Cover of Croatian Journal of Philosophy
Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:

Displaying: 61-80 of 684 documents

book reviews
61. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Gabriela Bašić Hanžek David Hitchcock, On Reasoning and Argument. Essays in Informal Logic and on Critical Thinking
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
62. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
David Grčki Michael E. Bratman, Planning, Time and Self-governance: Essays in Practical Rationality
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
philosophy of science
63. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
James Robert Brown Legitimate Mathematical Methods
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
A thought experiment involving an omniscient being and quantum mechanics is used to justify non-deductive methods in mathematics. The twin prime conjecture is used to illustrate what can be achieved.
64. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Jessica Carter The Effectiveness of Representations in Mathematics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article focuses on particular ways in which visual representations contribute to the development of mathematical knowledge. I give examples of diagrammatic representations that enable one to observe new properties and cases where representations contribute to classification. I propose that fruitful representations in mathematics are iconic representations that involve conventional or symbolic elements, that is, iconic metaphors. In the last part of the article, I explain what these are and how they apply in the considered examples.
65. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Marko Grba, Majda Trobok Mathematics and Physics within the Context of Justification: Induction vs. Universal Generalization
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Motivated by the analogy which holds within the context of discovery between mathematics and physics, we aim to show that there is a connection between two fields within the context of justification too. Based on the careful analysis of examples from science (especially within the domain of physics) we suggest that the logic of scientific research, which might appear as enumerative induction, is deduction, and we propose it to be universal generalization inference rule. Our main argument closely follows the analysis of the structure of physical theory proposed by theoretical physicist Eugene P. Wigner.
66. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Sahotra Sarkar Structural Realism in Biology: A (Sympathetic) Critique
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Structural realism holds that ontological commitments induced by successful scientific theories should focus on the structures rather than the objects posited by the theories. Thus structural realism goes beyond the empirical adequacy criterion of traditional (or constructive) empiricism. It also attempts to avoid the problems scientific realism faces in contexts of radical theory change accompanied by discordant shifts in posited theoretical objects. Structural realism emerged in the context of attempts to interpret developments in twentieth-century physics. In a biological context, Stanford (2006) provided pre-emptive criticism. French (2011, 2012) has since attempted to answer those criticisms and extend structural realism to the biological realm. This paper argues that, though Stanford’s criticism may be misplaced, and structural realism fares much better than traditional scientific realism in biological contexts, it remains a promissory note. The promise is based on shifting the focus of the debate from the status of biological laws to that of biological organization, an issue that remains a live debate within biology.
67. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Richard Vallée Does Sherlock Holmes Exist?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Fictional names have specific, cognitively relevant features, putting them in a category apart from the category of ordinary names. I argue that we should focus on the name or name form itself and refrain from looking for an assignment procedure and an assigned referent. I also argue that we should reject the idea that sentences containing fictional names express singular propositions. These suggestions have important consequences for the intuition that ‘Sherlock Holmes exists’ is either true or false, and they put our intuitions concerning fictional names into perspective. If Millianism is the view that names only have a referent only as their semantic value, then my proposal on fictional names is not Millian in nature.
68. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Erhan Demircioğlu Epistemic Infinitism, the Reason-Giving Game, and the Regress Skeptic
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Epistemic infinitism is one of the logically possible responses to the epistemic regress problem, claiming that the justification of a given proposition requires an infinite and non-circular structure of reasons. In this paper, I will examine the dialectic between the epistemic infinitist and the regress skeptic, the sort of skeptic that bases his attack to the possibility of justification on the regress of reasons. I aim to show that what makes epistemic infinitism appear as well-equipped to silence the regress skeptic is the very same thing that renders it susceptible to a powerful skeptical assault by the regress skeptic.
69. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Phil Maguire, Philippe Moser, Rebecca Maguire Are people smarter than machines?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Recent progress in artificial intelligence has led some to speculate that machine intelligence may soon match or surpass human intelligence. We argue that this understanding of intelligence is flawed. While physical machines are designed by humans to simulate human rule-following behaviour, the issue of whether human abilities can be emulated is not well-defined. We outline a series of obstacles that stand in the way of formalizing emulation, and show that even a simple, well-defined function cannot be decided in practice. In light of this, we suggest that the debate on intelligence should be shifted from emulation to simulation, addressing, for example, how useful machines can be at particular tasks, rather than deliberating over the nebulous concept of general intelligence.
book reviews
70. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Tamara Crnko Leif Wenar, Blood Oil: Tyrants, Violence, and the Rules that Run the World
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
71. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Vito Balorda Justin Garson, A Critical Overview of Biological Functions
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
72. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Carlo Penco, Massimiliano Vignolo Some Reflections on Conventions
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In Overlooking Conventions Michael Devitt argues in defence of the traditional approach to semantics. Devitt’s main line of argument is an inference to the best explanation: nearly all cases that linguistic pragmatists discuss in order to challenge the traditional approach to semantics are better explained by adding conventions into language, in the form of expanding the range of polysemy or the range of indexicality (in the broad sense of linguistically governed context sensitivity). In this paper, we discuss three aspects of a draft of Devitt’s Overlooking Conventions, which was discussed at a conference in Dubrovnik in September 2018. First, we try to show that his rejection of Bach’s distinction between convention and standardization overlooks important features of standardization. Second, we elaborate on Devitt’s argument against linguistic pragmatism based on the normative aspect of meaning and show that a similar argument can be mounted against semantic minimalism. While Devitt and minimalists have a common enemy, they are not allies either. Third, we address a methodological difficulty in Devitt’s view concerning a threat of over-generation and propose a solution to it. Although this paper is the result of collaboration the authors have written different parts. Carlo Penco has written part 1, Massimiliano Vignolo has written part 2 and part 3.
73. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Esther Romero, Belén Soria Overlooking Conventions: The Trouble with Devitt’s What-Is-Said
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In his forthcoming book, Overlooking Conventions: The Trouble with Linguistic Pragmatism, Michael Devitt raises, once again, the debate between minimalism and pragmatism to defend the former. He claims that, by taking some overlooked conventions into account, a semantic notion of what is said is possible. In this paper, we claim that a semantic notion of what is said is not possible, especially if some overlooked compositional conventions are considered. If, as Devitt defends, verbal activity is more linguistically constrained, compositional linguistic rules should be included in his catalogue of overlooked conventions and this entails an important challenge to the minimalist claim that the semantic view of what is said can handle all context relative phenomena. In this paper, we argue that, when conventions concerning compositionality are not overlooked, modulation should be added to the two qualifications (disambiguation and saturation) accepted by Devitt in the constitution of what is said. Thus, what is said is not always literally said and the traditional semantic view of what is said cannot be saved.
74. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Andrea Bianchi Speaker’s Reference, Semantic Reference, and the Gricean Project: Some Notes from a Non-Believer
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper, I focus on the alleged distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference. I begin by discussing Saul Kripke’s notion of speaker’s reference and the theoretical roles it is supposed to play, arguing that they do not justify the claim that reference comes in two different sorts and highlighting that Kripke’s own definition makes the notion incompatible with the nowadays widely endorsed Gricean project, which aims at explaining semantic reference in terms of speaker’s reference. I then examine an alternative account of speaker’s reference offered by Michael Devitt within his causal theory and express some doubts about its suitability for explaining proper name semantic reference. From all this, I conclude that there is at least some tension between Kripke’s chain of communication picture and the attempt to explain (Griceanly, so to say) semantic properties in terms of speakers’ mental states.
75. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Dunja Jutronić The Qua Problem and the Proposed Solutions
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
One basic idea of the causal theory of reference is reference grounding. The name is introduced ostensively at a formal or informal dubbing. The question is: By virtue of what is the grounding term grounded in the object qua-horse and not in the other natural kind whose member it is? In virtue of what does it refer to all horses and only horses? The problem is usually called the qua problem. What the qua problem suggests is that the causal historical theory in the final analysis depends on some kind of unexplained intentionality. This is a great problem since the whole project is an attempt to explain intentionality naturalistically. In this paper, I have two aims: (i) to discuss the most important attempts at solving the qua problem; and (ii) to evaluate the solutions. (i) I focus on the following attempts for the solution of the qua problem: Sterelny (1983), Richard Miller’s (1992), mentioning briefly more recent attempts by Ori Simchen (2012) and Paul Douglas (2018). I also concentrate on the attempts in mind and brain sciences as presented by Penelope Maddy (1983) and more recently by Dan Ryder (2004). (ii) In evaluating the solutions, I argue that when a metaphysical question “what is to name” is replaced/or identified with the question about the mechanism of reference, namely “in virtues of what does a word attach to a particular object”, then the final answer will/should be given by neurosemantics. The most promising attempt is Neander’s (2017), based on the teleological causal explanation of preconceptual content to which the conceptual can be developed, as Devitt and Sterelny suggested in their work (1999).
76. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Una Stojnić, Ernie Lepore Expressions and their Articulations and Applications
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The discussion that follows rehearses some familiar arguments and replies from the Kripke/Putnam/Burge critique of the traditional Frege/Russell/Wittgenstein views on names and predicates. Its main contributions are, first, to introduce a novel way of individuating tokens of the same expression, (what we call “articulations”) second, to then revise standard views on deference, (as this notion is understood to pertain to securing access to meaning for potentially ignorant, and confused agents in the externalist tradition going back to Putnam and Burge) and lastly, to emphasize the often conflated distinction between disambiguation and meaning fixing. Our line on deference is that it is not, and should not be conceived as, an intentional mental act, but rather indicates an historical chain of antecedent tokenings of the same expression.
77. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Marilynn Johnson Making Meaning Manifest
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In recent work Sperber and Wilson expand on ideas initially presented in Relevance (1986) and flesh out continuua between showing and meaning, and determinate and indeterminate content. Drawing on Sperber and Wilson’s work, and at points defending it from what I see as potential objections, I present a Schema of Communicative Acts (SCA) that includes an additional third continuum between linguistic and non-linguistic content. The SCA clears the way for consideration of what exactly is meant by showing, the motivations of speakers, how affect impacts expression, and metaphor. The SCA allows us to consider not only how but why we engage in certain forms of communicative behavior, and captures the incredible nuance of human interactions: said and meant, linguistic and non-linguistic, determinate and indeterminate.
78. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Jessica Pepp The Problem of First-Person Aboutness
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The topic of this paper is the question of in virtue of what first-person thoughts are about what they are about. I focus on a dilemma arising from this question. On the one hand, approaches to answering this question that promise to be satisfying seem doomed to be inconsistent with the seeming truism that first-person thought is always about the thinker of the thought. But on the other hand, ensuring consistency with that truism seems doomed to make any answer to the question unsatisfying. Contrary to a careful and enticing recent effort to both sharpen and escape this dilemma by Daniel Morgan, I will argue that the dilemma remains pressing both for broadly epistemic and broadly causal-acquaintance-based accounts of the aboutness of first-person thought.
79. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Pavel Gregorić Aristotle’s Perceptual Optimism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper, I would like to present Aristotle’s attitude to sense-perception. I will refer to this attitude as “perceptual optimism”. Perceptual optimism is, very briefly, the position that the senses give us full access to reality as it is. Perceptual optimism entails perceptual realism, the view that there is a reality out there which is accessible to our senses in some way or other, and the belief that our senses are veridical at least to some extent, but it is more comprehensive than that. For instance, a perceptual optimist does not admit such things as qualities which are perceptible in principle but not by us or bodies too small to be perceptible. In this paper I argue that Aristotle is a perceptual optimist, since he believes that reality, at least in the sublunary sphere, is indeed fully accessible to our senses. In the first and largest part of this paper, I will show, in seven distinct theses, what Aristotle’s perceptual optimism entails. In the second and shorter part, I will put Aristotle’s position in a wider context of his epistemology and show why it was important for him to be a perceptual optimist.
80. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Marko Delić Burge on Mental Causation
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The article discusses Tyler Burge’s views concerning the debate about the causal efficacy of mental properties, as found in his article “Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice.” Burge argues that a proper understanding of kind-individuation and causal explanation in science gives strong prima facie reasons for believing that mental and physical properties are not mutually exclusive. He does so by analysing the strength of two metaphysical theses which standardly underlie the debate—token physicalism and the “Completeness of physics.” I present his analysis and argue that without an account of mental causation, his analysis does not support the conclusion that mental and physical properties are not mutually exclusive. Also, I question the methodological adequacy of Burge’s analysis for scientific practice.