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81. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 18
Hongjian Wang Destruktion und formale Anzeige: Zur Erläuterung der methodischen Grundlage des frühen Heidegger am Beispiel der Bestimmungen von Geschichte und Philosophie
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From the hermeneutics of facticity to phenomenological destruction, Heidegger’s constant effort has been to achieve a non-metaphysical, pre-theoretical methodology of philosophy. His ideas finally lead to the development of the method of formal indication. In this essay, I will consider first the methodological function of historical things, in order to illustrate the method of destruction. Then, I will explain the definition of philosophy from the point of view of formal indication, thereby showing how different this method is from traditional philosophical methods. Finally, I will analyse the importance of this transformation of methodology, in order to reveal in which sense a concrete universality is possible and how it contributes to the foundation of the ontology of life.
82. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 18
Ovidiu Stanciu Le monde comme champ pré-individuel: Jacques Garelli, critique de Heidegger
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The purpose of this enquiry is to lay out the core features of Garelli’s conception of the world as a “pre-individual field,” as they emerge from his confrontation with Heidegger’s thought. In the first part, I am exploring Garelli’s interpretation of the “poetical expression” and the consequences he draws from it with regard to the process of “worlding” (Verweltlichung). Then, I am restating his criticism with regard to the concept of the world Heidegger developed within the framework of “fundamental ontology” and show why, on Garelli’s account, an understanding of the world as an “existential structure of Dasein” fails to grasp its proper meaning. In the final part, I expose Garelli’s objections to Heidegger’s later understanding of the world as “Fourfold” (Geviert) and underline the dependency of this conception on a set of assumptions which perpetuate the theoretical privilege of individual being.
83. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 18
Michel Dalissier Endo-Ontology and the Later Merleau-Ponty’s Thoughts on Space-Time
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In this paper, I consider the idea of space-time in its philosophical specificity. Such an approach must satisfy three main conditions. First, the inquiry must meditate on the link epitomized by the hyphen in the expression “space-time”. Second, it must not reduce either space to time or time to space, but must instead explore the significance of their in-between-ness and of their interweaving reality. Third, the inquiry must rid itself of any priority of space over time or of time over space that would take place in the mediation of space-time. I explore whether there is a metaphysical approach that might be able to articulate the organic link of space-time epitomized by the hyphen in order to grasp the philosophical meaning of its irreducible, deep, and fleshly thickness. I argue that Merleau-Ponty might usher in decisive clues and some insightful tools for building such a theory. I accordingly begin by discussing his later topic of an endo-ontology, linking together concepts such as endospace and endo-time. Starting from there, I examine what he finally envisions as the chiasm and nexus of space-time.
84. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 18
Giovanni Tidona Die „verkehrte Welt“: Er-Örterung raumtheoretischer Dimensionen der Flucht
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The discourse on escaping is primarily directed towards the who of escape. The question of what and how of escaping in its cultural-anthropological significance is usually neglected. The present paper claims to overcome this inadequacy by exploring escape eo ipso and as a spatial-theoretical phenomenon. For this purpose, it is necessary to rethink escape as a triple articulated phenomenological topology based on three vectors: escape as a start, escape as a transition and escape as a destination/refuge. The escape-vectors play the role of symbolic and basic structures which are connected with linguistic and cognitive paradigms. Among the basic figures of escaping, this paper examines escape as a separation, as a non-place and as a fugue; these correspond in turn to the environmental metaphors, first, of the earth as exile, secondly, of the sea and the desert, and finally of the earth as asylum. The multilayered topology of escaping is reconstructed in the interdisciplinary field of spatial theory, of etymology, literature and political philosophy. By examining its spatial-philosophical characteristics, escape emerges as a dynamic phenomenon that can reshape essential concepts and inverse traditional categories of politics. For that reason, escaping determines a philosophically “inverted world” and consequently constitutes an essential source for the future development of cultural-political systems.
85. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 18
Rolf Kühn Das „Ich“ als „Alibi der Wahrheit“ bei Jacques Lacan: Zum Verhältnis von Cogito und Begehren in der Psychoanalyse
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In Lacan’s perspective, the cogito is unable to account for the separation between desire and language for the individual. The fundamental difference pertaining to the signifier (signifiant) makes it impossible for the enunciation (sum) to ever coincide with what is enunciated (sense). Therefore no final knowledge of self, being and reality (réel) is possible within the framework of the imaginary-symbolic life-world. This analysis, which is decisive for the therapeutic process, is then confronted with a radical-phenomenological critique that questions Lacan’s presuppositions about alterity from the perspective of a primal and transcendental life (Lebendigkeit), a confrontation that ought to bear fruit for the dialog between psychoanalysis and phenomenology.
book reviews
86. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 18
Cătălina Condruz Reprises du donné
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87. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 18
Christian Ferencz-Flatz Husserl Handbuch. Leben – Werk – Wirkung
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88. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 18
Miklos Vetö La métaphysique chez Merleau-Ponty. Première partie : phénoménologie et métaphysique; Seconde partie : métaphysique et ontologie
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89. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 18
Saša Hrnjez Übersetzungshermeneutik. Historische und systematische Grundlegung
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phenomenology of animality
90. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 17
Cristian Ciocan, Mădălina Diaconu Introduction: Phenomenology of Animality: Challenges and Perspectives
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91. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 17
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone Husserlian Phenomenology and Darwinian Evolutionary Biology: Complementarities, Exemplifications, and Implications
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Descriptive foundations and a concern with origins are integral to both Husserlian phenomenology and Darwinian evolutionary biology. These complementary aspects are rooted in the lifeworld as it is experienced. Detailed specifications of the complementary aspects testify to a mutual relevance of phenomenology to evolutionary biology and of evolutionary biology to phenomenology. Exemplifications of the mutual relevance are given in terms of both human and nonhuman agentive abilities. The experiential exemplifications show that agentive abilities are rooted in the kinetic sequence: I move, I do, I can. The kinetic sequence in turn testifies to an ability to think in movement, a thinking that engenders corporeal concepts. It also, however, attests to the need for a veritable phenomenology of learning on the one hand and for a veritable recognition of mindful bodies on the other, mindful bodies that are a driving force both in the evolution of animate forms of life and in the evolution of repertoires of I cans.
92. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 17
Andreas Beinsteiner The “As” and the Open: On the Methodological Relevance of Heidegger’s Anthropocentrism
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Martin Heidegger distinguishes the human—as a world-forming, historical being that is capable of language—from the animal, which, according to him, is poor in world, ahistorical and incapable of language. This clear-cut distinction, which is connected to Heidegger’s anti-biologism, has frequently been criticised. By discussing the criticism of Matthew Calcaro, Giorgio Agamben and Jacques Derrida, the present paper aims to show that in Heidegger (1) the human-animal difference is not a biologically determined distinction, (2) human language is not (primarily) understood as an instrument of expression and communication, and (3) humans are not distinguished from animals on the basis of their supposed access to an “objective” reality. While all three points imply corrections to the reception of Heidegger in animal philosophy, (3) is particularly crucial since it refutes Derrida’s interpretation of the as-structure, which has had a large influence on readings of Heidegger, also far beyond the topic of animality. Taking into account these clarifications, a specific historical response-ability of the human becomes intelligible that is relevant in particular in regard to ethical aspirations in animal philosophy.
93. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 17
Tommy Andersson Otherworldly Worlds: Rethinking Animality With and Beyond Martin Heidegger
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By setting up a dialogue with contemporary animal research the essay attempts, on the one hand, to expose the limits of Martin Heidegger’s concept of animality in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, and, on the other hand, to propose some new ways of thinking the being of those animals that most distinctly show themselves as being other than Heidegger’s claims. I suggest, with reference to Heidegger’s thesis of the animal as “poor in world,” that the being of the cognitively most complex animals is better understood in terms of otherworldly worlds within the world of human world forming. With this concept I aim to develop and continue, rather than criticize, Heidegger’s way of thinking the being of animals and deepen the productive relationship between science and philosophy that Heidegger proposed in this work.
94. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 17
Frank Schlalow Animal Welfare, the Earth, and Embodiment: Transforming the Task of Hermeneutic Phenomenology
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The attempt to appropriate Heidegger’s thinking in order to found environmental ethics continues to pose challenges both for understanding the premise of an ethic, and, conversely, for unfolding the importance of his thought in the effort to displace the anthropocentric focus of modern philosophy. These challenges must be taken up on a methodological as well as a thematic level, in order to show how a claim of being can implicate a reciprocal guidance pertaining to our treatment of the earth, nature, and animals. An appeal to the ethos of situated dwelling is not sufficient to ground a transhuman ethic; rather, a precursory step must be taken to uncover a common space of embodiment, thereby marking a jointure whereby habitats fostering the potential for animals to “flourish” can be cultivated in concert with our own capacity to dwell. When viewed through this prism of our “incarnality,” the stewardship that we practice in dwelling on the earth can also “formally indicate” a sense of proportionality, e.g., a “measure,” counter balancing the interests of animals with humans. Conversely, the search for a trans-human ethic calls for a further transformation of phenomenology through its interface with hermeneutics.
95. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 17
Christian Sternad Being Capable of Death: Remarks on the Death of the Animal from a Phenomenological Perspective
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In this article, I investigate how phenomenologists have analysed the relation between man and animal with respect to death. The common tendency of most phenomenologists is to grant man a specific mode of being and to attribute a parallel but deficient mode to the animal. In this way, phenomenology fails to accomplish a positive phenomenological description of the animal’s mode of being or of animality as such. I turn to Heidegger’s decisive analysis of human/animal death since Heidegger would constantly hold on to the idea that the animal, in contrast to man, has no explicit relation to death and is therefore not capable of death as death. This leads to his very provocative claim that only man “dies” whereas the animal just “perishes.” Hence, the problem of the man/animal-relation becomes a very distinct problem in relation to death since death concerns the very way in which a certain form of being relates to the world. I aim to shed light on the genesis of the problem in order to put the question of the animal’s death in a proper perspective. I argue that it is precisely death where phenomenology loses its firm grip on the differentiation between man and animal and hence it is this distinction that has to be put back into question.
96. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 17
Simona Bertolini Ist der Mensch auch ein Tier?: Zwei Antworten der phänomenologischen Tradition
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The phenomenological interpretation of the human being is not a naturalistic explanation. Likewise phenomenology does not interpret the human being as an example of a complex animal: from a phenomenological point of view man is not an animal, inasmuch as his definition and his essence imply a specifically human component, which cannot be attributed to the linear development of animal complexity. However, this does not mean that any animal component is excluded from the structure of humans. How can human animality be acknowledged without denying human specificity and upholding a reductionist view? The purpose of the paper is to analyse and compare two different ways in which the phenomenological tradition has answered this question.
97. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 17
Lucia Zaietta La premiere personne en biologie : passion et révolution: Repenser la subjectivité animale a la lumiere de la dimension pathique
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Animality is a central issue in phenomenology. If the core of the phenomenological approach is the investigation into the correlation between subject and object, what are we talking about when we talk about animal subjectivity? Is it possible to include the notion of animal being in the category of subject? What kind of intentionality does it possess? Our article will analyse the pathic dimension in order to track down some indications about animal subjectivity. Particular emphasis shall be placed on Weizsacker and Merleau-Ponty’s perspectives. Both call into question the definition of subjectivity as an absolute and neutral gaze, exclusively attributed to human being. By contrast, by analysing sensitivity as the common background between animal and human beings, it will be possible to introduce the subject into biology, as explicitly stated by Weizsacker. Subjectivity lies at the intersection between passivity and activity, between perception and movement, between passion and revolution.
98. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 17
James Mensch The Animal and the Divine: The Alterity that I Am
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Even a quick look at the history of religions leaves one impressed with how often the animal has been taken as a manifestation of the sacred. Another feature, frequently found, is the emphasis on the transcendence of the divine. Its radical alterity is such that we cannot directly encounter it. What is the alterity, the transcendence that conjoins these features? In this article, I argue that this alterity is that of the unconscious. Two types of impulses spring from it: impulses that we symbolically project as the Eros rooted in our animal, embodied existence and impulses that we project as springing from the divine. The only way that we can form a stable representation of ourselves is through the intertwining of both of them. Such an intertwining can be accounted for by means of Merleau-Ponty’s model of reversibility and mutual disclosure.
99. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 17
Corry Shores What Is It Like To Become a Rat?: Animal Phenomenology through Uexküll and Deleuze & Guattari
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We respond to a phenomenological challenge set forth in Thomas Nagel’s “What Is It Like To Be a Bat?,” namely, to seek a method for obtaining a phenomenological description of non-human animal experience faithful to an animal’s first-person subjective perspective. First, we examine “translational” strategies employing empathy and communication with animals. Then we turn to a “transpositional” strategy from Uexkull’s Umwelt theory in which we objectively determine the components of a non-human animal’s subjective world of experience and then map those coordinates onto our own subjective world. While this method gives us partial access to the animal’s “perception-world” aspect of its Umwelt, it does not inform us about what it is like to live in the interactive, “effect-world” aspect. To better overcome this limitation, we add a “transformational” approach derived from Deleuze’s & Guattari’s notion of “becoming-animal,” in which we take on an animal’s manners and capacities for interacting with the other objects and creatures in its world.
100. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 17
Jean-François Perrier De la phénoménologie a l’éthique animale: Subjectivité et animalité chez Jacques Derrida
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The goal of this article is to demonstrate that, following Derrida, in order to develop a theory of animality it is necessary to renounce to the implicit use of concepts related to subjectivity (such as “ego,” “ipse,” or “Dasein”). The deconstruction of subjectivity is thus the only way to establish an ethical requirement concerning animals, a requirement which is no longer conceived from the point of view of our “humanity.” In the first part of the paper, I attempt to locate Derridean ethics within phenomenology in a way which situates ethics in relation to the experience of aporia. In the second part, I focus on what Derrida calls the “carnivorous sacrifice” and try to outline a concretization of the ethics of hospitality and of responsibility that reconfigures our relationships with animals.