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Displaying: 81-100 of 333 documents


book symposium
81. Res Philosophica: Volume > 97 > Issue: 1
John MacFarlane On Probabilistic Knowledge
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82. Res Philosophica: Volume > 97 > Issue: 1
Daniel Greco Acting on Probabilistic Knowledge
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83. Res Philosophica: Volume > 97 > Issue: 1
Sarah Moss Reply to MacFarlane and Greco
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articles
84. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Eduardo Pérez-Navarro, Víctor Fernández Castro, Javier González de Prado Salas, Manuel Heras–Escribano Not Expressivist Enough: Normative Disagreement about Belief Attribution
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The expressivist account of knowledge attributions, while claiming that these attributions are nonfactual, also typically holds that they retain a factual component. This factual component involves the attribution of a belief. The aim of this work is to show that considerations analogous to those motivating an expressivist account of knowledge attributions can be applied to belief attributions. As a consequence, we claim that expressivists should not treat the so-called factual component as such. The phenomenon we focus on to claim that belief attributions are non-factual is that of normative doxastic disagreement. We show through several examples that this kind of disagreement is analogous to that of the epistemic kind. The result will be a doxastic expressivism. Finally, we answer some objections that our doxastic expressivism could seem to face.
85. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Camil Golub Reid on Moral Sentimentalism
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In the Essays on the Active Powers of Man V. 7, Thomas Reid seeks to show “[t]hat moral approbation implies a real judgment,” contrasting this thesis with the view that moral approbation is no more than a feeling. Unfortunately, his criticism of moral sentimentalism systematically conflates two different metaethical views: non-cognitivism about moral thought and subjectivism about moral properties. However, if we properly disentangle the various parts of Reid’s discussion, we can isolate pertinent arguments against each of these views. Some of these arguments, such as the argument from disagreement and the argument from implausible counterfactuals against subjectivism, or the transparency argument against non-cognitivism, still have important roles to play in contemporary metaethics.
86. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Eric Stencil Arnauld's Silence on the Creation of the Eternal Truths
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In the latter half of the seventeenth century, Antoine Arnauld was a public and private defender of many of the central tenets of Cartesianism. Yet, one issue on which he is surprisingly silent is René Descartes’s claim that God freely created the eternal truths (the Creation Doctrine). Despite Arnauld’s evasion of the issue, whether he holds the Creation Doctrine is one of the most contested issues in Arnauld scholarship. In this article I offer an interpretation of Arnauld’s position. I argue that Arnauld does not hold what I call the metaphysical version of the Creation Doctrine according to which God in fact freely created the eternal truths. Rather, he holds what I call the epistemic version of the Creation Doctrine according to which we cannot know whether God freely created the eternal truths.
87. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Filip Grgić Good Luck, Nature, and God: Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics 8.2
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In this paper I argue that the basic form of good luck (eutuchia) that Aristotle identifies in his Eudemian Ethics 8.2 is the divine good luck, which is not also natural good luck, as is commonly assumed by interpreters. The property of being lucky is neither a primitive nor a natural property, nor such that it is based on some natural property, but a property bestowed by god. Hence, the only satisfactory explanation of good luck must be theological. Furthermore, I argue that Aristotle’s account is neutral in regard to character, intellectual, and physical dispositions of those who are subject to good luck.
88. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Philip Swenson, Bradley Rettler Bundle Theory and the Identity of Indiscernibles
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A and B continue their conversation concerning the Identity of Indiscernibles. Both are aware of recent critiques of the principle that haven’t received replies; B summarizes those critiques, and A offers the replies that are due. B then raises a new worry.
book symposium
89. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Anna Alexandrova Précis for A Philosophy for the Science of Well-Being
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90. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Dick Arneson Comments on Anna Alexandrova, A Philosophy for the Science of Well-Being
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91. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Nicole Hassoun Thoughts on Philosophy and the Science of Well-Being
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92. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Jennifer Hawkins Diversity of Meaning and the Value of a Concept: Comments on Anna Alexandrova’s A Philosophy for the Science of Well-Being
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93. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Anna Alexandrova Reply to Hawkins, Hassoun, and Arneson
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articles
94. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 3
Amie L. Thomasson What Can Phenomenology Bring to Ontology?
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“Ontology” is understood and undertaken very differently in the phenomenological tradition than it is in the recent analytic tradition. Here I argue that those differences are not accidental, but instead reflect deeper differences in views about what the proper role and methods for philosophy are. I aim to show that, from a phenomenological perspective, questions about what exists can be answered ‘easily,’ whether through trivial inferences (in the case of ideal abstracta) or (always tentatively, of course) by ordinary empirical means—seeing how our observations hang together. As a result, it can get us away from the obscurities, epistemological mysteries, and skepticism that the neo-Quinean approach to ontology has left us in and provide a clearer and less problematic approach to questions of ontology.
95. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 3
Daniel Coren Freedom, Gratitude, and Resentment: Olivi and Strawson
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I argue that by attending to a distinction among perspectives on the root causes of our reactive attitudes, we can better understand the bases and limitations of longstanding debates about free will and moral responsibility. I characterize this distinction as “objectivism vs. subjectivism.” I bring out this distinction by first scrutinizing an especially sharp divergence between Peter Strawson and Peter John Olivi. For Olivi, our ordinary human attitudes make it obvious that we have free will, and our attitudes would be senseless if we did not firmly believe that we have free will. For Strawson, reactive attitudes would carry on despite a theoretical acceptance that we lack free will. I apply my distinction to more recent disagreements, such as between Peter van Inwagen and John Martin Fischer/Mark Ravizza. By getting clearer on why we disagree, we can move closer toward a resolution and we can avoid talking past each other.
96. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 3
Luke Teeninga Who Must Benefit from Divine Hiddenness?
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Some have argued that God would not allow some person S to be the victim of an evil for the sake of some good G unless G benefits S in particular, not just someone else. Is this true and, if so, is a similar principle true regarding divine hiddenness? That is, would God remain hidden from some person S for the sake of some good G only if G benefits S? I will argue that this principle has a number of exceptions, even in the context of evil, but particularly in the context of divine hiddenness.
97. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 3
Eric Schwitzgebel Aiming for Moral Mediocrity
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Most people aim to be about as morally good as their peers—not especially better, not especially worse. We do not aim to be good, or non-bad, or to act permissibly rather than impermissibly, by fixed moral standards. Rather, we notice the typical behavior of our peers, then calibrate toward so-so. This is a somewhat bad way to be, but it’s not a terribly bad way to be. We are somewhat morally criticizable for having low moral ambitions. Typical arguments defending the moral acceptability of low moral ambitions—the So-What-If-I’m-Not-a-Saint Excuse, the Fairness Objection, the Happy Coincidence Defense, and the claim that you’re already in The-Most-You-Can-Do Sweet Spot—do not survive critical scrutiny.
book symposium
98. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 3
Michael D. K. Ing Précis to The Vulnerability of Integrity in Early Confucian Thought
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99. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 3
Julianne Nicole Chung A Paradox of Vulnerability
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100. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 3
Alexus McLeod Comments on Michael Ing's The Vulnerability of Integrity in Early Confucian Thought
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