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Displaying: 61-80 of 269 documents


articles
61. Balkan Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Claudiu Baciu The A priori as Bridge Between Kant’s Theoretical and Practical Philosophy
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Kant’s philosophy revolves around the concept of a priori, a term meaning not only that something happens before any experience, but that some cognitions of ours are necessary and universal. His fundamental question was in his first Critique of how synthetic a priori judgments are possible. The a priori also plays an essential role in the second Critique, such an important role that the idea of the categorical imperative is impossible to understand if one does not understand how the a priori is involved in Kant’s practical philosophy.
62. Balkan Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Abdullah Niksirat Hegel’s View on “Philosophy and Its Variety”: Based on the Preface of Phenomenology of Spirit
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Hegel's overall method is to offer his own theory not by rejecting rival philosophical theories, but by adapting them, or at least finding room for some of their elements in his own theory. In his view the human mind develops continuously throughout history in spite of the differences at various stages, and that the truth emerges from the whole.According to Hegel, philosophical schools not only are not mutually exclusive, but also supplement each other and indicate the progress and maturity of the human mind throughout history, with each stage becoming visible from within the previous stage.Hegel's main purpose is to propose philosophy as a science, so that philosophy is united with science instead of being a love of science (filo + sofia), because for him the philosophy in his time in the West had been indebted to science.
63. Balkan Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Milad Azarm, Mohammadreza Khaki, Sadegh Mirveisinik The Historical Evolution of the Concept of the Subject and the Contemporary Humanitarian Crisis
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It is necessary to seek out the origins of the modern world’s problems in their theoretical and intellectual infrastructures, which are based on concepts. This paper aims to study the modern crisis of identity from the viewpoint of the evolution of the Subject. The Subject is one of philosophy’s more complex concepts, and its complexity can be analyzed through its historical evolution. It has been connected with meanings such as subjectness, subjectivity, subjugation, and subjection, and each of these meanings contain a part of the Subject’s complicated definition. In addition to calling the concept of the human subject into question, this paper demonstrates that we are witnessing a rise in feelings of insecurity and meaninglessness. The paper will analyze three main concepts of the Subject, and an explanation of each with reference to history’s great philosophers.
book reviews
64. Balkan Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Rosen Lutskanov The Edinburgh Critical Edition of the Complete Works of Alfred North Whitehead
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65. Balkan Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Nonka Bogomilova The Minorities: “Let Them Speak!”
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articles
66. Balkan Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 1
Stathis Psillos World-involving Scientific Understanding
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Some philosophers argue that tying scientific understanding to explanation and truth generates a dilemma for a realist view of science: given the practice and the history of science, either we should give up the idea that understanding requires truth, or we should accept that we do not have scientific understanding. Given, we were told, that the latter horn is repugnant, we should jettison the first horn and disconnect understanding and truth. In this paper, I argue that the alleged dilemma for realism is a non-starter. We can accept both that understanding requires truth and claim that theories offer understanding. I argue that understanding and explanation in science go hand in hand, and that—for a realist at least—they should both be world-involving.
67. Balkan Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 1
Melinda Bonnie Fagan Explanation, Multiple Perspectives, and Understanding
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Science is increasingly interdisciplinary, as evidenced by empirical measures, funding initiatives, and the rise of integrative fields such as systems biology and cognitive neuroscience. In this paper, I motivate and outline an account of explanation for interdisciplinary contexts, building on recent debates about scientific perspectivism. Insights from these debates yield an inclusive list of relations between models constructed from different perspectives, which I then refine and generalize into a simple taxonomy. Within this taxonomy of relations among models, I identify the set of relations applicable to interdisciplinary contexts, discuss concepts of unification associated with each, and introduce three further constraints which furnish norms for this variety of explanation. Finally, I discuss implications of this account for a recent debate about understanding and explanation. One important consequence of my view is that explanation in interdisciplinary contexts and understanding of individual agents in those contexts are not equivalent.
68. Balkan Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 1
Sorin Bangu Is Understanding Factive?: Unificationism and the History of Science
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Factivism is the view that understanding why a natural phenomenon takes place must rest exclusively on (approximate) truths. One of the arguments for nonfactivism—the opposite view, that falsehoods can play principal roles in producing understanding—relies on our inclination to say that past, false, now superseded but still important scientific theories (such as Newtonian mechanics) do provide understanding. In this paper, my aim is to articulate what I take to be an interesting point that has yet to be discussed: the natural way in which nonfactivism fits within the unificationist account of scientific explanation. I contend that unificationism gives non-factivists a better framework to uphold their position. After I show why this is so, toward the end of the paper I will express doubts with regard to the viability of de Regt’s (2015) kind of non-factivism, based on the idea that understanding should be captured in terms of (scientific) skill.
69. Balkan Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 1
Lilia Gurova On Some Non-trivial Implications of the View that Good Explanations Increase Our Understanding of Explained Phenomena
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The central argument in this paper is the following: if we agree that one of the aims of explanation is to provide or increase understanding, and if we assess understanding on the basis of the inferences one can draw from the knowledge of the phenomenon which is understood, then the value of an explanation, i.e. its capacity to provide or increase understanding of the explained phenomenon, should be assessed on the basis of the extra-inferences which this explanation allows for. The extra-inferences which a given explanation allows for constitute its inferential content. The analysis of the explanation’s inferential content could be applied to all kinds of explanations with the aim of assessing their goodness. I show how such an analysis helps us to better understand a number of difficulties that have puzzled contemporary philosophers of explanation: the flagpole counterexample to the deductive-nomological model of explanation, the conjunction problem, the difference between good and bad circular explanations.
70. Balkan Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 1
Richard David-Rus On Understanding Through Agent-based Models
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The aim of this paper is to argue that it is more plausible to approach understanding from a special type of model—the ABS/IBMs models—as a non-explanatory form following some suggestions advanced by Lipton. I will first look to the type of explanation that some authors claimed is disclosed by these models: Weisberg’s analysis of IBMs in ecology and Grüne-Yanoff’s analysis of the Anasazi model. I argue that their analyses fail to show that these models qualify as explanatory understandings. This brings us to Strevens’ “simple view,” which claims the existence of a correct explanation behind any understanding, and his strategy of dismissing the challenges posed by non-explanatory forms. I argue that this strategy incurs damaging costs on his view. In the last part we turn to Khalifa’s critique on Lipton’s proposals and argue that it is based on an unjustified construal of Lipton’s framework. I show how Khalifa’s “argumentative strategy” fails to establish the superiority of actual understanding over possible explanation.
71. Balkan Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 1
Özlem Yılmaz Causation and Explanation in Phenotype Research
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A phenome occurs through the many pathways of the complex net of interaction between the phenome and its environment; therefore researching and understanding how it arises requires investigation into many possible causes that are in constant interaction with each other. The most comprehensive investigations in biology are the ones in which many biologists from different sub-areas—evolutionary biology, developmental biology, molecular biology, physiology, genetics, epigenetics, ecology—have collaborated. Still, biologists do not always need to collaborate or look for the most comprehensive explanations. A more standard investigation in biology occurs within a single subarea, and uses well-defined experiments with very specific conditions. This paper is about causation and related explanation in plant phenome research and its relevance to Aristotle’s Theory of Four Causes. I argue that there are causes which resemble Aristotle’s formal, material, and efficient causes in phenotype explanation and occurrence; but causes which resemble Aristotle’s final causes occur in phenotype explanation only, not in the occurrence.
72. Balkan Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 1
Joby Varghese The Principle of Common Cause and its Advantages and Limitations in Screening the Correlated Events off
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The Principle of Common Cause (PCC) puts forward the idea that events which occur simultaneously and are correlated have a prior common cause which screens off the correlation. I endorse the view that the PCC does qualify as a principle that can be used as a tool in explaining improbable coincidences. However, though there are epistemological advantages in common cause explanations of correlated events, the PCC is not impeccable. This paper offers a preliminary assessment of the PCC advocated by Reichenbach, and then attempts to illustrate three scenarios in which the principle might be inadequate in explaining correlated events. The paper also compares the Common Cause Principle and the Causal Markov Condition (CMC), and examines the advantages of CMC over the Common Cause Principle.
interview
73. Balkan Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 1
Stephan Hartmann, Stathis Psillos, Roman Frigg How Does Philosophy of Science Make a Difference in the World We Live In?: A Conversation with Stephan Hartmann, Stathis Psillos, and Roman Frigg
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book reviews
74. Balkan Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 1
Marţian Iovan A Possible Way of Relaunching Philosophical Creation in Culture and Public Life
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articles
75. Balkan Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Julian Fink Normative Lessons for the Debate on the Scope of Rational Requirements
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A significant part of the debate concerning the nature of rational requirements centers on disambiguating ordinary articulations of conditional requirements of rationality. Particular focus has been put on the question of whether conditional requirements of rationality take a wide or a narrow logical scope. However, this paper shows that this focus is misguided and harmful to the debate. I argue that concentrating on syntactic scope renders us more likely to arrive at incorrect formulations of rational requirements and to overlook questions of greater philosophical importance.
76. Balkan Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Chris Tasie Osegenwune Legacy of the Ancients: Plato on the Self
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Early traits of moral subjectivism can be gleaned from some of Plato’s dialogues with the emphasis on the “self.” The Socratic injunction “man know thyself” provided a stimulus for self-examination and self-awareness, which spring from human subjectivity. The Republic, Plato’s greatest dialogue, a magisterial masterpiece, recognized truth, value, and reality as fluctuating as they relate to the physical world. However, he gave much credence to the forms or ideas as the real reality. Plato recognized the centrality of human subjectivity—the contemplative intellect which grasps the forms—as the basis of truth, value, and intelligibility in the physical world. His accommodation of objectivity and subjectivity is an eloquent testimony to the centrality of duality not only in the everyday reality of humanity, but also in the decision making process in world affairs. For Plato, subjectivity is grounded in “theory of justice,” the recognition that communication, understanding, and co-operation are required for harmony and peaceful co-existence to subsist in the human community. Not adhering to Plato’s theory of justice, which stipulates the need for specialization of functions—i.e., one man, one job—is injustice, and does not encourage peace and stability.This paper recognizes the need to go beyond Plato’s presentation of moral objectivism as an independent realm of reality to moral subjectivity. This is the task of a philosophy that recognizes the importance of the idea of human freedom and the attainment of a stable society.
77. Balkan Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Augusto Trujillo Ontology and Ethics in Thomas Aquinas
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This article explains how Aquinas understood: a) apprehension of the first intellectual concepts: ens, verum et bonum simpliciter (Ens is understood metaphysically as composed of human nature and the act of being, ordered according to the bonum); b) establishment of the first and the second practical commandments in a genuinely human or rational person; c) ethics and natural law as essentially derived from ontology. Therefore, natural law only makes sense from a metaphysical point of view, not merely a physical or material one.
78. Balkan Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Golfo Maggini Martin Heidegger and Jan Patočka: Two Conflicting Paradigms on a Phenomenological Genealogy of Europe
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This paper explores two different, even opposite, genealogies of Europe in contemporary phenomenology by Martin Heidegger and Jan Patočka. On the one hand, the paper focuses upon Heidegger’s 1936 lecture on “Europe and German Philosophy”, which is one of his lesser-known texts. In light of this reading, the paper examines a series of key commentaries by Éliane Escoubas, Franco Volpi, Franco Chiereghin, and Reiner Schürmann. On the other hand, the later Jan Patočka’s discourse on Europe lies upon utterly different hermeneutic premisses, construing a new humanism and renewing the metaphysical tradition in the form of negative Platonism. It concludes by arguing that the major differences between Heidegger’s and Patočka’s phenomenological genealogies of Europe are, first, their different stances toward Western metaphysics and humanism, and, second, their divergent understandings of historical lifeworlds.
79. Balkan Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Constantin Stoenescu The Knowledge-Based Society and the Reverse Transition from Knowledge to Information
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The knowledge-based society developed technologies of information in order to make better use all the data it had acquired and to manage it efficiently. Computers have replaced human memory and improved other human capacities. However, these changes have had some hidden effects. Some information is processed by computers, and the epistemic subject is replaced by them. From an epistemological point of view, we cannot speak about the bits of knowledge that are stored, but only the semantic information or data which is attached. Secondly, in the case of an epistemic subject, the so-called tacit knowledge which is incorporated into skills and practical capacities becomes more important, and is externalized in new forms. Therefore, my claim is that we can speak of a paradoxical reverse transition from knowledge to information in the knowledge-based society.
80. Balkan Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Viorel Cernica The Ontology of the Judicative: An Outline of a Pre-Judicative Ontology
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In this paper, I will attempt to formulate some observations about the limits of a traditional ontology that is in its essence a judicative one. The main goal is to explore the possibility of constructing a pre-judicative ontology; in other words, to describe the cognitive and affective elements that are “under” the main ontological judgments, related naturally to being. The arguments in favor of a pre-judicative ontology offer a new perspective on judicative ontology itself. This pre-judicative ontology is nevertheless a kind of judicative ontology that covers a nonspecific realm of values. The paper has three parts: 1) a description of the main characteristics of traditional ontology from a judicative perspective; 2) the formulation of some logical conditions of possibility for a pre-judicative ontology; and 3) the outline of a pre-judicative ontology as an ontology of values.