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Displaying: 81-100 of 344 documents


études
81. Chôra: Volume > 13
Meryem Sebti, Daniel De Smet Présentation du dossier: La providence, le destin et le mal, de la philosophie antique à la falsafa
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82. Chôra: Volume > 13
Luc Brisson D’où vient le mal chez Platon?
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In this paper, a pluralistic explanation of the sources of evil according to Plato is offered, which takes into account not only ethics, but also cosmology. In Plato, one must distinguish between negative evils, which result from the inherent distortion of images, that is, of bodies, as compared to their model, that is, of intelligible reality; and positive evils, whose ultimate cause is the soul. In the case of the soul of the world, one must speak of relative positive evils that are the consequence of its degraded power, and in the case of man, of absolute positive evils, which are the consequence of error.
i. origines et figures orientales
83. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Jean Kellens Les origines du dualisme mazdéen
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The discussions about the origin of mazdean dualism are concentrated upon the interpretation of the Gathic stanza Y30.3 which opposes two mental powers called mainiiu and usually translated by «spirit». The divergence of the understandings led to a controversy on the nature of this dualistic opposition : is it philosophical, cosmic or religious ? Do these various distinctions remain relevant now we know that this stanza is not a piece of a sermon, but of a liturgical recitative ?
84. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Nele Ziegler Enuma elish, le récit babylonien de la création
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The Babylonian Poem of Creation Enuma Elish tells the story of Apsu and Tiamat begetting the first generations of gods, of Marduk vanquishing Tiamat and creating from its corps the whole universe. Can the story of this fight be a hint to a dualistic vision of the universe in Mesopotamia ? The author stresses some arguments against this conclusion even if some of the main elements of dualistic cosmologies are present : combatting forces, non‑existence – creation of the universe, male – female opposition.
études
85. Chôra: Volume > 13
Isabelle Koch Le destin et la providence: sur deux traités «jumeaux» d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise
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Alexander’s Treatises on Fate (in Greek) and on Providence (conserved in Arabic) have many features in common, so that Jaap Mansfeld referred to them as «twins treatises». One reason of this kinship is the method used by Alexander, who takes the doxographical presentation as a skeptical dissensus in order to establish the superiority of Aristotelian thesis. But another reason, perhaps more important, is their conceptual closeness : the peripatetic definitions of providence and fate, in these two treatises, are very similar and obviously seek to address similar concerns. This proximity is so high that one could ask in which way the two concepts differ one from another. In this paper I will offer an overview of common features between the two treatises, especially Alexander’s attempts to find some textual grounds in Aristotle’s treatises for building a peripatetic theory of fate and providence consistent and strong enough to be held against the thesis developed on these topics since the Hellenistic period. Then I will propose a hypothesis on the relation between these two treatises and consequently between these two concepts.
i. origines et figures orientales
86. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Lionel Marti L’Enuma elish – une oeuvre dont la pérennité et le propos ont marqué les esprits: (réponse a N. Ziegler)
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études
87. Chôra: Volume > 13
Silvia Fazzo, Mauro Zonta Toward a «critical translation» of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ De principiis, based on the indirect tradition of Syriac and Arabic sources
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One of the main philosophical works by Alexander of Aphrodisias, De principiis, is lost in its original Greek text, but it is preserved in three extant Medieval Semitic versions, one in Syriac and two in Arabic, which were written in the Near East between 500 and 950 AD. These versions are not totally identical and, as we have shown in 2012, they are in a rather complex textual relationship. As we will show in this article, a tentative reconstruction of the lost text should be based upon an attentive and point‑to‑point comparative analysis of some aspect of all three versions. We have tentatively called the abore way “critical translation”.
i. origines et figures orientales
88. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Ivan Guermeur Du dualisme et de l’ambivalence séthienne dans la pensée religieuse de l’Égypte ancienne
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In his De Iside, Plutarch uses the example of the Osirian myth and the cases of Osiris, Horus and Typhon (Seth) to define his doctrine of dualism which according to him offers an explication for the philosophical problem of the existence of Good and Evil. Since the philosopher has based himself on Egyptian mythology, the present study seeks to elucidate what the documentation of “pharaonic” Egypt teaches us about the conception of an opposition between Good and Evil, about the place that the complex figure of Seth takes within this concept, and about the typically Egyptian binary way of thinking.
89. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
François Chenet Le dualisme de l’Esprit et de la Nature du Sāṃkhya
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Sāṃkhya, which is one of the oldest systems (darśana) of Indian Philosophy, advocates an uncompromising dualism in its theoretical metaphysical teachings. There is a fundamental dualism or split at the very heart of reality, and this dualism or split is the fundamental fact of existence.According to Sāṃkhya, there are two co‑present and co‑eternal realities. The first one is the principle of pure Consciousness, the Puruṣa, which is inactive, indifferent, eternally free and Alone. Puruṣa is the soul, the self, the spirit, the subject, the knower. The other of the two co‑present and co‑eternal realities of Sāṃkhya is Nature or Prakṛti : it is the primordial and unconscious “stuff ” of the entire unmanifest and manifest world, whereas Puruṣa is the presupposition of individual consciousness. Nature or Prakṛti is the ultimate material principle and thus the substratum from which manifest, in the presence of the self (puruṣa), the gross and subtle bodies including the mental organs of all living beings. But Sāṃkhya is not a dualism of mind and body or even a dualism of subject and object.In classical Sāṃkhya the world is not derived from consciousness, nor is consciousness derived from the world. The classical Sāṃkhya refuses to understand the world simply as a product of consciousness. It refuses to see the world as an illusory projection of consciousness, and thus it rejects any idealistic monism. Similarly, it refuses to see consciousness simply as a product of the world, and thus it rejects any kind of materialism or naturalism. Thus, it steers an intermediate course or path between the Indian notion of a conscious, cosmic Self or its equivalent, which is the ground of all being, on the one hand, and the notion of a conscious self, which is only an empirical, relative construction, on the other. It maintains, rather, a fundamental dualism, the opposite poles of which function in a kind of dialectical interaction. The fact of consciousness and the fact of the world are two irreductible realities in constant interplay with one another. Though quite separate and unconnected, Spirit and Nature mutually interact to bring about the process of creation, self‑awareness and, finally, enlightenment. But Spirit or Puruṣa and Nature or Prakṛti are always only in proximity to one another, never in actual contact. This is a puzzling notion if one thinks of Puruṣa and Prakṛti as two things. Puruṣa and Prakṛti are two realities of a completely different order.Right knowledge is the knowledge of the separation of the Puruṣa from the Prakṛti. The individual soul (jīva) has to realize itself as the pure Puruṣa through discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti.From a rational point of view, classical Sāṃkhya can be regarded as a bundle of contradictions. Some problems regarding its interpretation are the problem of the nature of the Sāṃkhya dualism and the problem of the connection or relationship of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. The Sāṃkhya system clings to spiritualistic pluralism and dualistic realism, but its very logic indeed impels it to embrace idealistic monism or absolutism.
études
90. Chôra: Volume > 13
Christopher Isaac Noble, Nathan M. Powers Création et providence divine chez Plotin
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In this paper, we argue that Plotinus denies deliberative forethought about the physical cosmos to the demiurge (or to any other divine principle) on the basis of certain basic and widely shared Platonic and Aristotelian assumptions about the character of divine thought. We then discuss how Plotinus can nonetheless maintain (as he does) that the cosmos is «providentially» ordered.
ii. dans la philosophie grecque et latine
91. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Gérard Journée Dualités présocratiques
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This papers tries to show at first that the dualism Plutarchus attributed in the De Iside et Osiride to most ancient thinkers, mainly «presocratics», has been largely influenced by the doxographical overview given by Aristotle at the beginning of the Metaphysics, which not only assumed that Empedocles was the first to introduce principles of Good and Evil, but also compared the theory of Anaxagoras to the alleged platonic dualism of the One and the Other. If dualities are quite present and important in some of the main theories of the so‑called presocratic philosophers, the question remains to determine in which cases these dualities can be compared to dualism in the sense this word has taken since Hyde. The second part of this article will thus consist to try to answer this question on the ground of three examples of thinkers for whom dualities played a crucial role : Alcmaeon, Parmenides and, chiefly, Empedocles, who had obviously linked Love and Strife to an axiological pattern in his Katharmoi.
études
92. Chôra: Volume > 13
Michael Chase Porphyre sur la Providence
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Studies the doctrine of providence of the Neoplatonic philosopher Porphyry of Tyre (c. 234‑c‑304 AD). Following a survey of Hellenistic theories of fate and providence, the doctrine of destiny ex hupotheseos, developed on the basis of Plato’s dialogues, is examined : according to it, our acts are free, but their consequences are necessary. As an integral part of Middle Platonic philosophy, this theory was probably transmitted to Late Antiquity by Porphyry. We then move on to examine Porphyry’s treatise On what depends on us, which contains an interpretation of Plato’s Myth of Er, and develops the doctrine of the twofold choice of lives. Nemesius and Proclus react, each in his own way, against the individualism of Porphyry’s approach. In conclusion, the theory of fate and providence in Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy is briefly examined.
ii. dans la philosophie grecque et latine
93. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Anca Vasiliu Platon et l’invention aristotélicienne du dualisme platonicien
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Aristotle’s main grievances against his forebears, in the first instance Plato, but also Empedocles and Anaxagoras, rely on three theoretical standpoints : the status of the whole and the one, the separation or the immanence of the principle and its ability to act as a cause or not, and finally the possibility of engendering or producing from contraries. An analysis of the criticisms developed in Metaphysics Lambda 10 brings to light both the purpose and the flaws of the Aristotelian indictment. Arguably, Plato has brought things to existence from a secondary dualism, not from an immutable and separate principle, since, according to the Stagirite’s critical reading, the status of that principle remains ambiguous on the grounds that it is used both as an efficient cause and a universal predicate. From the encounter between the theory of causes and of being advocated by Aristotle against Plato and what Aristotle introduces as the Platonic theory of the principle, Ideas and Numbers, emerges a “dualistic” vision of Plato’s thought. However when one endeavours to locate and contextualize in the Dialogues the theses attributed to Plato by his rebellious disciple, that “dualistic” vision not only does not appear to be founded, but one can even find a criticism of the aptness of such interpretation. The example given is that of the fight of the Gods and the Giants in The Sophist ; in that fight between philosophers around the status of the being can be found a great many of the themes and positions mentioned in what is called in Lambda 10 a criticism of the forebears. Isn’t the “dualistic” interpretation of ancient philosophies ultimately the projection of a modern type of reading, sensitive to the mythologizing interpretation fashioned owing to the late popularity of Platonism ?
études
94. Chôra: Volume > 13
Giovanna R. Giardina Providence in John Philoponus’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics
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Commentando Aristotele, Phys. II 4, 6 e 8, Filopono assume costantemente Empedocle come modello di tutta una tradizione filosofica che individua nella materia e nel caso i principi sia dell’universo sia degli enti particolari. Filopono e d’accordo con Aristotele nel ritenere assurda la posizione dei materialisti, che considerano il caso non soltanto come causa degli enti che divengono sempre o per lo piu allo stesso modo, tra i quali talvolta si verificano casi di enti che si generano contro natura, ma anche come causa dei corpi celesti, che si muovono di movimenti sempre identici e tra i quali non si osservano casi di contro natura. Ma se nella Fisica Aristotele ha opposto a questa posizione teorica la sua nozione di natura come causa finale, Filopono oppone al caso dei fisiologi materialisti la provvidenza, che egli chiama anche “provvidenza della natura” e che differenzia come natura universale e natura particolare. Pur utilizzando un concetto non aristotelico, gli argomenti di Filopono sono il frutto di un’eccellente esegesi di Aristotele, e persino l’esclusione del contro natura nell’ambito della natura universale sembra riconducibile a quanto Aristotele insegna nel De generatione animalium.
ii. dans la philosophie grecque et latine
95. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Jean‑Baptiste Gourinat Les stoïciens et le dualisme
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The Stoic system is alternatively described as “dualist” because its physics relies on two principles, God and matter, or as “monist”, because these two principles are intimately linked, and belong to the same body. It is difficult to describe the Stoic system as monist, since every substance is a body, and the two principles, while united in the same body, coexist from all eternity since matter is not created by God. But it is inappropriate as well to describe it as “dualist”, because the inferior principle is completely passive and is not a cause, but endures the effect of the active cause. Moreover, matter is not responsible for evil, even if some interpreters, ancient and modern, claimed it : the only metaphysical principle which accounts for the existence of evil is the “affinity of the contraries”, according to which good cannot exist without evil and agent without patient, but this is not a dualist explanation.
études
96. Chôra: Volume > 13
Emma Gannagé Al‑Kindī on the ḥaqīqa ‑ majāz Dichotomy
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L’article se penche sur l’opposition bi‑l‑majāz (par extension) vs. bi‑l‑ḥaqīqa (en verite/realite) qu’on rencontre dans plus d’un traite d’al‑Kindī. Il s’agit de determiner si l’usage qu’en fait al‑Kindī se situe sur le plan lexical, voire semantique, a savoir l’opposition ‛sens propre’ vs. ‛sens figure’ ou devrait plutot se lire sur le plan ontologique, ḥaqīqa s’appliquant alors a tout ce qui est propre a Dieu et majāz a ce qui est cree par lui et donc en derive. S’appuyant sur les conclusions de Wolfhart Heinrichs au sujet de la genese de la dichotomie ḥaqīqa ‑ majāz, l’auteure montre que l’usage qu’al‑Kindī en fait releve de l’ordre ontologique, ce en quoi il s’accorde avec les milieux mu‛tazilites contemporains du philosophe. Cette interpretation est relayee par un temoin plus tardif, a savoir le theologien et philosophe andalou Baḥya Ibn Paqūda (XIe s.) dont le traite al‑Hidāya ilā farā’iḍ al‑qulūb («Guide des devoirs du coeur») fait d’importants emprunts a la Philosophie Premiere d’al‑Kindī.
ii. dans la philosophie grecque et latine
97. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Fabienne Jourdan Plutarque développe‑t‑il réellement une pensée dualiste ?
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Plutarch is often seen as a dualist philosopher. Yet, when one studies the texts which are most often quoted to back such an opinion, the so‑called dualist doxographies in De Iside et Osiride and in De animae procreatione, one is actually lead to think otherwise. When they are replaced in their context, it so happens that these texts describe the conditions to obtain harmony and the mixing of the contraries which are both necessary to the birth and to the very existence of the universe. However, harmony and mixing cannot be obtained without the receptacle of the contraries that constitute them. Far from being a simple intermediary, this receptacle, which takes different aspects in the different treatises, is indeed a constituent principle according to Plutarch. Without it, there can be neither encounter nor opposition of the contraries, and so, paradoxically, precisely because it is a guarantee of dualism, it makes dualism disappear. Dualism then turns out to be a mere preparatory step in the elaboration of a really triadic philosophy.
études
98. Chôra: Volume > 13
Livio Rossetti La polumathia di Parmenide
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Our «universal» perception of Parmenides’ poem is biased by traditional readings to a considerable degree, at least if the poem actually included two different doctrinal bodies, one on being and another peri physeōs properly, the latter encompassing a number of short treatises on the physical world and (some) living organisms.What I plan to offer in support of this claim is, to begin with, an inventory (the first ever prepared) of the topics dealt with in the section devoted to physical world and living creatures (§ 2). Something on Parmenides’ way of studying and understanding different aspects of the physical world and living organisms follows (§ 3).Once acknowledged the above (a point which is not particularly controversial, I presume), the poem comes to look quite differently and some principles of interpretation are likely to collapse : first of all, the customary assumption that frgs. 1‑9 include definite ideas on the doctrines to be found in the second main body, and tell us that they are not of great value. Indeed, the very high quality of several among these doctrines seems to imply that no devaluation of the second main doctrinal body is tenable.Several corollaries are likely to follow. Among them : (a) once concluded the section on being, no further group of verses, meant to establish a convenient relation between the first and the second main doctrinal body, surfaces ; (b) Parmenides was a polymath, and he may have been aware of that, or at least some evidence in support of the awareness thesis is available.
99. Chôra: Volume > 13
Izabela Jurasz Dieu comme dêmiourgos et poiêtês des auteurs chrètiens du IIe siècle
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The article is dedicated to the study of the origins of Christian cosmogony. Christian authors of the 2nd century are known for their enigmatic or ambiguous positions on the issue. The problem concerns mainly the apologists, but it first appears in Ignatius of Antioch (†180) and continues in Bardesanes (†222). Although they all confess God as the Creator, their ways of presenting the act of creation are strongly marked by philosophical doctrines, primarily by Platonism, or by Stoicism in the case of Bardesanes. The Christian Creator receives the characteristics of a demiurge and an artisan. This approach has implications for the notions of universe and matter. But first and foremost, the idea of God as a demiurge and an artisan determines the role assigned to the Logos in the act of creation. Those concepts are later abandoned in favour of a doctrine based more on the Bible, but they give us a better understanding of the relationship between young Christianity and Platonism.
ii. dans la philosophie grecque et latine
100. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Mauro Bonazzi Numenio, il platonismo e le tradizioni orientali
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Contrary to what is often assumed since the seminal studies of Puech, I argue that Numenius’ interest in Oriental Wisdom is part of his Platonist stance. The most important testimony is fr. 1a des Places, which shows that Plato is not only the reference‑point but also the criterion and measure to judge the truthfulness of the other philosophical traditions and religions. Numenius’ dualism therefore can be explained as an attempt to preserve the transcendence of the first principle, the typical problem of Middle Platonists as opposed to Hellenistic philosophies such as Stoicism.