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Displaying: 41-60 of 1540 documents


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41. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Andrew Burnside Critical Commodities: Adorno on Beethoven and Jazz
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This paper is a critique of Adorno’s ideas concerning jazz from his own perspective. I approach the topic from a dialectical standpoint, accounting for the historical development of jazz in the African-American context while trying to understand why Adorno found nothing of the genre redeemable; he scorned jazz as an unoriginal product of the culture industry. Drawing on the work of Eric Hobsbawm and Fumi Okiji on jazz, history, and Adorno, I try to demonstrate the internal contradiction of Adorno’s dislike of jazz and appraisal of Beethoven. Although Adorno’s critical tools of the culture industry, deconcentration, and his usage of Lukács’s idea of reification are indispensable, Adorno should have consistently applied the subtle distinction between two intrinsically tied but nevertheless separate entities: (1) an artwork and (2) the mode of production in which it is developed.
42. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Andrew Russo Worm-theoretic Persistence and Temporal Predication: A Reply to Johnston’s Personite Problem
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43. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Andréa Daventry Seeing Oneself as a Source of Reasons: Gaslighting, Oppression, and Autonomy
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44. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Audrey L. Anton Moral Idiots and Blameless Brutes in Aristotle’s Ethics
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Aristotle maintains that vicious people are blameworthy despite their moral ignorance, since becoming vicious was up to them (eph’ hemin) and whatever is up to us we are able to do or not do. However, one’s upbringing shapes one’s moral character. Together, these claims invite an objection I call the horrible childhood challenge. According to this objection, vicious adults who suffered horrible childhoods through which they were taught to adopt bad ends as though they were good should not be held accountable for their vice. Aristotle’s likely answer to this challenge reveals that, for Aristotle, a minimal degree of rationality is necessary for moral responsibility. I argue that, for Aristotle, a vicious agent is responsible for her vice only if 1) she is rational, which implies 2) she grasps a specific basic principle, thus consenting to become a certain kind of person through action. The thoroughly bad who satisfy both claims are moral idiots; those who do not may be blameless brutes.
commentaries
45. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Matti Eklund Reply to Hernandez and Laskowski
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46. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Kenneth G. Lucey Traditional Epistemological Concerns Defended
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47. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Abigail Pfister Aguilar Commentary on Horn: Cosmopolitan Dreaming
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48. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Deborah K. Heikes Comments on Josué Piñeiro’s “Epistemic Peerhood and Standpoint Theory: What Knowledge from the Margins tells us about Epistemic Peerhood”
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49. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
J. Harrison Lee Comments on “Aesthetic Reasons and Aesthetic Shoulds”
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50. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
E.M. Dadlez Metaphor and Misconstrual: A Defense of Tirrell’s Toxic Speech Metaphor against Shane Ralston’s Criticism
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51. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Holly Longair Conceptualizing Microagressions: Comments on Heather Stewart
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52. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
G. M. Trujillo, Jr. Un/Examined Lives: A Comment on Lamont Rogers’ “What Are Internalist and Externalist Analyses of Utopia?”
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53. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Caitlin Maples Commentary on “Utilitarian Aggregation”
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54. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Justin Bell Epicurean Philosophy, Change, and Curiosity: A Commentary on Alex Gillham’s “Epicurean Tranquility and the Pleasure of Philosophy”
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55. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Paul Carron (Im)Permissibility and Psychological Mechanisms: Comments on Samuel Kahn’s “A Problem for Frankfurt Examples”
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56. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Andrew Burnside Why Nietzsche Was So Wise: Comments on Joseph Swenson
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57. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Emily McGill Commentary on Rich Eva’s “Religious Liberty and the Alleged Afterlife”
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58. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Richard R. Eva Commentary on “Why Moral Rights of Free Expression for Business Corporations Cannot Be Justified”
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59. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Sarah DiMaggio Probabilistic Reasons, Belief, and the Presumption of Objective Purport: Comments on Tanner Hammond
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60. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Lucy Alsip Vollbrecht Commentary on Jack Warman’s “Reflections on Intellectual Grandstanding”
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