In his writing, “Xiaoyaoyou” (逍遙遊), Zhuangzi uses parables to express his profound and innermost spiritual world. His artistic conception and approach inspire ongoing research by subsequent generations. Fang Yizhi analyzes numerous ancient and modern interpretations of Zhuangzi’s piece, applies Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist thinking, and uses his unique writing method to interpret the rich content in Zhuangzi’s writing.In the present article, important concepts of Fang Yizhi’s interpretation are analyzed from three different angles. First, regarding Zhuangzi’s argument of “the distinction between micro and macro” (小大之辨), Fang Yizhi intends to eliminate this persistent polarized view by emphasizing that micro and macro are indistinguishable. Second, Fang Yizhi uses the conflict between the concepts of “existence” (有) and “nonexistence” (無) to illustrate the relationship between mutual negation and mutual confirmation. He also advocates that if we “are not biased by or do not insist on either existence or nonexistence” and “do not break away from the confronting phenomena of existence andnonexistence”, then we shall be at ease in our real life. Third, Fang Yizhi applies Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism to illustrate the approach and structure of Xiaoyaoyou. This is precisely the reflection of his own life experiences. Through the analysis of the present article, one can understand the interpretation methods and theoretical basis Fang Yizhi advocates to remove any polarized view in order to obtain freedom of the soul.

According to Zhuangzi, the meaning of Yang-Sheng is all about life-cultivation. This can be seen from the fact that it is one of Yang-Sheng’s requirements to keep good company with one’s parents. The story of Cook Ding, as presented in the book by Zhuangzi, is meant to provide an insight into the importance of technê in life. To put it briefly, technê is important not because it can bring about flow experience, but because it can reveal the world as one in which one can wander about and be playful with valuable things in multiple dimensions. Thus, it is a necessary condition for anyone who wants to cultivate the meaning of life to be able to master at least some skills, especially the ones involved in keeping good company with one’s parents. As a consequence, Zhuangzi is quite successful at giving a daoist twist to filial obedience, though he confineshimself not to pursue further ethical and/or political theorizations.

本文試圖替François Recanati 回應以Emma Borg 為主的兩面向批評，而 得以闡明並辯護其所主張的可及原則：其一面向是關於可及原則所預設的 「直覺內容」與「意識到」兩概念，其二面向是關於是否滿足可及原則會使 的語意理論無法滿足語言的規範性與組構性。我將引導此爭論至問題核心 ─即語意內容的承載者─重新審視何以一般咸認為語句本身有其客觀、不受脈絡影響而改變的語意內容，並論證若我們顧及意義的經驗基礎，則可及原則是恰當的。

「酵素模型」指的是借用生物學中酵素催化機制的概念，來說明認知科 學中「大量模組假說」在計算與功能層次上有關資訊處理與分配之模型。酵 素模型的最大優點在於回應了「訊號配置」與「整體計算」兩難題，從而替 大量模組假說提供有利的辯護基礎。但本文之目的，在論證酵素模型的這兩 個回應並不成立。一方面，酵素模型在避免訊號配置的無限後退時會產生新 的困難。另一方面，要說明整體計算至少得滿足兩個必要條件：一是跨模組 的訊號交換是可能的、二在於模組能夠不只是針對輸入訊號的語法結構來處 理訊號。本文將論證酵素模型頂多說明如何滿足第一個必要條件，而沒有釐 清第二個必要條件如何在該模型中實現。換言之，酵素模型對兩難題的回應 不成立。因此，酵素模型無法用以支持大量模組假說。

In order to understand the content and significance of Zhan Zai’ thought, commentarial works on the Zhengmeng during the Ming and Qing period areindispensable because these works present detailed explications on every conceptual terms. Compared to those commentarial works on the Zhang Zai’s thought by Gao Panlong and Wang Fuzhi who have been regarded as rather creative thinkers, other commentarial works during the Qing period have not drawn sufficient scholarly attention. Bearing this in mind, this article aims to explore the two topics: Firstly, it analyzes Li Guangdi’s interpretation on Zhang Zai’s idea of “deification” through Li’s Commentary of the Zhengmeng. And secondly, it also traces Wang Zhi’s elucidation of the concept of “Ultimate Voidness” (Taixu) in his commentarial work, the Basic Meanings of the Zhengmeng, as well as Wang’s correction of initial mistakes in aforementioned Li Guangdi’s commentary.The discussion of this article consists of the following four sub-topics: (1) Wang Zhi’s exposition of three aspects in the concept of “Ultimate Voidness”; (2) Li Guangdi’s interpretation of the term “Ultimate Voidness” and Wang Zhi’s repudiation against it; (3) Li’s argument that the ontological significance of the concept of “Ulitmate Voidness” should be dissolved, and that Zhang Zai’s idea of deification of continuity between vital breath and voidness should be understood by the dualistic framework between principle and vital breath; and (4) Highlighting of Wang’s insight and Li’s limitation of his conception of deification by means of our analysis of the three aspects in the concept of “Ultimate Voidness.”

人是如何獲得「理解」？德性知識論的代表人物Linda Zagzebski 長久 來宣稱「理解的獲得來自於對技藝的掌握」。在本文中，作者闡釋Zagzebski 的宣稱，並指出這宣稱的問題。透過對Zagzebski 之宣稱的批判性檢視，作 者在文後提供另一修改自Zagzebski 的理解獲得觀點。

This paper aims to dissolve Rott’s counterexamples in terms of default logic proposed by Reiter in 1980. In his counterexample, Rott pointed out that some fundamental principles in AGM theory which meet the property of monotonicity are implausible because it seems unable to handle the processes of nonmonotonic reasoning which are common in our ordinary reasoning. In contrast to classical logic, AGM theory indeed developed a prominent way to deal with belief change, whereas many philosophers still casted doubts on the fundamental principles in AGM theory. For example, there might be some sentences in one’s belief set which are of the same form but different in information value and AGM theory does not commit it. Nevertheless, Rott failed to suggest a plausible way to fix the defect of AGM theory, so I aim to propose a suitable way to dissolve the problem of the processes of nonmontonic reasoning in virtue of the association of AGM theory with default logic.

本文從跨領域的角度探討視覺的根本性質，並以Tyler Burge 的「知覺 的反個體主義」（perceptual anti-individualism）為研究對象。根據這一理論，知覺狀態的本質乃是由知覺者與外在環境的互動關係而定。Burge 提出論證 主張：視覺科學（vision science）預設了這個理論。本文反對這個觀點，並 企圖從三方面來論證：「知覺的反個體主義」不是我們理解視覺的唯一理論 選項。首先，我討論「體內恆定」（homeostasis）的概念，並指出這概念會 使我們對Burge 理論中的「知覺規範」（perceptual norms）產生質疑。第二，我以論證指出：許多視覺科學所研究的現象，可以不必預設Burge 理論中的 「正確性」（veridicality）和「單一表徵」（singular representation）也能得到解釋。第三，我討論一些有關視覺的科學理論並論證：許多視覺科學領域中 的看法其實不支持Burge 的理論。本文的結論是：「知覺的反個體主義」並 不是瞭解視覺本質唯一可選的理論架構。

The concept of oikeiōsis is the characteristic of Stoic ethics. The ontological foundation of the oikeiōsis is based on its pantheistic material monism. Thecosmos is constituted by god (gods), humans and natural world as a complete divine substance. The whole cosmos is controlled and directed by the divinelogos. For the stoics, matter is the only true reality. Man is joined by soul and body as a structured wholistic self. The oikeiōsis is in developing processes.Living in accordance with nature and making all those belong to oneself as one’s own is the first stage of oikeiōsis at the moment of the birth of all the animals,including humans. At this stage animals attain their oikeiōsis by their instincts. At the beginning of its birth, a baby lives in agreement with its nature just as theway animals do. When it grows up, as its reason develops, living in accordance with nature turns out to be living in accordance with reason. The second stage ofoikeiōsis is then to attain summum bonum, leading a virtuous life, since man as rational being is capable of recognizing what his constitution is. Because allmen possess the same reason and belong to the same human family, oikeiōsis by nature has social dimension. At the third stage, a man should take intoaccount of his fellow’s well-being as his own oikeiōsis. A man should love the others as he loves himself.This paper tries to argue why the Stoics’ oikeiōsis concept based on its pantheistic material monism. The reason is its objection to any forms of dualism, especially the Platonic dualism; the dualistic opposition between the immaterial and material worlds, that of the psyche and body, and even that of rational and irrational. The Stoics’ oikeiōsis is not only based on its idea of the wholistic cosmos, but also found on that of the structured wholistic self; i.e. the psychophysical whole and the relations between a human being with itself, with the others, and with the natural world. This kind of wholistic ideas of the cosmos and of humans are what Plato denied.

Most contemporary philosophers believe that things in the world can be exhaustively and exclusively divided into two categories: abstract objects and concrete ones, and a main “problem” about this division is where exactly the line between these two categories should be drawn? Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (2003) argued that every ordinary distinction between these two categories was subject to some serious problems and counterexamples, and they therefore proposed a novel distinction that they believed to be completely unproblematic. This paper argues against their proposal by appealing to the same strategy and criterion that they set up for other proposals. This paper also argues for two other points. First, it argues that the fundamental reason why it is so hard (even impossible) to find “the right” distinction between abstract and concrete objects is that philosophers’ “intuition” about the distinction is nothing but the result of conflation and confusion of several non-equivalent and/or vague distinctions. Second, it argues that the problem of the distinction between abstract and concrete objects is of no philosophical significance; it is, therefore, a pseudo problem that need not be investigated at all.

Peirce and James have been regarded as co-founders of pragmatism, but their pragmatisms differ significantly. This paper examines and compares, onthe basis of the distinction between the levels of community and individual inquiry, Peirce’s early and James’s pragmatic views of truth, reality, and methodof inquiry; and points out that Peirce argues that these three notions could be satisfactorily explicated only on the level of community inquiry, whereas Jamesinsists on characterizing them on the level of individual inquiry─this can explain why James’s pragmatic view of truth has suffered severe objections and misunderstandings.

I will focus upon the arguments of Wang Yang Ming’s theory of “Zhi Hsin He Yi”(知行合一) in this paper. Concerning this issue, scholars have proposed various interpretations, pondering whether “Yi Nian Fa Dong Chu” (一念發動處) is applicable to “Zhi Hsin He Yi.” For instance, Chen Lai accentuates “Chong Hsin” (重行) and argues that “Yi Nian Fa Dong Chu” is not applicable to “Zhi Hang He Yi.” Besides Li Ming Hui suggests that “Yi Nian”(意念) is also an “act” in “Zhi Hsin He Yi” so as to solve the entanglement. Inspired by these researches, I intend to analyze the intricate relationship between “Zhi Hang He Yi” and “Yi Nian.” Furthermore, I will reevaluate whether “Shan Nian”(善念) and “Er Nian”(惡念) can be categorized as an “act” in Wang Yang Ming’s theoretical framework. Finally, I attempt toassimilate the arguments proposed by Chen Lai and Li Ming Hui while returning to the core principle of Wang Yang Ming’s “Zhi Hsin He Yi.”

“Kanhua Chan”, normally known as the Chan practice of huatou, is a famous method in the Chinese Chan tradition, while “non-abiding” is a fundamental thought in the Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch. Based on the Chan method of huatou taught by Master Sheng Yen, this thesis tries to investigate whether there is consistence between the Chan practice of huatou and the thought of “non-abiding”, so as to put forward some critical comments on the Chan method of huatou. This thesis points out that the Chan practice of huatou presupposes the thought of Lankavatara Sutra that deluded thoughts can and should be eliminatedcompletely, rather than the thought as expressed by Huineng the Sixth Patriarch in the Platform Sutra that deluded thoughts need not be eliminated and thatone should not give rise to the thought of eliminating them completely. In other words, what is consistent with the Chan practice of huatou is the thoughtof ever-abiding mind of tathagata-garbha that advocates “the complete elimination of deluded thoughts,” rather than the prajna thought of non-abiding that advocates “non-abiding from one thought-moment to another,” so it is a method that follows the Chan principle of Northern School, rather than that of Southern School.Precisely speaking, therefore, the Chan method of huatou is, judged by the characteristics of its method, a Chan approach pertaining to the Northern School, not the Southern School. Although it is also one of the expedient Dharma methods for achieving liberation and buddhahood, it is, from the perspective of Huineng’s Chan teaching, not a method of practice that can truly help people pacify their mind ultimately, unless one adopts the manner Master Sheng Yen used in teaching the Chan practice of huatou, a manner that, based on some concepts derived from the prajna sutras and the Platform Sutra, strictly adheres to the thought of “non-abiding,” guiding it to the method of Chan practice that can ultimately bring about the effect of pacifying the mind.

This paper tries to elucidate what Nietzsche’s view of history and his thesis about the relationship between history and life would be in his essay On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for the Life. It is above all to explain how Nietzsche criticizes the teleology of history and the methodology of historiography in this article: Nietzsche claims that there would be no ultimate destination of human activities and the history itself, and that historical writing could not fulfill the objective standard. In another words, the historical writing which runs after the goal of objectivity would, as purely theoretical knowledge, become an obstacle of human life and action, and would then wither and ossify the human life. Historical knowledge and memory would be, in the sight of Nietzsche, a stone of stumbling to autonomous creativity and practice of human life. By this Nietzsche demonstrates the characteristics of human individual life: Neither can life be eternal and immortal, nor would it even be a substantial being; at the same time, it would not necessarily be rational, moral and just. Life is mortal and is a perpetually changing and unfathomable phenomenon. By analyzing the attitude toward history and historical writing, Nietzsche lays the emphasis that life would have to realize itself and surpass itself by the autonomous determination, action and practice.

This paper focuses on two famous debates concerning “humaneness” between Zhu Xi and the Hu Xiang scholars. Based on the survey of literature, this paper tries to justify, at least partly, what Zhu Xi comprehends about the philosophical position of Hu Xiang School. According to Zhu Xi’s philosophy, “humaneness” specifically labels the complete virtue of mind which exemplifies excellent qualities. On the one hand, Zhu Xi objects to the claim of those Hu Xiang scholars that“humaneness” can be defined as “vivid perception”; on the other hand, he argued that perception is by nature attributed to the intellectual virtue, although the humane person certainly possesses the competence of perception. As a matter of fact, the key point of the two debates between Zhu Xi and the Hu Xiang scholars is how to treat Hsieh Liang-Tso’s interpretation of humaneness.Furthermore, this paper argues that Cheng Hao, Hsieh’s teacher, illustrated distinctively the concept of humaneness in his own analogical or metaphorical way, but Hsieh’s formulation of it is akin to definition of a certain kind. This missed link or the rhetorical nuance is the reason why the Hu Xiang scholars follow Hsieh’s approach to humaneness and Zhu Xi has to argue against their ideas of humaneness.

It is said that Hegel’s method is dialectic, while the dialectical method is said to be the form of ‘thesis-antithesis-synthesis’. This paper argues that both these sayings are legends which lack support from the text. It then studies the text of Phenomenology of Spirit and advocates that what Hegel talks about in his work is the method of phenomenology. It also surveys and criticizes the other interpretations. As for dialectic, this paper proposes in accordance with the text to ascribe it to Hegel’s metaphysics rather than his method.

Rosenberg (2006) argues for reductionism in biology, and he has a special name for the position he adopts: Darwinian Reductionism (DR). The reason why it is dubbed Darwinian is that natural selection plays a key role in answering questions as to what form reductionism should take and what is the lowest level that biological explanations can be reduced to. Given that most contemporary philosophers of biology are anti-reductionists, Rosenberg begins his argument with a diagnosis of why they have been led to embrace the antireductionism: (1) the inapplicability of Nagelian account of reduction to biological sciences; (2) Mayr’s distinction between proximate and ultimate explanations; and (3) the literal truth of Dobzhansky’s dictum that nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution. In this paper, I will critically examine Rosenberg’s DR. I will begin with an analysis of how Rosenberg responds to the anti-reductionists’ considerations, and how he is led step by step to DR. Then I will argue that an internal intension is implicit in DR, for it turns out to be not only Darwinian, but also Nagelian. Such an intension, as I will argue, brings some troubles to DR: (1) DR has difficulties convincing biologists who agree with Mayr that biology, as a discipline, is unique and autonomous. (2) DR is forced to abandon the ideal unification of all physical sciences, based on the Nagelian account of reductionism. In addition, DR has difficulties explaining why the principle of natural selection, among all laws in the physical sciences, turns out to be the only one law in its kind. (3) Ironically and to Rosenberg’s surprise, DR has difficulties rendering the principle of natural selection compatible with the physicalism. The critical examination of DR leads me to the conclusion: if we aim to figure out how explanation and reduction in biology proceed, instead of confining ourselves to the law-based account, which is modeled on the physical sciences, we should pay more attention to how biology is distinct from the physical sciences.

At the first glance, Mou Zongsan's and Heidegger’s interpretations of Kant seem to be irrelevant to each other. The former focuses on “intellectual intuition” while the latter on “imagination”. In fact, the nexus between them may be more complicated. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger suggests that the essence of cognition in general is intuition and the receptivity of sensible intuition is the root of human finitude. We can conclude his thought into the following theses: (1) Human beings have only sensible intuition; (2) Human beings are finite. In his Zhi de zhijue yu Zhongguo zhewue, Mou translates §16 and §25 of Kantbook and he claims the following theses in contrast to Heidegger: (1) Human beings can have intellectual intuition; (2) Human beings are finite and yet they can be infinite. Mou is determined to go beyond the line delimited by Heidegger. Therefore, Mou thinks that human beings should have “intellectual intuition” and thus they are able to create “thing-in-itself”. In this paper, I try to argue that Mou’s doctrine is not a reformulation of Kant’s philosophy, but an illustration of a relation between “heart-mind” and “thing”: Heart-mind is an ability to bestow value on other things.Despite Mou’s doctrine is not as radical as we may think, we can still consider that he exaggerates the status of human beings. Mou puts his ontology out of time and he regards an infinite noumenon as the ground of his ontology. In Heidegger’s opinion, this is doomed to failure. In Kantbook, Heidegger highlights the concept of imagination in order to show that human beings are both sensible and intellectual. Any concept is worth to be cognized only if it goes through a procedure by imagination─schematized─and then they have spatial-temporal elements. In this sense, there is not a separation between understanding and sensibility, spontaneity and receptivity. All in all, human capacity to reason cannot separated from finitude. Under Heidegger’s challenge, Mou’s radical claim on “infinite heart-mind” seems not possible to stand firm.

本論文試圖論證：殊性存有論並不需要將殊性之間的相似關係作為其存 有論的原初設定。論證主要依據所謂的「位元原則」。但這不表示「相似」 是一個沒有意義的概念。本論文建議，在形上學裡，「相似」可以化約到介 於兩個一階內存關係之間的二階內存關係，例如「大於」、「重於」；本論文 並且倡議相似現象應該訴求知識論或心理學的解釋。

This paper, taking ideas from history of philosophy, reflects on Wang, Yang-Ming’s criticisms of Chu, Xi. The reflection indicates that these critical ideas are all derived directly from Wang’s interpretation of Dah Xue (The Great Learning). Taking the perspective that nearly all Wang’s works are based on criticizing Chu’s theory, we can say however that Wang is deeply influenced by Chu. Actually, their difference is not that explicit as seen from the generally held distinction in history of philosophy between Cheng and Chu about Li (principle) school on the one hand and Lu and Wang about Xing (principle) school on the other. In fact, according to Wang’s criticisms which concentratedthe limits of Chu’s theory of Kung Fu, we see clearly that the problem originated from Wang’s confusion of Chu’s theory of Kung Fu with Chu’s personal ability of Kung Fu. Moreover, on the Kung Fu theoretical level, Wang’s criticisms confused Chu’s theory of Kung Fu procedure and ontology with pure Kung Fu theory. Consequently this confusion caused the lost of accuracy. Besides, there were other problems relating to criticism based on different interpretations of Pre-Qing Dynasty texts and various views on deviating editions of Dah Xue. This paper however holds the view that these differences caused by referring to ancient texts can be attributed to their differences concerning their attitudes towards the fundamental philosophical problems. It is on this view that this paper argues that the difference between Wang and Chu can be resolved by elaborating their differing problematics.