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Displaying: 61-80 of 1540 documents


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61. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Sarah H. Woolwine Comments on “The Benefits of Being a Suicidal Curmudgeon: Emil Cioran on Killing Yourself”
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62. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Julie Kuhlken The Arendtian Public Space of Black Lives Matter
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articles
63. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
David Antonini Black Lives Matter as an Arendtian New Beginning and Political Principle
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open submission articles
64. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
David Emmanuel Rowe Death Does Not Harm the One Who Dies Because There is No One to Harm
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If death is a harm then it is a harm that cannot be experienced. The proponent of death’s harm must therefore provide an answer to Epicurus, when he says that ‘death, is nothing to us, since when we are, death is not present, and when death is present, then we are not’. In this paper I respond to the two main ways philosophers have attempted to answer Epicurus, regarding the subject of death’s harm: either directly or via analogy. The direct way argues that there is a truth-maker (or difference-maker) for death’s harm, namely in virtue of the intrinsic value the subject’s life would have had if they had not died. The analogy argues that there are cases analogous to death, where the subject is harmed although they experience no pain as a result. I argue that both accounts beg the question against the Epicurean: the first by presupposing that one can be harmed while experiencing no displeasure as a result and the second by conflating a de re with a de dicto reading of death’s harm. Thus, I argue, until better arguments are provided, one is best to agree with Epicurus and those who follow him that death is not a harm.
65. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Jesús H. Ramírez Arriving at Racial Identity from Heidegger’s Existentiell
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66. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Mehrzad A. Moin Heidegger on Anxiety in the Face of Death—An Analysis and Extension
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A significant portion of the secondary literature on Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time has focused on interpreting his formal conceptions of death and anxiety. Unlike these previous works, this essay will serve to fill a gap in the Heideggerian portrayal of death. Although he argues that Dasein is anxious about death at a fundamental level and that it proximally and for the most part covers up such anxiety, Heidegger does not provide ontic evidence in support of his claim, instead opting to uncharacteristically take it as something self-evident. I attempt to supplement Heidegger’s framework by introducing Stephen Cave’s immortality narratives and the emerging field of Terror Management Theory as the aforementioned ontic evidence that rounds out Heidegger’s notion of death, before ultimately transitioning from Heidegger’s work into the larger philosophical discourse on death and demonstrating the potential joy that can manifest when one gains a lucid understanding of the ownness of their death and the narratives to which it gives rise.
67. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Andrew Barrette Fate of Ideas: Some Reflections on the Enduring Significance of Manfred Frings’ Rejected Translation of Edmund Husserl’s Ideas II
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This paper investigates a moment in the history of the phenomenological movement and offers an argument for its enduring significance. To this end, it brings to light, for the first time in a half-century, Manfred Frings’ rejected and so unpublished translation of Edmund Husserl’s Ideas II. After considering the meaning of the term Leib, which Frings renders ‘lived-body’ and to which the editor suggests ‘organism,’ a brief argument for the living tradition of phenomenology is given. It is claimed that the enduring significance of the document is found in the elucidation of the need to renew the phenomenological tradition through a collaboration across generations. Thus, even in its supposed “failure,” Frings’ translation gives data to future thinkers for insight into both their own life and the life of the ideas of phenomenology itself.
68. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Blake McAllister From One Conservative to Another: A Critique of Epistemic Conservatism
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Epistemic conservatism maintains that some beliefs are immediately justified simply because they are believed. The intuitive implausibility of this claim sets the burden of proof against it. Some epistemic conservatives have sought to lessen this burden by limiting its scope, but I show that they cannot remove it entirely. The only hope for epistemic conservativism is to appeal to its theoretical fruit. However, such a defense is undercut by the introduction of phenomenal conservatism, which accomplishes the same work from a more intuitive starting point. Thus, if one opts for conservatism, better to choose the phenomenal kind.
69. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Nicholas Sars Retrospective Attitudes and Non-Identity
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Many philosophers think the non-identity problem undermines the ability for future generations to have been wronged by past ones. This problem has prompted a number of responses, some of which purport to vindicate the relevant claims of wrongdoing. However, I argue that a closely related issue remains even for those convinced by these responses. It is commonly thought that wrongdoing makes certain retrospective attitudes, such as resentment, fitting toward the wrongdoer. In this paper, I shift a familiar problem of future generations from wrongdoing to the fittingness of retrospective attitudes, and I show that a narrative sense of identity provides one means of addressing the puzzle of how these attitudes can be fi tting in non-identity cases.
plenary session: black feminism
70. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Tempest M. Henning, Scott Aikin IntroductIon: Plenary on Black Feminist Thought
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71. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Andrea Dionne Warmack Smiling Lessons: Toward an Account of AfroSkepticism
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72. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Ayanna De’Vante Spencer Surviving Jane Code: Black Feminist Epistemological Concerns for MeTooBots
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73. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Tempest M. Henning Trying to Stay Safe While Swimming in Toxic Waters
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74. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Nathifa Greene Epistemic Injustice and Transformative Justice
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articles
75. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Shawn Hernandez, N. G. Laskowski What Makes Normative Concepts Normative: (Presidential Prize Award Winner)
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When asked which of our concepts are normative concepts, metaethicists would be quick to list such concepts as good, ought, and reason. When asked why such concepts belong on the list, metaethicists would be much slower to respond. Eklund (2017) is a notable exception. He argues by elimination for “the Normative Role view” that normative concepts are normative in virtue of having a “normative role” or being “used normatively” (2017, p. 79). One view that Eklund aims to eliminate is “the Metaphysical view” that normative concepts are normative in virtue of referring to normative properties (2017, p. 71).2 In addition to arguing that Eklund’s objection looks doubtful by its own lights, we argue that there are several plausible versions of the Metaphysical view that Eklund doesn’t eliminate, defending various claims about normative concepts and their relationships to deliberation, competence, reference, and possession along the way.
76. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Joshua Anderson G.E. Moore and the Problem of the Criterion
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In this paper, I offer an understanding of G.E. Moore’s epistemology as presented in, “A Defence of Common Sense” and “Proof of an External World.” To frame the discussion, I look to Roderick Chisholm’s essay, The Problem of the Criterion. I begin by looking at two ways that Chisholm believes one can respond to the problem of the criterion, and, referring back to Moore’s essays, explain why it is not unreasonable for Chisholm to believe that he is following a line of reasoning that Moore might take. I then show why I believe Chisholm is actually trying to do something quite different from what Moore was, and thus misses Moore’s actual point. I conclude that Moore is best understood as rejecting traditional epistemological concerns. By forcing Moore to deal with a traditional epistemological problem, it will become clear how bold Moore’s “epistemology” is.
77. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Corey R. Horn Thomas Paine and Immanuel Kant’s Cosmopolitanism: Towards a Universal System
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78. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Josué Piñeiro Epistemic Peerhood and Standpoint Theory: What Knowledge from the Margins tells us about Epistemic Peerhood
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This paper uses standpoint theory to explore whether all there is to establish epistemic peerhood between subjects is that they be (i) equally exposed to or familiar with the evidence pertaining to a disagreed claim, and be (ii) equals with regards to intelligence, freedom from bias and similar epistemic virtues within the domain of the claim in question. I argue that there is at least one general circumstance in which conditions (i) and (ii) are met, but nevertheless the subjects deviate in their likelihood to be mistaken about the claim in question, thus preventing them from being epistemic peers. Such a circumstance presents itself as a case in which the claim in question is part of those aspects of social relations and experiences of the marginalized.
79. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Andrew McGonigal, Erin Taylor Aesthetic Reasons and Aesthetic Shoulds
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Some questions about normative structure are global. We can ask how we should live, or what we ought to do all things considered, or whether there are any categorical oughts. But we can also examine local normative structure. We might ask ourselves about what we should do from the moral point of view rather than the prudential one, or discuss promissory obligation in contrast with what friendship demands. How should we understand such localized forms of normativity? We argue that a plausible sounding treatment of the distinction cannot account for what we call the “interrelatedness” of reasons from different domains.
80. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Shane J. Ralston Metaphor Abuse in the Time of Coronavirus: A Reply to Lynne Tirrell
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In the time of Coronavirus, it is perhaps as good a time as any to comment on the use and abuse of metaphors. One of the worst instances of metaphor abuse—especially given the recent epidemiological crisis—is Lynne Tirrell’s notion of toxic speech. In the foregoing reply piece, I analyse Tirrell’s metaphor and reveal how it blinds us to the liberating power of public speech. Lynne Tirrell argues that some speech is, borrowing from field of Epidemiology, toxic in the sense that it harms vulnerable listeners. In this response piece, I summarize the main points of Tirrell’s toxic speech argument, map the underlying conceptual metaphor and pose three objections.