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Displaying: 61-80 of 2180 documents


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61. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: 1
Ben Vilhauer Hard Determinism, Humeanism, and Virtue Ethics
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Hard determinists hold that we never have alternative possibilities of action—that we only can do what we actually do. This means that if hard determinists accept the “ought implies can” principle, they mustaccept that it is never the case that we ought to do anything we do not do. In other words, they must reject the view that there can be “ought”- based moral reasons to do things we do not do. Hard determinists who wish to accommodate moral reasons to do things we do not do can instead appeal to Humean moral reasons that are based on desires to be virtuous. Moral reasons grounded on desires to be virtuous do not depend on our being able to act on those reasons in the way that “ought”-based moral reasons do.
62. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: 1
Cecilia Wee, Michael Pelczar Descartes’ Dualism and Contemporary Dualism
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After drawing a distinction between two kinds of dualism—numerical dualism (defined in terms of identity) and modal dualism (defined in terms of supervenience)—we argue that Descartes is a numericaldualist, but not a modal dualist. Since most contemporary dualists advocate modal dualism, the relation of Descartes’ views to the contemporary philosophy of mind are more complex than is commonly assumed.
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63. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: 1
Information and Subscription
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64. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: Supplement
Sarah Clark Miller Editor’s Introduction
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articles
65. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: Supplement
Virginia Held Military Intervention and the Ethics of Care
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66. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: Supplement
Bat-Ami Bar On Comments: Military Intervention in Two Registers
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67. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: Supplement
Lorraine Code Advocacy, Negotiation, and the Politics of Unknowing
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68. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: Supplement
Kristie Dotson Comments: In Search of Tanzania: Are Effective Epistemic Practices Sufficient for Just Epistemic Practices?
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69. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: Supplement
Mariana Ortega Multiplicity, Inbetweenness, and the Question of Assimilation
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70. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: Supplement
Ann Ferguson Comments: Multiplicitous Subjectivity and the Problem of Assimilation
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71. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: Supplement
Carol C. Gould Recognition in Redistribution: Care and Diversity in Global Justice
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72. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: Supplement
Serena Parekh Comments: Care and Human Rights in a Globalized World
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73. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: Supplement
Christine M. Koggel Theory to Practice and Practice to Theory?: Lessons from Local NGO Empowerment Projects in Indonesia
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74. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: Supplement
Ranjoo Seodu Herr Comments: Philosopher’s Contribution to the Empowerment of Local Practitioners: A Response to Christine Koggel’s “Theory to Practice and Practice to Theory?”
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75. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: Supplement
Eva Feder Kittay The Global Heart Transplant and Caring across National Boundaries
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76. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: Supplement
Allison Weir Global Care Chains: Freedom, Responsibility, and Solidarity
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77. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: Supplement
Claudia Card The Paradox of Genocidal Rape Aimed at Enforced Pregnancy
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78. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: Supplement
Ann E. Cudd Comments: Rape and Enforced Pregnancy as Femicide: Comments on Claudia Card’s “The Paradox of Genocidal Rape Aimed at Enforced Pregnancy”
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79. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 45 > Issue: 4
Benjamin Bayer How Not to Refute Quine: Evaluating Kim’s Alternatives to Naturalized Epistemology
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This paper offers an interpretation of Quine’s naturalized epistemology through the lens of Jaegwon Kim’s influential critique of the same. Kim argues that Quine forces a false choice between traditional deductivist foundationalism and naturalized epistemology and contends that there are viable alternative epistemological projects. However it is suggested that Quine would reject these alternatives by reference to the same fundamental principles (underdetermination, indeterminacy of translation, extensionalism) that led him to reject traditional epistemology and propose naturalism as an alternative. Given this interpretation of Quine, it is essential that a successful critic of naturalism also examine Quine’s aforementioned principles. The divide between naturalist and nonnaturalist epistemology turns out to be defined by the divide between more fundamental naturalist and nonnaturalist approaches to semantics.
80. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 45 > Issue: 4
Steven D. Hales, Timothy A. Johnson Time for Change
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Metaphysical theories of change incorporate substantive commitments to theories of persistence. The two most prominent classes of such theories are endurantism and perdurantism. Defenders of endurance-style accounts of change, such as Klein, Hinchliff, and Oderberg, do so through appeal to a priori intuitions about change. We argue that this methodology is understandable but mistaken—an adequate metaphysics of change must accommodate all experiences of change, not merely intuitions about a limited variety of cases. Once we examine additional experiences of change, particularly those in (special) relativistic circumstances, it becomes clear that only a perdurance account of change is adequate.