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Displaying: 81-100 of 533 documents

81. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 2
Paul Carron Aristotle on Blaming Animals: Taking the Hardline Approach on Voluntary Action in the Nicomachean Ethics III.1–5
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This essay offers a reconstruction of Aristotle’s account of the voluntary in the Nicomachean Ethics, arguing that the voluntary grounds one notion of responsibility with two levels, and therefore both rational and non-rational animals are responsible for voluntary actions. Aristotle makes no distinction between causal and moral responsibility in the NE; rather, voluntariness and prohairesis form different bases for responsibility and make possible different levels of responsibility, but both levels of responsibility fall within the ethical sphere and are aptly appraised. Important differences between the two levels remain. Animals and children are aptly appraised for direct voluntary actions. Conversely, only adults capable of prohairesis or rational choice are appraised for indirect voluntary actions—psychologically compelled actions that stem from character. Furthermore, while children and animals are responsible for actions, only adults casually contribute to the formation of their characters and thus are aptly appraised for character traits.
82. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 2
Josh Hayes A Politics to Come: Benevolence and the Nature of Friendship in Aristotle’s Ethics
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Throughout Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics, and Magna Moralia, the disposition of benevolence (εὔνοια) operates as the primary condition for both friendship and political community to fully manifest themselves. However, benevolence always retains the possibility of not developing into proper friendship. Although benevolence may develop into proper friendship, its non-possibility comes to be disclosed in the concord (ὁμόνοια) of political friendship (πολιτική φιλία) and the generation of political community. As I shall claim, benevolence is constituted by an essential ambivalence modeled upon Aristotle’s definition of nature as the principle and source of generation (γένεσις) and corruption (φθορά). Following this inherent tendency in all organic life, Aristotle’s account of benevolence thus serves to adumbrate the fragile and tenuous nature of friendship and political community as the site of a cosmopolitanism to come.
83. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 2
Marta Jimenez Self-Love and the Unity of Justice in Aristotle
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In this paper I take up the question about the unity of justice in Aristotle and advocate for a robust relationship between lawfulness and equality, the two senses of justice that Aristotle distinguishes in Nicomachean Ethics (EN) V. My strategy is to focus on Aristotle’s indication in NE V 2 that “other-relatedness” is the common element shared by the two justices and turn to Aristotle’s discussion of the notion of self-love (philautia) in EN IX 8 to explain what that means. I argue that the other-relatedness of justice can be characterized in terms of proper self-love. Concretely, the discussion of self-love makes clear that those who are concerned with the well-being of others in their community over their own material gain—i.e., those who are lawful and not grasping or pleonectic—are able to see that their own self-interest is in harmony with (and promoted by) acting in benefit of their community. This shows that there is an intimate link between lacking pleonectic inclinations and being able to act for the sake of the common good—and in general, between lacking pleonectic inclinations (i.e., being equal) and being virtuous in relation to others (i.e., being lawful).
84. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 2
Katharine R. O'Reilly Cicero Reading the Cyrenaics on the Anticipation of Future Harms
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A common reading of the Cyrenaics is that they are a school of extreme hedonist presentists, recognising only the pleasure of the present moment, and advising against turning our attention to past or future pleasure or pain. Yet they have some strange advice which tells followers to anticipate future harms in order to lessen the unexpectedness of them when they occur. It’s a puzzle, then, how they can consistently hold the attitude they do to our concern with our present selves, and yet endorse the practise of dwelling on possible future painful scenarios. To establish that this is a puzzle, though, we must first be convinced that the report is true. Cicero is our only clear source for the Cyrenaic advice, and scholars have noted reasons to be suspicious of the reliability of his report. I discuss these doubts, and why they ultimately fail to undermine Cicero’s testimony as a source. Defending Cicero as a source for Cyrenaic thought removes a barrier to taking seriously an aspect of Cyrenaic psychology which could radically alter our understanding of their views.
85. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 2
Danielle A. Layne The Value of the Present Moment in Neoplatonic Philosophy
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In the spirit of Pierre Hadot’s analysis of the value of the present moment in Hellenistic philosophies on happiness, the following argues that the Neoplatonic tradition heralded a similar view about the soul’s well-being. Primarily, the value of the present moment in Plotinus focuses on his arguments regarding the immortal soul’s desire for eternity that is lived in the ‘actuality of life’ right now. In contrast, the following analyzes the later Platonists and argues that Proclus offers a more practical and thick understanding of human happiness in relation to the present. Overall, for Proclus the good is revealed in the connective nature of the present moment, a good discovered in the soul’s temporal activities.
86. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 2
Pieter d’Hoine Proclus and Self-Predication
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In Proclus, like in Plato, we find statements about the Forms that at least appear to allow self-predication of Forms. In his discussion of the Parmenides’s Third Man Argument (TMA), however, Proclus argues that Forms and their participants are not synonymous, which means that the property that the Form causes in its participants cannot be predicated of the Form itself. In this paper, I try to show how such seemingly self-predicative statements about the Forms are to be understood in the context of Proclus’ metaphysics. I will argue that, in Proclus, statements such as ‘(only) the Form of Large is truly Large’ should be considered what I will call ‘causal predications’. Causal predication does not attribute any property to a subject, but only concerns the subject’s causal efficacy in relation to that property.
distinguished scholar session: drew a. hyland
87. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 2
John Sallis Dramatic Philosophy
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88. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 2
Jill Gordon Finitude and/or Transcendence in the Work of Drew Hyland
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89. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 2
David Roochnik The Questions of Drew Hyland
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90. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 2
Drew A. Hyland Thanking, Thinking, Aporia
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91. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1
Lucio Angelo Privitello Approaching the Parmenidean Sublime: A New Translation and Resequencing of the Fragments of Parmenides
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To engage with the fragments of Parmenides requires a dutiful apprenticeship. The work of translation/resequencing are of equal weight in an interpretative commentary that carry one towards the possible world pictured by the Eleatic master. As far as the translation and resequencing, presented here in its entirety, I have held fast to Eco’s recommendation for translations, that “goodwill . . . prods us to negotiate the best solution for every line. Among the synonyms for "faithfulness," the word "exactitude" does not exist. Instead there is loyalty, devotion, allegiance, piety.” The “Notes to Translator’s Introduction,” and more so, the “Notes to the Fragments,” are a condensed version of a few frames of references, both cultural and theoretical, that stand in, for the present, as signposts. A fuller elaboration of the resequencing decisions, and philosophical aspects of my position, will take the form of an accompanying piece, and Part II, to this article.
92. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1
Esben Korsgaard Rasmussen Aristotle and the Constitution of the Political Community
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In this paper I will argue that the distinction between biological life and political life as found in Hannah Arendt’s reading of Aristotle and later repeated and elaborated by Giorgio Agamben under the headings of (“bare life”) and (“qualified life”), is in fact a fertile point of entry to , and the only viable option in order the grasp what constitutes the political as such for Aristotle. By hashing out the conceptual steps necessary for the establishment of what can be called a “political community” , I seek to illuminate how the distinction upon which much of Arendt’s and Agamben’s works rests, does indeed play a vital role in the work of Aristotle. By clarifying the nature of a “political community” according to Aristotle, this paper thus seeks to make a proper assessment of the thought of both Arendt and Agamben possible.
93. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1
James Oldfield Truth, Touch, and the Order of Inquiry in Aristotle’s Metaphysics
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A surprising feature of Aristotle’s thought is the fact that he does not offer a single, extended account of truth. He makes passing references to the meaning of truth in various texts, and his comments at times seem hard to reconcile. A preponderance of these comments occur in the Metaphysics, where he seems to adopt two quite different models for thinking about truth: truth is on the one hand a kind of touching or contact, and on the other a matter of joining or dividing subjects and predicates correctly. This paper proposes a reading that reconciles these two models with one another, one that assigns to each model its appropriate place in what Aristotle thinks of as the process of inquiry, a process exemplified by the text of the Metaphysics itself.
94. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1
Maggie Ann Labinski Care and Critique: Augustine’s De magistro
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This paper explores the moments of overlap between Augustine’s pedagogical approach in De magistro and feminist theories of care. I argue that Augustine not only offers a useful model for those who wish to reclaim the centrality of students within education. He also encourages us to critique the narrative that women are more ‘naturally’ suited for caring relationships. I conclude by outlining the benefits of such critique. What do we gain when we allow a diversity of gendered experiences to inform the practice of care in the classroom?
95. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1
Simon Truwant From the Critique of Reason to a Critique of Culture: Cassirer’s Transformation of Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy
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This paper argues that Cassirer’s development of ‘the critique of reason into a critique of culture’ was prompted by two motives that ultimately seem to collide. On the one hand, Cassirer attempts to overcome the Kantian dichotomy between the faculties of sensibility and the understanding. To this end, he turns to the schemata of the Critique of Judgment. On the other hand, Cassirer expands the scope of transcendental philosophy to include cultural domains such as myth, language, and the human sciences. His desire to maintain both the differences between these domains and the unity of reason however leads to a new dualism between the material modalities of the symbols and their ideal, recurring, forms. Yet, by adopting both a constitutive and a regulative conception of objectivity, Cassirer renders this duality legitimate, and his motives for a philosophy of culture on a Kantian foundation compatible.
96. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1
Miles Hentrup Self-Completing Skepticism: On Hegel’s Sublation of Pyrrhonism
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In his 1802 article for the Critical Journal of Philosophy, “Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy,” Hegel attempts to articulate a form of skepticism that is “at one with every true philosophy.” Focusing on the priority that Hegel gives to ancient skepticism over its modern counterpart, Michael Forster and other commentators suggest that it is Pyrrhonism that Hegel views as one with philosophy. Since Hegel calls attention to the persistence of dogmatism even in the work of Sextus Empiricus, however, I argue that it is only a sublated form of Pyrrhonism, what in the Phenomenology of Spirit he calls “self-completing skepticism,” that Hegel takes to be part of genuine philosophical cognition. In this way, I hope to show that the insight that motivates Hegel’s engagement with skepticism in the 1802 essay comes to inform the philosophical itinerary of the Phenomenology of Spirit.
97. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1
Joshua M. Hall Religious Lightness in Infinite Vortex: Dancing with Kierkegaard
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Dance is intimately connected to both Kierkegaard’s personal life and his life in writing, as exemplified in his famous nightly attendance at the dance-filled theater, and his invitation to the readers of “A First and Last Explanation” to (in his words) “dance with” his pseudonyms. The present article’s acceptance of that dance invitation proceeds as follows: the first section surveys the limited secondary literature on dance in Kierkegaard, focusing on the work of M. Ferreira and Edward Mooney. The second section explores the hidden dancing dimensions of Kierkegaard’s “leap” and “shadow-dance” (Schattenspiel). And the third section reinterprets the pseudonymous works richest in dance, Repetition and Postscript, concluding that the religious for him is the lighthearted dance of a comic actor through the everyday theater of the world.
98. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1
Jennifer Gaffney At Home with the Foreign: Arendt on Heidegger and the Politics of Care
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This paper examines Hannah Arendt’s contribution to a conception of political life that remains vigilant of the foreignness that confronts us in our efforts to inhabit a shared world. To this end, I interpret Arendt’s less appreciated discourse on caritas, or love of the neighbor in Love and Saint Augustine, as a critical appropriation of Heidegger’s notion of care. In turning to caritas, I maintain that Arendt captures, perhaps more fully than Heidegger, the foreignness that care is destined to confront in its native desire to belong to something outside of itself. This, I argue, leads Arendt to insist that the responsibility to care is not foremost a matter of individual existence, but rather of politics, grasped precisely as an openness to the foreign in communal life.
99. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1
Katherine Davies The Resistant Interlocutor: Plato, Heidegger, and the End of Dialogue
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Dialogue, as a philosophical form, enables the exploration of the conditions, limits, and consequences of understanding arguments. Two philosophers who undertook to write dialogues—Plato and Heidegger—feature moments in philosophical conversation in which understanding, on its own, fails to convince an interlocutor of an argument. In this article, I examine the philosophical stakes of the collisions which unfold in Plato’s Gorgias, between Socrates and Callicles, and in Heidegger’s “Triadic Conversation,” between the Guide and the Scientist. Plato’s Socrates is ostensibly unsuccessful in persuading Callicles to adopt his position while Heidegger’s Guide is able to support the Scientist in learning a new way of thinking. I argue that it is Heidegger’s attention to feeling as a philosophically significant phenomenon which can overcome trans-rational resistance which may persist even after truth has been determined.
100. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1
Landon Frim, Harrison Fluss Substance Abuse: Spinoza contra Deleuze
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This paper will set out in plain language the basic ontology of “Deleuze’s Spinoza”; it will then critically examine whether such a Spinoza has, or indeed could have, ever truly existed. In this, it will be shown that Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza involves the imposition of three interlocking, formal principles. These are (1) Necessitarianism, (2) Immanence, and (3) Univocity. The uncovering of Deleuze’s use of these three principles, how they relate to one another, and what they jointly imply in terms of ontology, will occupy Part 1 of this paper. The critique of these principles from a Spinozist perspective, i.e. that their use by Deleuze is incompatible with Spinoza’s own metaphysics, will occupy Part 2 of this paper.