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Displaying: 81-90 of 2435 documents


acpa reports and minutes
81. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 88
Treasurer’s Report (2013)
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82. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 88
Financial Statements
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83. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 88
Necrology (2013–2015)
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84. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 88
Available Back Issues of the Proceedings
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presidential address
85. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 87
John O’Callaghan The Identity of Knower and Known: Sellars’s and McDowell’s Thomisms
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Wilfrid Sellars’ engagement with Thomism in “Being and Being Known” is examined, specifically for his reformulation of the thesis that the mind in its mental acts is in some sense identical in form to the object known. Borrowing the notion of “isomorphism” from modern set theory, Sellars describes an identity of form between mind and world that is non-intentional in the “Realm of the Real,” while confining all questions of meaning and truth to the “Realm of the Intentional.” John McDowell’s response to Sellars’ reformulation is then examined. McDowell is critical of Sellars’ “blind spot” on the normativity of truth, and argues for the embedding of the intentional in the Realm of the Real under the guise of truth. This paper notes difficulties with both authors’ discussions. Both authors are misled in their discussions of Aquinas by an overemphasis upon the “mental word” as described by Peter Geach. In addition it is proposed that Sellars’ notion of “isomorphisms” has the additional problem of adequately distinguishing various types of mental statements as neural states in the Realm of the Real. The paper concludes by arguing for a deep affinity between McDowell and Aquinas on the normativity of truth.
presentation of the aquinas medal
86. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 87
Theodore R. Vitali, C.P. Introduction of Eleonore Stump: 2013 Aquinas Medal Recipient
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aquinas medalist’s address
87. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 87
Eleonore Stump The Nature of a Simple God
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plenary sessions
88. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 87
Alasdair MacIntyre Philosophical Education Against Contemporary Culture
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Four stages in an adequate philosophical education are distinguished. The first is that in which students learn to put in question some commonly shared assumptions about what happiness is and to ask what the good of engaging in this kind of questioning is. The second is a conceptual and linguistic analysis of “good” which enables questions about what human goods are to be formulated. The third is an investigation into the nature and unity of human beings designed to enable us to propose rationally justifiable answers to those questions. In the fourth and final stage those questions are posed.
89. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 87
Candace Vogler Good and Bad in Human Action
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According to Aristotle, every action is aimed at some good. Neo-Aristotelians argue that all intentional actions are pursued “under the guise of the good.” Contemporary critics find this thesis either perplexing or obviously false. In this essay, I survey a recent attempt to defend the guise of the good thesis, urge that the critic will reject the defense, and sketch a novel direction for defense of the thesis based on the thought that practical reason’s orientation to the future is fundamentally different from a modern predictive stance. Practical reason is directed to what is supposed to happen next, whether or not things go as they are supposed to go.
90. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 87
V. Bradley Lewis Aristotle, the Common Good, and Us
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While the notion of the common good figures frequently in both rhetoric and the inquiries of academic political theory, it is often neither closely examined nor precisely defined. This article examines Aristotle’s use of the idea, focusing primarily on two sets of key texts: first, Politics 1.1–2 and Nicomachean Ethics 1.2; and second, Nic. Ethics 8.9 and Politics 3.7. The first set of texts emphasizes the common good as flourishing and the city as its necessary condition; the second emphasizes the common good as the good of all citizens as distinct from that of the rulers alone and leads to Aristotle’s notion of the generic political regime with its focus on the middle class and the rule of law. The conclusion notes both continuities and discontinuities with and challenges to contemporary politics posed by Aristotle’s view, which is neither as readily supportive of modern political programs nor as opposed to modern practices as is sometimes thought.