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Displaying: 61-80 of 1471 documents


articles
61. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
James Mock American Ruins, Aesthetic Responses, and Speculations
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62. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Jerry Green Epistemic Goods
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63. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
G. M. Trujillo, Jr. Friendship for the Flawed: A Cynical and Pessimistic Theory of Friendship
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When considering the value of friendship, most philosophers ignore the negatives. Most assume that humans need friends to flourish, and some argue that friendships can be good, no matter the risks entailed. This makes conversations about the value of friendship one-sided. Here, I argue that Cynics and Pessimists have an important view on friendship, despite it being ignored. They hold that: (a) friendship is unnecessary for flourishing, and (b) friendship presents ethical risks, especially to one’s own self-sufficiency. I defend these views. Then I conclude with reflections on why Cynics and Pessimists actually make great friends. By helping people to focus on vulgar human nature and the flaws that humans have, they create an unpretentious basis for friendship.
64. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Nikolaus Breiner Charles Peirce on Assertion: Assuming Liabilities as Offering Evidence
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Charles Peirce claimed that the principal ingredient in assertion is an act of “taking responsibility” for the truth of what is asserted. Some people writing about the Commitment Theory of Assertion have at times construed Peirce’s claim as his espousal of that contemporary theory, but this, I argue, is mistaken. Peirce saw “taking responsibility” as the assumption, not of an obligation, but instead of a liability, a penalty to be incurred if one’s assertion turned out to be false. I then consider how this point connects to other parts of Pierce’s analysis of assertion, specifically his claims that we assert to persuade, that assertion involves an intentional exhibition of our assumption of liability, and that this assumption of liability furnishes evidence for what is asserted. I conclude by sketching on Peirce’s behalf how the assumption of liability could constitute, and be intelligibly offered as, evidence for what is asserted.
commentaries
65. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
Marco J. Nathan Remarks on Emergence and Dynamic Interactions
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66. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
Lisa M. Madura Government of the People, By the People, For the Best: A Challenge to the Possibility of Nietzschean Democracy
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67. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
Sarah Tyson Response to “Historic Injustice, Collective Agency, and Compensatory Duties”
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68. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
J.P. Andrew Why Semi-Compatibilists Should Be Metaphysical Compatibilists: A Response to James Cain’s “Free Will, Resiliency, and Flip-flopping”
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69. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
Matthew Pike Some Thoughts on Counterfeit Quantum Indeterminacy in Competing Neural Processes
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70. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
Todd M. Stewart Comments on Green’s “Metacognition as an Epistemic Virtue”
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71. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
E.M. Dadlez Comment on Kenneth Brewer’s “Fashion and the Judgment of Taste”
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72. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
Moti Gorin Collective Action Problems, Causal Impotence, and Virtue
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73. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
Fiacha D. Heneghan Noumenal Ignorance Revisited: A Reply to Stuart Rosenbaum
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74. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
G. M. Trujillo, Jr. Sincere Exchanges, Not Fabricated Neutrality: A Response to Mark Piper
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75. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
Mark Silcox Comments on “Authority, Particularity and the Districting Solution” by Chris King
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76. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
Emily McGill Commentary on Alyssa Lowery’s “Investigating Integrity in Public Reason Liberalism”
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77. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
James Mock On Campana’s “The Coherence of Emerson’s Epistemology”
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78. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
Yong Dou (Michael) Kim Comments on “Subversive Joy: Nietzsche’s Practice of Life-Enhancing Cheerfulness”
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79. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
Liz Goodnick Comments on Toby Eugene Bollig’s “Desire Satisfactionism and Not-So-Satisfying Deserts: The Problem of Hell”
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80. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
Paul Carron Confirmation Bias and the (Un)reliability of Enculturated Religious Beliefs: Comments on “The Atheological Argument from Geography”
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