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61. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 19
Mădălina Guzun Briser le silence: Le déploiement de la langue comme traduction du silence en son chez Martin Heidegger
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The aim of the present article is to offer a new interpretation of Heidegger’s account of the unfolding of language by analyzing the notion of Geläut der Stille, “sounding gathering of silence.” Taking as a starting point the experience of silence described by Stefan George in his poem “The Word,” the article presents the opposition between silence and the sounding words, showing that the latter coincide with the language we speak. The passage from silence to the spoken language belongs to the unfolding of language itself, which presents itself as a translation of silence, redefining thus what translation originally is. The latter, understood as violence and harmony, gathers itself under the term of “rift,” overcoming thus the ontological difference and offering us a radically new perspective over the nature of “relation” within Heidegger’s thinking.
62. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 19
Max Schaefer Bonds of Trust: Thinking the Limits of Reciprocity with Heidegger and Michel Henry
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This paper seeks to address whether human life harbours the possibility of a gratuitous or non-reciprocal form of trust. To address this issue, I take up Descartes’ account of the cogito as the essence of all appearing. With his interpretation of Descartes’ account of the cogito as an immanent and affective mode of appearing, I maintain that Henry provides the transcendental foundation for a non-reciprocal form of trust, which the history of Western philosophy has largely covered over by forgetting this aspect of Descartes’ thought. I demonstrate that Heidegger’s reading of Descartes serves as a pre-eminent example of this. Because Heidegger overlooks Descartes’ insight into the essence of appearing, and reduces this essence to the finite transcendence of the world, I maintain that Heidegger reduces trust to reciprocal relations of understanding between beings of shared contexts of significance.
63. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 19
Ahmet Suner The Ineluctable Sign in Sartre’s Account of Franconay’s Imitation
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The most interesting example of all the physical images that Sartre examines in L’Imaginaire concerns a female performer’s (Franconay’s) imitation of a male performer (Chevalier). The example is a unique instance in which Sartre deals explicitly with the possibility of ambiguity and hybridity in consciousness. Sartre’s introduction of the sign into the consciousness of imitation ties the perception of Franconay with the imaged Chevalier, but it also leads to the dissemination of the sign across the entire consciousness, a consequence that runs against Sartre’s analytic tendencies. I argue that, despite Sartre’s endeavor to keep the sign separate from perception and the image, the sign is a diffuse property of the entire consciousness of imitation, penetrating and contaminating its every instant. Sartre’s account of Franconay’s imitation contains the germs of the destruction of his clear-cut analytic distinctions, revealing the irreducible hybridity of the sign with both perception and the image.
64. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 19
Mathieu Cochereau La Dissidence et l’unité des trois mouvements de l’existence chez Jan Patočka
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Jan Patočka is usually connected with Czech dissidence, a political movement which stood up against the communist government. We want to defend the hypothesis that the notion of dissidence is not originally a political one but, above all, a phenomenological one. Dissidence is a movement of distancing which implies a rootedness, and this movement of distancing is peculiar to human beings. Patočka calls “movement of human existence” this paradoxical rootedness which is an extramundane and mundane position. Thus, we have to review the theory of the three movements of human existence. While it is tempting to separate the third movement, as a movement of transcendence, and to describe it as a political dissidence, we would like to show that the three movements (and not only the third), have to be understood as Dissidence.
book reviews
65. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 19
Erik Norman Dzwiza-Ohlsen Phänomenologische Schriften. 1981–1988
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66. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 19
Alexandru Bejinariu Was ist Phänomenologie?
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67. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 19
Christian Ferencz-Flatz Philosophers at the Front. Phenomenology and the First World War
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68. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 19
Mihaela-Cătălina Condruz The Concept of Violence
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69. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 19
Delia Popa Rupture(s)
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the promise of genetic phenomenology
70. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 18
Christian Ferencz-Flatz, Andrea Staiti Introduction: Notes on a Troubled Reception History
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71. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 18
Dieter Lohmar On Some Motives for Husserl’s Genetic Turn in his Research on a Foundation of the Geisteswissenschaften
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My contribution tries to outline some of the motives that lead Husserl to genetic phenomenology. The starting point are the analyses he wrote to include in Ideas I and Ideas II, which are dedicated to the founding of human sciences during the period 1910–1916. Here we find an intertwinement of investigations concerned with an understanding of others (on lowest and higher levels) and their contribution to the constitution of objectivity, and new research of the genesis of the way in which individual experience shapes our access to the world. My main interest is to point out systematic connections between these two directions of research which are general characteristics of genetic phenomenology.
72. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 18
Tarjei Larsen Interest and Pregivenness in Husserl’s Genealogy of Logic
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The problem of accounting for the cognitively relevant relation between experience and thought is among the defining problems of modern philosophy. I suggest that addressing this problem provides an important motive for the “genealogy of logic” that Husserl outlines in his posthumously published Experience and Judgment. Arguing that the notions of “interest” and “pregivenness” are crucial to this approach, I seek to assess it through a detailed analysis of the use to which these notions are put in its most decisive part, the account of the origin of “simple predication”. I conclude that there is reason to think that the notions cannot play the roles that Husserl assigns to them, and hence that his approach fails.
73. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 18
Honghe Wang Die Verteilung und Fortpflanzung der Affektion in der Wahrnehmung nach Husserl
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Affection in perception does not exhaust itself in a single subjective act of turning-towards (Zuwendung) an object. Husserl’s analyses of the propagation of affection in perception (in Hua XI), which have not been systematically or thoroughly thematized up until now, offer a much more complex picture of affection, which this article brings to the fore. The affective power distributes itself irregularly in perception. The differentiation of perceptual field into foreground and background (first section) prepares the field for the investigation of the distribution of affections (second section). This investigation leads from lower to higher levels of constitution, from simple to complex relations, and from sensations of the lived body to egological factors. In the third section, three directions of propagation of affection and, collectively, six modes of affective awakening are thoroughly analyzed. I end with a discussion of a recent critique of Husserl’s “abstract” approach to affection, which seeks to offer an insight into how a complete theory of affection would look like.
74. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 18
Alice Pugliese Motivational Analysis in Husserl’s Genetic Phenomenology
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The paper discusses motivation as the inner lawfulness of consciousness and a central methodological principle of genetic phenomenology, highlighting the problem of its ambiguous status oscillating between a historical-empirical and a transcendental account of consciousness. The focus on motivation allows for the practical character of intentionality to emerge, thus presenting genetic phenomenology as a more comprehensive approach to subjective life which takes into account its constitutive indeterminacy.
75. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 18
Kristjan Laasik Phenomenological Reflections on Instincts
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The familiar Husserlian conception of fulfillment involves a contrast between the same content as being represented emptily and then (more) fully, and also the idea that the empty givenness is rightly conceived in terms of anticipations of fullness. Since perceptual experiences provide a paradigmatic case of such fulfillment, I will call it “P-fulfillment.” Additionally, there is also the fulfillment of our wants, wishes, and desires. Taking wants as the paradigmatic case, I will call it “W-fulfillment.” In this paper, I consider the applicability of these conceptions of fulfillment to Husserl’s views of instincts, and conclude that the fulfillment of instincts is best understood not as P-fulfillment or W-fulfillment, but as sui generis, “I-fulfillment,” which is distinguished by its peculiarly retrospective nature, and by the fact that when it reveals something, it can also give rise to determinacy where previously there was none.
76. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 18
Peter Gaitsch Husserls Phänomenologie biologischer Generativität
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The present article intends to show that genetic phenomenology, as conceived by Edmund Husserl, implies an essential biological dimension. In his later research manuscripts, from the 1920s and 1930s , Husserl not only reflects on the conceivability of forms of intropathy (Einfühlung) regarding animal and plant bodies, based on dismantling reduction (Abbaureduktion), but also on the embeddedness of the human monad in ontogenetic and phylogenetic generative becoming. On that basis, the article aims to locate the place of bio-generative phenomena within the field of genetic analysis in the theories of monadic gradualism and of somatic anomalism. However, by taking into consideration that new attempts to approach biological generativity from a Husserlian perspective (A. Steinbock, R. Affifi) are only partly successful, the article ends with a delimitation of certain elements that require further elaboration, namely the investigation into the biological implications of monadology, the determination of forms of corporeal anomality, and the vindication of the notion of essential limit-phenomena.
77. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 18
Olivier Malherbe Roman Ingarden: phénoménologie génétique et ontologie réaliste
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Roman Ingarden, one of Husserl’s most gifted students, devoted several thousand pages to the development of an ontological, epistemological, aesthetical and even anthropological framework that would allow him to firmly reject the so-called “idealistic turn” of his master Husserl. This paper aims at reconstructing an often overlooked side of his philosophy: his theory of consciousness and his analysis of the constitutive process involved in sense perception. After emphasizing the distinctive character of Ingarden’s ontological frame and its impact on understanding concepts as fundamental as consciousness or intentionality, this paper tries to sketch Ingarden’s answers to several genetic questions raised by Husserl: the relation between time and consciousness, the nature of the ultimate sense data and the question of motivation.
78. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 18
Lovisa Andén Language and Tradition in Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Husserl and Saussure
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In this paper, I examine how Merleau-Ponty develops Husserl’s genetic phenomenology through an elaboration of language, which is largely influenced by Saussure’s linguistics. Specifically, my focus will be on the unpublished notes to the course Sur le problème de la parole (On the Problem of Speech). I show how Merleau-Ponty recasts Husserl’s notion of the historicity of truth by means of an inquiry into the relation between truth and its linguistic expression. The account that Merleau-Ponty offers differs from Husserl’s in two important respects. Firstly, whereas Husserl describes a regressive inquiry of truth, Merleau-Ponty describes a regressive movement of truth, where every acquired truth seizes the tradition that precedes it. Secondly, this new notion of truth, and its dependency on its proper expression, opens up a new understanding of literature.
79. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 18
Tammo Mintken Verantwortung in Gottes Grund: Zur Bedeutung der genetischen Phänomenologie in ethischer und religionsphilosophischer Perspektive
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Many genetic approaches in philosophy, psychology or sociology lead to a partially or fully deterministic understanding of the self and its position-taking. In this article, I argue that Husserl’s view of genesis differs broadly from such deterministic conceptions, as he investigates the genesis as the awakening of consciousness as consciousness or spirit as spirit. Husserl claims that the passive foundation of conscious life is the topsoil of activity and rational position-taking. But still the genetic process of the awakening of the ego, far from being an automatism, demands a primary responsibility to proceed with the awakening itself. I discuss the issue of the responsibility of wakefulness in three interconnected ways. Drawing on Edith Stein, I first develop some theological implications to demonstrate how the paradox of responsibility points toward its divine ratio, because the unfounded givenness of responsibility links the awakening person to a phenomenological understanding of theosis: the more a person cultivates her responsibility the more she resembles the divine actus purus. In a second step, I show how the ethical implications of the responsibility of awakening connect it with the truth of will. The manifold obstacles that tend to undermine ethical love reveal a new level of both responsible position-taking and practical faith in the divine entelechy. Finally, the theological and ethical results motivate a social renewal, in which responsibility embraces the Other and longs for the communitization of the truth of wills. Clearly, the Husserlian view of genetic philosophy enables deep theological and ethical insights, that remain hidden from the method of static phenomenology and that are denied by most empirical genetic approaches.
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80. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 18
Paul Slama Husserl et le jeune Heidegger sur l’intentionnalité de valeur pratique et sociale: de l’enroulement intentionnel a l’auto-suffisance de la vie
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This paper examines how practical intentionality is described by Husserl and Heidegger respectively, and looks at the phenomenological and sociological issues of these descriptions. In Husserl, the phenomenological reduction reveals that the practices of the world involve two intentionalities which wrap one inside the other. The foundation of this dynamic is a theoretical intentionality: there are always reasons which make it possible to understand why such and such an object is surrounded by such and such a value. In the early Heidegger’s work, life is not expressed by means of judgments, and it coils around itself, perpetuating itself in the ordinary practices of the world. We show that this phenomenological immanentism is put in question by Heidegger himself, and in particular in connection to the issue of the social source of intentionality. We consider the question of the compatibility between immanentism and normativity, which involve a dialectic that sheds new light on the phenomenological project.