Cover of Quaestiones Disputatae
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Displaying: 41-60 of 216 documents


41. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Max Baker-Hytch Complexly Based Beliefs and the Generality Problem for Reliabilism
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42. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Donald J. Bungum Preemptionism and Epistemic Authority
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43. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Martijn Blaauw, Jeroen de Ridder The Unassertability of Contextualism
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44. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Logan Paul Gage Can Experience Fulfill the Many Roles of Evidence?
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45. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Lydia McGrew The World, the Deceiver, and The Face in the Frost
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46. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Timothy McGrew Fine-Tuning and the Search for an Archimedean Point
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47. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Tyler Dalton McNabb Proper Functionalism and the Metalevel: A Friendly Reply to Timothy and Lydia McGrew
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48. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Calum Miller Defeating Objections to Bayesianism by Adopting a Proximal Facts Approach
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49. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Joshue Orozco The Myth of a Pure Virtue Epistemology
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50. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Patrick Toner Editor’s Introduction
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51. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
M. T. Lu The Philosophical Foundations of Distributism: Catholic Social Teaching and the Principle of Subsidiarity
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52. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
John J. Davenport Four Moral Grounds for the Wide Distribution of Capital Endowment Goods
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53. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Charles Taliaferro The Philosophically Peculiar Members of a Distributist Culture: An Essay in Chestertonian Platonism
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54. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
J. Cuddeback Technology as a Threat to Ordinary Human Life in Households Today
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55. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Patrick Toner Is Distributism Agrarian?
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56. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Chris Tollefsen Distributism and Natural Law
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57. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Charles Joshua Horn Leibniz’s Ripples: The Continuing Relevance of the Last Great Polymath
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58. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Christopher P. Noble On Analogies in Leibniz’s Philosophy: Scientific Discovery and the Case of the “Spiritual Automaton"
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This paper analyzes Leibniz’s use of analogies in both natural philosophical and metaphysical contexts. Through an examination of Leibniz’s notes on scientific methodology, I show that Leibniz explicitly recognizes the utility of analogies as heuristic tools that aid us in conceiving unfamiliar theoretical domains. I further argue that Leibniz uses the notion of a self-moving machine or automaton to help capture the activities of the immaterial soul. My account helps resist the conventional image of Leibniz as an arch-rationalist unconcerned with methods of empirical discovery and contributes to ongoing discussions on the nature of immaterial substance and mind in Leibniz.
59. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Stephen Napier “Because I Said So!”: Leibniz on Moral Knowledge via Testimony
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Most philosophers will grant that on some issues and in some circumstances, we can acquire knowledge from another. But when it comes to moral knowledge, the presumption is on the side of autonomy; we must not rely on others for our moral beliefs. I argue here for the surprising thesis that in some circumstances we must rely on others in order to acquire moral knowledge. I believe that this, or something trivially different, is a position that Leibniz would hold. When woven together, his comments on teaching, authority, errors of conscience, and testimony provide concrescent support for this surprising thesis.
60. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Saša Stanković “Contingency, Imperfection and Evil”: Leibniz’s Conception of Freedom
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Leibniz argues in the Theodicy that three conditions must be satisfied for a human being to be free. These are intelligence, spontaneity and contingency. While both intelligence and spontaneity present their own unique issues, the condition of contingency constitutes the most difficult problem in Leibniz’s metaphysical corpus. In this paper, I focus on this problem. I argue that Leibniz offers a successful account of contingency. First, I explain what Leibniz means by contingency in the context of his discussion of freedom. Second, I argue that the standard interpretation of the problem of contingency, the theory of internal possibility, is unsuccessful. Third, I offer an original interpretation of contingency in terms of Leibniz’s ideas about simple imperfection and original limitation of all creatures. Finally, I demonstrate that Leibniz relies on the latter notion of contingency in his understanding of moral agency.