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Displaying: 61-80 of 100 documents


book symposium
61. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Brian Loar David Chalmers’s The Conscious Mind
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62. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
David J. Chalmers Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality
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review essays
63. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Nicholas White Harmonizing Plato
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64. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Reinaldo Elugardo Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind
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65. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
James P. Sterba Morality and Self-Interest
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critical notices
66. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Marcus G. Singer Essays on Henry Sidgwick
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67. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Kirk Ludwig Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the World
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68. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Paul Churchland Reason, Regulation, and Realism: Toward a Regulatory Systems Theory of Reason and Evolutionary Epistemology
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69. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Jeff McMahan Killing and Saving: Abortion, Hunger, and War
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70. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
George Sher Punishment as Societal Defense
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71. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Taylor Carman After Modernity: Husserlian Reflections on a Philosophical Tradition
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72. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Jane Heal Language, Thought and Consciousness
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73. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Recent Publications
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articles
74. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Mariam Thalos Degrees of Freedom: An Essay on Competitions between Micro and Macro in Mechanics
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This paper argues that the doctrines of determinism and supervenience, while logically independent, are importantly linked in physical mechanics---and quite interestingly so. For it is possible to formulate classical mechanics in such a way as to take advantage of the existence of mathematical devices that represent the advance of time---and which are such as to inspire confidence in the truth of determinism---in order to prevent violation of supervenience. It is also possible to formulate classical mechanics---and to do so in an observationally equivalent, and thus equally empirically respectable, way---such that violations of supervenience are (on the one hand) routine, and (on the other hand) necessary for achieving complete descriptions of the motions of mechanical systems---necessary, therefore, for achieving a deterministic mechanical theory. Two such formulations-only one of which preserves supervenience universally----will conceive of mechanical law in quite different ways. What’s more, they will not admit of being extended to treat thermodynamical questions in the same way. Thus we will find that supervenience is a contingent matter, in the following rather surprising and philosophically interesting way: we cannot in mechanics separate our decisions to conceive of physical law in certain ways from our decisions to treat macroscopic quantities in certain ways.
75. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Selmer Bringsjord The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind
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Is it true that if zombies---creatures who are behaviorally indistinguishable from us, but no more conscious than a rock-are logically possible, the computational conception of mind is false? Are zombies logically possible? Are they physically possible? This paper is a careful, sustained argument for affirmative answers to these three questions.
76. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Richard M. Gale William James and the Willfulness of Belief
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It was important to James’s philosophy, especially his doctrine of the will to believe, that we could believe at will. Toward this end he argues in The Principles of Psychology that attending to an idea is identical with believing it, which, in turn, is identical with willing that it be realized. Since willing is identical with believing and willing is an intentional action, it follows by Leibniz’s Law that believing also is an intentional action. This paper explores the problems with James’s thesis that attending=will=belief. An attempt is made to show that it has a salvageable core that is of considerable philosophical interest and importance.
77. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
David Galloway Seeing Sequences
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This article discusses Charles Parsons’ conception of mathematical intuition. Intuition, for Parsons, involves seeing-as: in seeing the sequences I I I and I I I as the same type, one intuits the type. The type is abstract, but intuiting the type is supposed to be epistemically analogous to ordinary perception of physical objects. And some non-trivial mathematical knowledge is supposed to be intuitable in this way, again in a way analogous to ordinary perceptual knowledge. In particular, the successor axioms are supposed to be knowable intuitively.This conception has the resources to respond to some familiar objections to mathematical intuition. But the analogy to ordinary perception is weaker than it looks, and the warrant provided for non-trivial mathematical beliefs by intuition of this sort is weak too weak, perhaps, to yield any mathematical knowledge.
78. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Ralph Wedgwood The a Priori Rules of Rationality
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Both these ideas are intuitively plausible: rationality has an external aim, such as forming a true belief or good decision; and the rationality of a belief or decision is determined purely by facts about the thinker’s internal mental states. Unlike earlier conceptions, the conception of rationality presented here explains why these ideas are both true. Rational beliefs and decisions, it is argued, are those that are formed through the thinker’s following ‘rules of rationality’. Some rules count as rules of rationality because it is rational to believe---through following other rules---that those rules are reliable. But there must also be certain basic rules, which are a priori, or ‘built into’ our basic cognitive capacities. That these rules are a priori is a purely internal matter; and in following these rules the thinker has done all that could reasonably be expected to achieve the external aim of forming a true belief or good decision.
79. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
George Pappas Berkeley and Scepticism
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In both the Principles and the Three Dialogues, Berkeley claims that he wants to uncover those principles which lead to scepticism; to refute those principles; and to refute scepticism itself. This paper examines the principles Berkeley says have scepticial consequences, and contends that only one of them implies scepticism. It is also argued that Berkeley’s attempted refutation of scepticism rests not on his acceptance of the esse est percipi principle, but rather on the thesis that physical objects and their sensible qualities are immediately perceived.
discussions
80. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Lynne Rudder Baker What Am I?
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Eric T. Olson has argued that any view of personal identity in terms of psychological continuity has a consequence that he considers untenable---namely, that he was never an early-term fetus. I have several replies. First, the psychological-continuity view of personal identity does not entail the putative consequence; the appearance to the contrary depends on not distinguishing between de re and de dicto theses. Second, the putative consequence is not untenable anyway; the appearance to the contrary depends on not taking seriously an idea that underlies a plausible view of persons that I call ‘the Constitution View.’ Finally, Olson’s own “Biological View of personal identity” has liabilities of its own.