, discussion of a notorious Meinongian doctrine—the thesis that some objects have no kind of being at all—has been conspicuous by its absence. And this is despite the fact that this thesis is the central element of the noneist metaphysics of Richard Routley (1980) and Graham Priest (2005). In this paper, we therefore examine the metaontological foundations of noneism, with a view to seeing exactly how the noneist's approach to ontological inquiry differs from the orthodox Quinean one. We proceed by arguing that the core anti-Quinean element in noneism has routinely been misidentified: rather than concerning Quine's thesis that to be is to be the value of a variable, the real difference is that the noneist rejects what we identify as Quine's "translate-and-deflate" methodology. In rejecting this aspect of Quinean orthodoxy, the noneist is in good company: many of those who think thatquestions of fundamentality should be the proper focus of ontological inquiry can be read as rejecting it too. Accordingly, we then examine the differences between the noneist's conception of ontology and that offered by the fundamentalist. We argue that these two anti-Quinean approaches differ in terms of their respective conceptions of the theoretical role associated with the notion of being. And the contrast that emerges between them is, in the end, an explanatory one.
43. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Oliver Rashbrook An Appearance of Succession Requires a Succession of Appearances
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A familiar slogan in the Hterature on temporal experience is that 'a succession of appearances, in and of itself, does not amount to an experience of succession'. I show that we can distinguish between a strong and a weak sense of this slogan. I diagnose the strong interpretation of the slogan as requiring the support of an assumphon I call the 'Seems Seemed' claim. I then show that commitment to this assumphon comes at a price: if we accept it, we either have to reject the extremely plausible idea that experience is as it seems, or we are forced to provide an account of temporal experience that isn't compatible with the phenomenology. I conclude by nohng that the only plausible interpretahon of the slogan is the weak interpretation, and outhne a positive account of temporal experience, according to which an appearance of succession requires a succession of appearances.
44. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Gunnar Björnsson A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments
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Skeptical worries about moral responsibility seem to be widely appreciated and deeply felt. To address these worries—if nothing else to show that they aremistaken—theories of moral responsibility need to relate to whatever concept of responsibility underlies the worries. Unfortunately, the nature of that concept hasproved hard to pin down. Not only do philosophers have conflicting intuitons; numerous recent empirical studies have suggested that both prosaic responsibilityjudgments and incompatibilist intuitions among the folk are influenced by a number of surprising factors, sometimes prompting apparently contradictory judgments. In this paper, we show how an independently motivated hypothesis about responsibility judgments provides a unified explanation of the more important results from these studies. According to this 'Explanation Hypothesis', to take an agent to be morally responsible for an event is to take a relevant motivational structure of the agent to be part of a significant explanation of the event. We argue that because of how explanatory interests and perspectives affect what we take as significant explanations, this analysis accounts for the puzzling variety of empirical results. If this is correct, the Explanation Hypothesis also provides a new way of understanding debates about moral responsibility.
45. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Justin A. Capes Mitigating Soft Compatibilism
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46. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Ryan Preston-Roedder Faith in Humanity
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47. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Jonathan Tallant Quantitative Parsimony and the Metaphysics of Time: Motivating Presentism
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In this paper I argue that presentism—the view that only present objects exist—can be motivated, at least to some degree, by virtue of the fact that it is morequantitatively parsimonious than rival views.
book symposium
48. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Theodore Sider Précis of Writing the Book of the World
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49. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Eli Hirsch The Metaphysically Best Language
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50. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Cian Dorr Reading Writing the Book of the World
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51. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Kit Fine Fundamental Truth and Fundamental Terms
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52. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Theodore Sider Replies to Dorr, Fine, and Hirsch
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53. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Recent Publications
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articles
54. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 2
Sarah Moss Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility
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55. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 2
Peter Brössel Evidential Support and Instrumental Rationality
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56. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 2
Dilip Ninan Self-Location and Other-Location
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57. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 2
Kris McDaniel Heidegger's Metaphysics of Material Beings
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58. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 2
John Divers, José Edgar González-Varela Belief in Absolute Necessity
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We outline a theory of the cognitive role of belief in absolute necessity that is normative and intended to be metaphysically neutral. We take this theory to beunique in scope since it addresses simultaneously the questions of how such belief is (properly) acquired and of how it is (properly) manifest. The acquisition andmanifestation conditions for belief in absolute necessity are given univocally, in terms of complex higher-order attitudes involving two distinct kinds of supposition(A-supposing and C-supposing). It is subsequently argued that the proposed acquisition and manifestation conditions are rationally interdependent, and that suchharmony affords explanations of connections between different facets of belief in necessity that otherwise remain mysterious.
59. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 2
Evan G. Williams Promoting Value As Such
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Without needing to commit to any specific claims about what states of affairs have most agent-neutral value, we can nevertheless predict that states of affairs which are relatively valuable are also relatively likely to occur—on the grounds that, all else equal, at least some other agents are likely to recognize the value of those states of affairs, pursue them because they are valuable, and successfully bring them about as a consequence of that pursuit. This gives us a way to promote value as such, rather than promoting it under some more tendentious description. We can predict that actions which help other people—or our own future selves—to recognize valuable states of affairs, actions which motivate them to pursue whatever states of affairs they beheve to be valuable, or actions which help them succeed at their pursuits will, all else equal, have positive consequences. So we have a pro tanto reason to take such actions, and the subjective justification of that reason is independent of other moral claims.
60. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 2
Ian Phillips Afterimages and Sensation
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