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book reviews
81. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
John Macias Ethics under Capital: MacIntyre, Communication, and the Culture Wars.
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82. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
Josef Novák Heidegger et la question de l’habiter : Une philosophie de l’architecture.
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83. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
Andrew Pfeuffer Gottfried Achenwall. Natural Law: A Translation of the Textbook for Kant’s Lectures on Legal and Political Philosophy
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books received
84. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
Books Received
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85. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
About Our Contributors
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articles
86. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Timothy Perrine Arithmetic, Logicism, and Frege’s Definitions
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This paper describes an exegetical puzzle that lies at the heart of Frege’s writings—how to reconcile his logicism with his definitions and claims about his definitions. It also reviews two interpretations that try to resolve this puzzle: the “explicative interpretation” and the “analysis interpretation.” This paper defends the explicative interpretation and critiques the careful and sophisticated defenses of the analysis interpretation given by Michael Dummett and Patricia Blanchette. Specifically, I argue that Frege’s texts either are inconsistent with the analysis interpretation or do not support it. I also defend the explicative interpretation from the recent charge that it cannot make sense of Frege’s logicism. While I do not provide the explicative interpretation’s full solution to the puzzle, I show that its main competitor is seriously problematic.
87. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Paul Kucharski On the Grounds of a Person’s Dignity: A Response to Linda Zagzebski
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What does it mean to say that a person has dignity, and what explains her dignity? Linda Zagzebski argues that personal dignity entails both infinite and irreplaceable value. Initially she grounds the former claim in the power of rationality and the latter in the uniqueness of one’s subjective lived experience. Later she grounds both in the power of rationality, understood in terms of reflective consciousness. I argue that the latter account is an improvement upon the former but that needless problems arise from both accounts because (1) she conflates properties considered in the abstract with properties instantiated in concrete persons and (2) she fails to recognize an ambiguity in the notion of incommunicability or uniqueness. I also argue that the more fundamental account of rationality should be given not in terms of reflective consciousness but in terms of the ability to understand particulars in light of universals.
88. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Domenic D’Ettore Does Analogy Work in Demonstration?: A Scotist’s Critique of Thomism
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Thomas de Vio Cajetan produced a highly influential Thomistic treatise on analogy entitled De nominum analogia. The merits of this work have been contested since the sixteenth century. Notable twentieth-century Thomists who adopted many of the teachings of De nominum analogia include Jacques Maritain and Yves Simon. Joshua Hochschild’s The Semantics of Analogy highlighted the significance of chapter ten, where Cajetan applies his theory to resolve the problem of demonstrations that use analogous terms, with the explicit purpose of addressing a serious challenge from Scotists regarding the use of analogy in metaphysics. This paper examines the criticism of Cajetan’s way of using analogous terms in demonstrations by the seventeenth-century Franciscan Scotist Bartolomeo Mastri. It shows how the Thomist differs from the Scotist and analyzes these rival positions.
89. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
William Tullius Person and Spirit: On the Ethical and Pedagogical Implications of Edith Stein’s Christian Personalism
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Much of Edith Stein’s work on personhood is influenced by Max Scheler’s ethically focused Christian personalism. But Stein’s own treatment of the ethical implications of personalism is not yet well studied. While the ethical theme is visible early on, it is not until the 1930s that the implicitly Christian dimension of her personalism became explicit. Stein mined her Christian personalism for its ethical and pedagogical implications on the topic of self-formation. This paper reviews the lines of development of Stein’s Christian personalism and examines its centrality for a concept of ethical education.
90. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Rico Gutschmidt The Religious Dimension of Skepticism
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Philosophical skepticism, according to numerous influential accounts of it, is bound up with our failure or inability to adopt an “absolute” standpoint. Similarly, many religions speak of an “absolute” that also is beyond human reach. With this similarity in mind, I will develop what I take to be a religious dimension of skepticism. First, I will discuss the connection that Stanley Cavell draws between his reading of skepticism and the notions of God and original sin. I will then refer to William James’s description of the religious experience of conversion and apply it to the transformative aspect of skepticism. Finally, I will argue with respect to mysticism and negative theology that the transformative experiences one can find in both skepticism and religion can be interpreted as yielding an experiential understanding of the finitude of the human condition.
91. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Jonathan Head Kant’s Religion as a Response to the Pantheism Controversy: Between Mendelssohn and Jacobi
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This paper places Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason within the historical context of the pantheism controversy between Mendelssohn and Jacobi. I argue that reading Religion with this context in mind shines new light upon passages connected with the need for a moral archetype and prototype in the form of Christ, as well as various comments upon the relation between Christianity and Judaism. Within this new viewpoint, we can also see Religion as ultimately concerned with promoting Christianity, broadly understood, as the most appropriate historical vehicle for the promulgation of rational religion, and thus as a cornerstone of the Enlightenment project.
book reviews
92. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Peter N. Bwanali Finding Locke’s God: The Theological Basis of John Locke’s Political Thought
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93. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Curtis Hancock In Search of the Good Life: Through the Eyes of Aristotle, Maimonides, and Aquinas
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94. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Glenn Statile The Logic in Philosophy of Science
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95. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Joseph W. Koterski Converts to the Real: Catholicism and the Making of Continental Philosophy
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books received
96. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Books Received
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97. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 4
About Our Contributors
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articles
98. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 4
Andy German Cosmic Mathematics, Human Erōs: A Comparison of Plato’s Timaeus and Symposium
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In her 2014 monograph, Sarah Broadie argues that Timaeus’s cosmology points to a radical Platonic insight: the full rationality of the cosmos requires the existence of individualized, autonomous, and finite beings like us. Only human life makes the cosmos truly complete. But can Timaeus do full justice to the uniquely human way of being and hence to his own insight? My paper argues that he cannot and that Plato means for us to see that he cannot, by showing how Timaeus treats a famous Platonic theme: eros. Timaeus describes human perfection as assimilation to the mathematical proportions of the cosmos, but by comparing Timaeus with the Symposium I show that, given his deeply mathematized conception of reason, Timaeus cannot provide what Diotima can: a phenomenologically satisfactory account of how we come to identify ourselves with this perfection. Such identification is a transformation in our self-understanding explicable only because of the desirous and reflexive character of the soul. Expressing this character, however, requires combining the mathematical with a poetic, or even mantic, register. Only these sensibilities together grant access to Plato’s cosmology in its fullness.
99. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 4
Thomas Feeney Cartesian Circles and the Analytic Method
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The apparently circular arguments in Descartes’s Meditations should be read as analytic arguments, as Descartes himself suggested. This both explains and excuses the appearance of circularity. Analysis “digs out” what is already present in the meditator’s mind but not yet “expressly known” (Letter to Voetius). Once this is achieved, the meditator may take the result of analysis as an epistemic starting point independent of the original argument. That is, analytic arguments may be reversed to yield demonstrative proofs that follow an already worked-out order of ideas. The “Cartesian Circle,” for example, is circular only when Descartes’s original analytic argument is mistaken for the demonstration that it enables. This approach to Cartesian Circles is unlike the standard approach, which attempts to show that Descartes’s original arguments do work as demonstrations after all.
100. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 4
Michael Barker The Right Stuff: Kantian Matter, Organs, and Organisms
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I consider Kant’s theory of matter, examine his distinction between “formal” and “material” purposiveness, review the related secondary literature, and interpret the role of the stuff of which organs consist in his conception of the special characteristics of organisms. As organisms ingest or absorb compounds, they induce chemical changes among those materials to grow and repair organs. Those organs have their functions with respect to each other in part on account of the materials of which they are composed. A Kantian biological law, I argue, is a coordinated system of lower-order chemical and mechanical regularities that an organism instantiates in the relations that its organs have to each other. I interpret Kant’s contention that organisms resist cognition as claiming that a “discursive understanding” can have no conception of why a particular biological law instantiates whichever lower-order mechanical and chemical regularities it does.