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Displaying: 61-80 of 412 documents


articles
61. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Marine Picon Actualism and Analyticity: Leibniz's early thoughts towards a synthesis between Lutheran metaphysics and the foundation of knowledge
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Recent scholarship has established that, until the mid-1670s, Leibniz did not hold the possibilist ontology which, in his mature philosophy, provides the foundation for both his account of human freedom and of eternal truth. Concentrating on the Mainz period (1667-1672), this paper examines the conciliation, in those early writings, of an actualist ontology and a conception of necessary truth as analytical. The first section questions the view that Leibniz was educated in a “Platonist” tradition; the second section presents the actualist metaphysics that he adopted in the wake of his teachers; the third section shows how Leibniz could, contrary to those same teachers, hold an analytical view of eternal truth, even without the support of his later possibilist ontology and doctrine of real definitions.
62. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Ohad Nachtomy, Tamar Levanon On Oneness and Substance in Leibniz’s Middle Years
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We argue in this paper that Leibniz’s characterization of a substance as “un être” in his correspondence with Arnauld stresses the per se unity of substance rather than oneness in number. We employ two central lines of reasoning. The first is a response to Mogens Lærke’s claim that one can mark the difference between Spinoza and Leibniz by observing that, while Spinoza’s notion of substance is essentially non-numerical, Leibniz’s view of substance is numerical. We argue that Leibniz, like Spinoza, qualifies the substance as “one” primarily in a non-numerical sense, where non-numerical means per se unity or qualitative uniqueness. The second line of reasoning suggests that the term “one” should be understood as a-unity-presupposed-by-multiplicity in two senses: a) externally, in the sense of being presupposed by higher complex structures, such as aggregates, and, b) internally, in the sense of having itself a complex structure. We develop an analogy along these lines between the role the notion of a fundamental unity plays in Leibniz’s view of numbers and his view of substance. In other words, we suggest that looking at the role units play in Leibniz’s view of mathematics can shed some light on the role they play in his metaphysics.
texts
63. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Oberto Marrama The dog that is a heavenly constellation and the dog that is a barking animal by Alexandre Koyré
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book reviews
64. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Philip Beeley Leibniz and Cryptography: An account on the occasion of the initial exhibition of the reconstruction of Leibniz’s cipher by Nicholas Rescher
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65. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Ohad Nachtomy Leibniz by Richard T. W. Arthur
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66. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Richard T. W. Arthur Reply to Ohad Nachtomy
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special section
67. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Patrick Riley In Honorem Irena Backus
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68. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Philip Beeley Patrick Riley (1941–2015): Some reminiscences and reflections on his life
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69. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
David Lay Williams Patrick Riley (1941-2015) In Memoriam
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70. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Wenchao Li News from the Leibniz-Gesellschaft
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71. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Recent Works on Leibniz
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72. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Acknowledgments, Subscription Information, Abbreviations
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articles
73. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 23
Richard T. W. Arthur Massimo Mugnai and the Study of Leibniz
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This essay is an appreciation of Massimo Mugnai’s many contributions to Leibniz scholarship, as well as to the history of logic and history of philosophy more generally.
74. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 23
Nicholas Rescher Leibniz and the English Language
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The only extensive study that Leibniz ever made of an English-language book, his New Essays on John Locke’s 1690 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, was based not on the English original, but on a French translation. And his correspondence with English scholars and political figures was invariably written in Latin or French. In consequence the impression is widespread among Anglophone Leibnizians that he did not know English. However, considerable evidence has come to light in recent years that Leibniz did somehow manage to acquire a capacity to handle the language in its written form.
75. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 23
Mogens Lærke, CNRS (UMR 5037) Ignorantia inflat Leibniz, Huet, and the Critique of the Cartesian Spirit
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This article explores the relations between Leibniz and the French erudite Pierre-Daniel Huet in the context of their shared anti-Cartesianism. After an introductory survey of the available commentaries and primary texts, I focus on a publication by Leibniz in the Journal des sçavans from 1693, where he fully endorses the critique of Descartes developed by Huet in his 1689 Censura philosophiae cartesianae. Next, I provide some indications as to Leibniz’s motivations behind this public approval of Huet. First, I show how Leibniz throughout the 1690s was attempting to have his 1692 Animadversiones in partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum and other anti-Cartesian items annexed to a reedition of Huet’s Censura. I finally show how these attempts to team up with Huet were prompted by Leibniz’s dislike of certain German Cartesians, in particular J. E. Schweling, and by his fear that orthodox Cartesianism might do irremediable damage to the intellectual ethics of the Republic of Letters.
76. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 23
Julia Jorati Monadic Teleology without Goodness and without God
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Most interpreters think that for Leibniz, teleology is goodness-directedness. Explaining a monadic action teleologically, according to them, simply means explaining it in terms of the goodness of the state at which the agent aims. On some interpretations, the goodness at issue is always apparent goodness: an action is end-directed iff it aims at what appears good to the agent. On other interpretations, the goodness at issue is only sometimes apparent goodness and at other times merely objective goodness: some actions do not aim at what appears good to the agent, but merely at what is objectively good—that is, at what God knows to be good—and that is sufficient for teleology. My paper, on the other hand, argues that both of these interpretations are mistaken. Monadic teleology, I contend, does not have to consist in striving for the good; neither goodness nor God is required to make monadic actions teleological.
77. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 23
Larry M. Jorgensen By Leaps and Bounds: Leibniz on Transcreation, Motion, and the Generation of Minds
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This paper traces Leibniz’s use of his neologism, “transcreation.” Leibniz coins the term in his 1676 discussions of motion, using it to identify a certain type of leap that is essential to motion. But Leibniz quickly dispensed with this theory of motion, arguing instead that “nature never acts by leaps,” and the term “transcreation” fell out of use. However, Leibniz surprisingly revived the term in 1709 in his discussion of the generation of rational beings. By contrasting the way Leibniz uses the term in his theory of motion with his use of the term in the generation of rational beings, we will see that Leibniz’s arguments against leaps early in his career are less forceful against the leaps purportedly involved in the generation of minds. Nevertheless, the “transcreation” of minds does not necessary entail a discontinuity in the “chain of being.”
leibniz texts
78. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 23
Richard T. W. Arthur Leibniz’s Mechanical Principles (c. 1676): Commentary and Translation
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book reviews
79. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 23
Sarah Tietz Divine Machines: Leibniz and the Sciences of Life, by Justin E. H. Smith
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80. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 23
Justin E. H. Smith Reply to Sarah Tietz
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