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Displaying: 81-100 of 1758 documents


articles
81. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Hugh Burling The Reference of “God” Revisited
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I argue that the reference for “God” is determined by the definite description “the being that is worthy of our worship.” I describe two desiderata for rival theories of the reference of “God” to meet: accessibility and scope. I explain the deficiencies of a view where God is dubbed “God” and the name passed down by causal chains and a view where “God” picks out the unique satisfier of a traditional definite description. After articulating the “Worship-Worthiness” view, I show how it best satisfies the desiderata. I then respond to some putative counterexamples to the view.
82. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Frederick Choo The Prior Obligations Objection to Theological Stateism
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Theological stateist theories, the most well-known of which is Divine Command Theory (DCT), ground our moral obligations directly in some state of God. The prior obligations objection poses a challenge to theological stateism. Is there a moral obligation to obey God’s commands? If no, it is hard to see how God’s commands can generate any moral obligations for us. If yes, then what grounds this prior obligation? To avoid circularity, the moral obligation must be grounded independent of God’s commands; and therefore DCT fails to ground all moral obligations in God’s commands. I argue that DCT proponents should embrace “metaethical DCT.” On this view, there is no moral obligation to obey God. God creates our moral obligations out of normative nothingness. I argue that this helps DCT proponents to escape the prior obligations objection. Other theological stateist theories can modify their theory similarly to meet this objection.
book reviews
83. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Gregory E. Ganssle Philosophical Essays Against Open Theism, edited by Benjamin H. Arbour
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84. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Kate Finley Petitionary Prayer: A Philosophical Investigation, by Scott Davison
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85. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Dustin Crummett Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism, edited by Klaas Kraay
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86. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Chris Tweedt Faith and Humility, by Jonathan Kvanvig
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87. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Michael Thune God, Science, and Religious Diversity: A Defense of Theism, by Robert T. Lehe
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88. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Benjamin B. DeVan The Devil’s Redemption: A New History and Interpretation of Christian Universalism, Volumes 1 and 2, by Michael J. McClymond
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articles
89. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Jc Beall, Jared Henderson A Neglected Qua Solution to the Fundamental Problem of Christology
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We advance a neglected QUA solution to the fundamental problem of Christology. Our chief aim is to put the view on the theological table, leaving future debate to tell its ultimate fate. After presenting the view we measure it against standard problems that confront extant QUA views and also against objections peculiar to the proposed view.
90. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Joseph Jedwab, John A. Keller Paraphrase and the Doctrine of the Trinity
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The Doctrine of the Trinity says that there is one God, that there are three divine Persons, and that each divine Person is God. The Logical Problem of the Trinity is that these claims seem logically inconsistent. We argue that any coherent and orthodox solution to the Logical Problem must use the technique of paraphrase: a logically or metaphysically more perspicuous reformulation. If so, discussions of paraphrase deserve more prominence in the literature on the Doctrine of the Trinity. We also show that such explicit discussion has important implications for theorizing about the Trinity.
91. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Robert C. Roberts Joys: A Brief Moral and Christian Geography
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This paper is an initial effort preparatory for a more thorough “theology of joys.” I distinguish joys from other kinds of pleasure and argue that joy can be seen as the form of all the so-called positive emotions (the ones that feel good). So joy is properly treated in the plural: joys come in a variety of kinds. I distinguish canonical (joys with single-term names) from non-canonical joys. The worthiness of joys is primarily a function of their objects—what the joys are about. I look at a few examples of joys that appear in the New Testament and sketch the relation of joys to happiness.
92. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Jeroen de Ridder Against Quasi-Fideism
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Duncan Pritchard has recently ventured to carve out a novel position in the epistemology of religious belief called quasi-fideism. Its core is an application of ideas from Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology to religious belief. Among its many advertised benefits are that it can do justice to two seemingly conflicting ideas about religious belief, to wit: (a) that it is, at least at some level, a matter of ungrounded faith, but also (b) that it can be epistemically rationally grounded. In this paper, I argue that quasi-fideism fails. Its central tenets either have unattractive consequences or are implausible.
93. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Jonathan Curtis Rutledge Perspectival Skeptical Theism
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Skeptical theists have paid insufficient attention to non-evidential components of epistemic rationality. I address this lacuna by constructing an alternative perspectivalist understanding of epistemic rationality and defeat that, when applied to skeptical theism, yields a more demanding standard for reasonably affirming the crucial premise of the evidential argument from suffering. The resulting perspectival skeptical theism entails that someone can be justified in believing that gratuitous suffering exists only if they are not subject to closure-of-inquiry defeat; that is, a type of defeat that prevents reasonable belief that p even if p is very probable on an agent’s evidence.
reviews
94. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Craig Warmke Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics, edited by Tyron Goldschmidt and Kenneth L. Pearce
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95. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Matthew A. Benton A Grotesque in the Garden, by Hud Hudson
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96. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Andrew M. Bailey Maximal God: A New Defence of Perfect Being Theism, by Yujin Nagasawa
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97. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Michelle Panchuk The Hiddenness of God, by Michael C. Rea
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98. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Jordan Wessling The Christian Idea of God: A Philosophical Foundation for Faith, by Keith Ward
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99. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Mark C. Murphy From the Editor
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article
100. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Rebecca Chan Transformed By Faith
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Appealing to self-interest is a common way of justifying the rationality of religious faith. For instance, Pascal’s wager relies upon the expected value of choosing the life of faith being infinite. Similarly, many contemporary arguments for the rationality of faith turn on whether it is better for an agent to have faith rather than lack it. In this paper, I argue, contra Pascal, that considerations of self-interest do not make choosing faith rational because they fail to take into account the way the self is transformed by faith.