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Displaying: 61-80 of 885 documents


61. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 42
Ching Hui Su Context and Logical Consequence
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It is commonly agreed that logic studies the form of arguments and that the concept of a consequence relation is based on the idea of truth-preservation in all models. Based on some observations about arguments involving conditionals, Brogaard and Salerno argue that the consequence relation should be defined in terms of truth-preservation within one fixed context. I will argue that Ichikawa’s contextualism for counterfactuals can be treated as an elucidation of what they have in mind. Instead of standing for or against Stalnaker’s or Lewis’s semantics of counterfactuals, I will argue that the key to explaining the phenomena in question is the concept of a consequence relation. To support the point above, logical contextualism or relativism will be introduced and defended. I thus suggest that the concept of a consequence relation is sensitive to the context in which a certain argument is asserted.
62. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41 > Issue: Supplement
Robert Audi Foreword
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63. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41 > Issue: Supplement
Thomas D. Senor Introduction and Remembrance
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64. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Matthew Homan On the Alleged Exceptional Nature of Thought in Spinoza
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Since modes of the attribute of thought are ideas of the modes of all the other attributes in Spinoza, the scope of thought appears to be equal to that of all the other attributes combined. This suggests that thought is exceptional, and threatens to upset Spinoza’s doctrine of parallelism, according to which thought is just one among an infinity of attributes each expressing the divine essence in its own unique way. After providing an overview of attempts to solve the problem of thought’s scope in the literature, I outline two reasons why the problem is not the problem it has been taken to be: (1) quantitative comparisons have no place between attributes, and (2) with knowledge of only two attributes, it is impossible to speak of norms and anomalies. I also explain how my view undercuts debate about where Spinoza lies on the idealism–dualism–materialism spectrum, and refocuses attention on the identity of the order and connection of causes regardless of the attribute under consideration.
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65. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41 > Issue: Supplement
Sanford C. Goldberg Epistemic Justification Revisited
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In his Beyond Justification, Bill Alston argued that there is no single property picked out by ‘epistemic justification,’ and that instead epistemological theory should investigate the range of epistemic desiderata that beliefs may enjoy (as well as the nature of and interconnections among the various epistemic good-making properties). In this paper I argue that none of his arguments taken singly, nor the collection as a group, gives us a reason to abandon the traditional idea that there is a property of epistemic justification. I conclude by suggesting how Alston’s proposal to investigate the variety of epistemic desiderata bears on the questions at the heart of the theory of epistemic justification. Here I suggest that, despite his attempts at neutrality with respect to debates about epistemic justification, Alston might well have taken sides on one of the main issues of substance.
66. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Simon Skempton Transcendence and Non-Contradiction
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This article is an inquiry into how the relationship between the principle of non-contradiction and the limits of thought has been understood by thinkers as diverse as Hegel, Heidegger, Levinas, and Graham Priest. While Heidegger and Levinas focus on the question of temporality and Priest takes a formal approach, all these philosophers effectively maintain that the principle of non-contradiction imposes a restriction on thought that disables it from adequately accounting for its own limits and thus what lies beyond those limits, the implication being that the violation of the principle is necessary for such an accounting to take place. However, the ultimate argument here is that, contrary to Priest’s interpretation, Hegel’s philosophy can be convincingly read as supporting the idea that the mind’s ability to go beyond any particular limit of thought can actually be said to involve an adherence to a normative demand to locate and dispel the contradictions that emerge through the very setting of determinative limits. This is a non-formal consistency that evinces a “logic” that is unknowingly followed by the Heideggerian and Levinasian phenomenological philosophies of transcendence.
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67. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41 > Issue: Supplement
Daniel Howard-Snyder Two Peas in a Single Polytheistic Pod: John Hick and Richard Swinburne
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A descriptive polytheist thinks there are at least two gods. John Hick and Richard Swinburne are descriptive polytheists. In this respect, they are like Thomas Aquinas and many other theists. What sets Swinburne and Hick apart from Aquinas, however, is that unlike him they are normative polytheists. That is, Swinburne and Hick think that it is right that we, or at least some of us, worship more than one god. However, the evidence available to me shows that only Swinburne, and not Hick, is a cultic polytheist: he actually worships more than one god. I conclude that only Swinburne is a polytheist par excellence.
68. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41 > Issue: Supplement
Michael P. Lynch, Paul Silva, Jr. Why Worry about Epistemic Circularity?
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Although Alston believed epistemically circular arguments were able to justify their conclusions, he was also disquieted by them. We will argue that Alston was right to be disquieted. We explain Alston’s view of epistemic circularity, the considerations that led him to accept it, and the purposes he thought epistemically circular arguments could serve. We then build on some of Alston’s remarks and introduce further limits to the usefulness of such arguments and introduce a new problem that stems from those limits. The upshot is that adopting Alston’s view that epistemically circular arguments can be used to justify their conclusions is more costly than even he thought.
69. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Asha Bhandary Liberal Dependency Care
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Dependency care is an asymmetric good; everyone needs to receive it, but it is not the case that we all have to provide it. Despite ethicists’ of care’s theorizing about the importance of dependency care, it has yet to be theorized within a form of liberalism. This paper theorizes two components of a liberal theory of dependency care. First, it advances a liberal justification to include the receipt of dependency care among the benefits of social cooperation. Then, it advances an autonomy-based principle to guide how care should be provided (“strong proceduralism”). Strong proceduralism is based on an account of autonomy that incorporates the significance of a person’s skills when he parses options. Strong proceduralism consequently requires educational efforts to teach care-giving skills to groups who have not previously possessed them. I hypothesize that strong proceduralism will secure adequate care provision as the outcome of autonomous choice, but if an inadequate number of people choose to provide care, then a secondary stage of deliberations will be necessary. If the outcome of those secondary deliberations is that people want to have their care needs met, then a fair process for distributing infringements on autonomy must be devised.
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70. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41 > Issue: Supplement
Matthew McGrath Alston on the Epistemic Advantages of the Theory of Appearing
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William Alston claimed that epistemic considerations are relevant to theorizing about the metaphysics of perceptual experience. There must be something about the intrinsic nature of a perceptual experience that explains why it is that it justifies one in believing what it does, rather than other propositions. A metaphysical theory of experience that provides the resources for such an explanation is to be preferred over ones that do not. Alston argued that the theory of appearing gains a leg up on its rivals, particularly sense-datum theory and adverbialism, precisely on this score. This paper examines these claims, along with the further question of whether the theory of appearing fares better epistemologically than the currently popular theory of intentionalism about perceptual experience. I conclude that while Alston is correct that the theory of appearing fares better than its traditional rivals (the sense datum theory and adverbialism), it does not clearly fare better than intentionalism. I further argue that Alston ignores a number of complexities in his account of how perceptual experience, construed as states of objects appearing certain ways to subjects, justifies perceptual beliefs.
exchange: framing a decision problem
71. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Thomas A. Blackson Against Weatherson on How to Frame a Decision Problem
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In “Knowledge, Bets, and Interests,” Brian Weatherson makes a suggestion for how to frame a decision problem. He argues that “the states we can ‘leave off’ a decision table are the states that the agent knows not to obtain.” I present and defend an example that shows that Weatherson’s principle is false. Weatherson is correct to think that some intuitively rational decisions wouldn’t be rational if states the agent knows not to obtain were not omitted from the outcomes in the decision problem. This, however, is not true of every rational decision. Weatherson’s principle for how to frame a decision problem is open to counterexample.
articles
72. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41 > Issue: Supplement
Daniel J. McKaughan Action-Centered Faith, Doubt, and Rationality
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Popular discussions of faith often assume that having faith is a form of believing on insufficient evidence and that having faith is therefore in some way rationally defective. Here I offer a characterization of action-centered faith and show that action-centered faith can be both epistemically and practically rational even under a wide variety of subpar evidential circumstances.
exchange: framing a decision problem
73. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Brian Weatherson Reply to Blackson
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Thomas Blackson argues that interest-relative epistemologies cannot explain the irrationality of certain choices when the agent has three possible options. I argue that his examples only refute a subclass of interest-relative theories. In particular, they are good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the stakes involved in the gambles that she faces. But they are not good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the odds involved in the gambles that she faces. Indeed, the latter class of theories does a better job than interest-invariant epistemologies of explaining the phenomena he describes.
74. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Cristina Ionescu Due Measure and the Dialectical Method in Plato’s Statesman
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In this paper I explore the relevance of due measure for the dialectical method of division in Plato’s Statesman, and I argue that due measure is the unifying thread of the dialogue insofar as it guides the application of the dialectical method throughout the conversation. I defend this view by showing (a) that due measure accounts for the Stranger’s shift from bisective and value-neutral divisions to non-bisective divisions that identify the essence of statesmanship and situate this art hierarchically in relation to other arts needed in the polis; (b) that due measure accounts for the transition from the paradigm of the shepherd to the paradigm of the weaver, and finally (c) that due measure is also intimately related to the myth, insofar as the myth provides the metaphysical horizon in which natural joints of division and due measure itself are to be discerned.
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75. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41 > Issue: Supplement
Thomas D. Senor The Knowledge-As-Perception Account of Knowledge: A Prolegomenon
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William Alston once argued that justification is not necessary for knowledge. He was convinced of this because he thought that, in cases of clear perception, one could come to know that P even if one’s justification for believing P was defeated. The idea is that the epistemic strength of clear perception is sufficient to provide knowledge even where justification is lacking; perceiving (and believing) that P is sufficient for knowing that P. In this paper, I explore a claim about knowledge that is the opposite side of the coin from Alston’s position: clear perception (with belief) that P is necessary for knowledge. Taking my cue from John Locke, I examine the plausibility of a theory of knowledge that distinguishes justified true unGettiered belief that P from knowing that P. Although I don’t fully advocate this position, I argue that it has significant plausibility, and that the initially troubling consequences of the account are not as problematic as one might have suspected.
76. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Dionysis Christias Sellars, Meillassoux, and the Myth of the Categorial Given: A Sellarian Critique of “Correlationism” and Meilassoux’s “Speculative Realism”
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The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we examine the Sellarsian concept of the (myth of the) categorial Given, focus on its wide application and suggest that it can be applied to those post-Kantian philosophical views, currently fashionable in Continental philosophical circles, for which Quentin Meillassoux coins the term “correlationism”: the view that mind and world are “always already” given to us as essentially related to one another, and only subsequently can they be thought of as being independently existing and meaningful “entities.” Second, it is pointed out that Sellars uses an argument against the explanatory adequacy of the manifest image (an image with essential “Givenist” elements in its descriptive and explanatory dimension) that is exactly of the same form as Meillassoux’s argument against correlationism, but, which, when combined with other crucial Sellarsian views concerning the transcendental/empirical distinction, can avoid a problematic feature of Meillassoux’s argument, and, in this way, constitute a better philosophical weapon against correlationism. Finally, it is suggested that by not drawing the transcendental/empirical distinction in the right (i.e., Sellarsian) way, Meillassoux himself is exposed and, in the constructive (“speculative realist”) part of his work, indeed succumbs to a version of the myth of the categorial Given.
articles
77. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41 > Issue: Supplement
Eleonore Stump The Atonement and the Problem of Shame
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The atonement has been traditionally understood to be a solution to the problem created by the human proneness to moral wrongdoing. This problem includes both guilt and shame. Although the problem of human guilt is theologically more central to the doctrine of the atonement, the problem of shame is something that the atonement might be supposed to remedy as well if it is to be a complete antidote to the problems generated by human wrongdoing. In this paper, I discuss the difference between guilt and shame; I explore the different varieties of shame, and I suggest ways to connect the atonement to a remedy for all the kinds of shame.
78. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Reiner Schaefer Brandom’s Account of Reasoning: Nonmonotonic, But Does Not Allow Entitlement Recovery
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In most everyday instances of reasoning, reasoners can gain, lose, and reacquire entitlement to (or justification for) a possible commitment (or belief) as a result of their consecutively acquiring new commitments. For example, we might initially conclude that ‘Tweety can fly’ from ‘Tweety is a bird,’ but later have to reject this conclusion as a result of our coming to learn that Tweety is a penguin. We could, even later, reacquire entitlement to ‘Tweety can fly’ if we became committed (and presumably entitled) to the claim ‘Tweety has a jetpack.’ I will call this very common feature of reasoning entitlement recovery. In this paper I will argue that the types of inferential relations that are central to Brandom’s entire account of language and reasoning make entitlement recovery impossible. I will then briefly attempt to diagnose why this problem arises for Brandom and suggest how his account should be modified so that it will successfully allow entitlement recovery.
79. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Carl Hammer The Structure of Accountability: An Analysis Applied to Animals
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There is a growing trend toward recognizing that moral obligation is centrally grounded in accountability. This, however, may seem to offer another argument, perhaps in the footsteps of Kant, that other animals have no moral standing. Accountability seems to be grounded in some kind of authoritative demands and, as Stephen Darwall puts it, “second-personal address.” Other animals are not competent in such practices, so they may seem to be left out of the domain of obligation. I argue that demand-accountability-based obligation is consistent with robust moral standing for other animals. Our accountability could be based on demands made by the moral community at large, which would put other animals on equal footing with moral agents in terms of how obligations might apply to them. Further, I argue that the most plausible model of demand-accountability-based obligation would have such a community-centered structure and would support other animals having moral standing.
book exchange: epistemological disjunctivism
80. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 41
Duncan Pritchard Précis of Epistemological Disjunctivism
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An articulation is offered of the main themes of my book, Epistemological Disjunctivism (2012).