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81. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Andrew Ward Gettier Cases, Knowledge and Experimental Inquiry
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In 1963, Edmund Gettier published a short paper in the journal Analysis. That paper, entitled “Is Justifi ed True Belief Knowledge?,” purported to demonstrate that even though a person is justified in believing a true proposition p, having that justified true belief (JTB) is not sufficient for the person knowing that p (Gettier, 1963). In particular, Gettier presented examples purporting to show that a person may have a justified true belief, but the belief is, in one way or another, a “lucky belief,” and so the person having the justified true belief that p does not know that p. In what follows, I argue that justified, but luckily true beliefs do count as knowledge. What is important is that there is a limited ability to generalize from such cases, suggesting that many, if not most of what we count as instances of knowledge are, to a greater or lesser extent, localized.
82. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Heather Stewart Making Sense of “Microaggression”: On Family Resemblance and Standpoint Epistemology
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Though philosophers are beginning to pay attention to the phenomenon of microaggressions, they are yet to fully draw on their training and skills in conceptual analysis to help make sense of what microaggression is. In this paper, I offer a philosophical analysis of the concept of microaggression. I ultimately argue that ‘microaggression’ as a concept gets its meaning not by decomposing into a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather by means of what Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) has called “family resemblance.” That is to say, what unifies the concept of microaggression is a set of common, overlapping features that link related instances together, but are not necessarily all present in all cases. I identify and explain a common set of features that together form the basis for a family resemblance account of the concept. I then argue that despite the difficulty that microaggressions pose in terms of being reliably recognized and understood as such, some people, in virtue of their epistemic standpoint, are better suited to recognize these features and subsequently identify instances of micraoggression in practice. I argue this by drawing on the vast literature in feminist standpoint epistemology (Alcoff, 1993; Hill Collins, 1990, 2004; hooks, 2004; Harding, 2004, 2008; Wylie, 2013).
83. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Lamont Rodgers What Are Internalist and Externalist Analyses of Utopia?
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84. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Ken Rogerson Utilitarian Aggregation
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I want to tackle a central thesis of contemporary Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism holds what has come to be called the Aggregation Thesis. The Aggregation Thesis claims, roughly, that several individual harms (or benefits) can be “added up” to represent a larger harm (or benefit). One controversial aspect of this view is that, seemingly, one large harm to a single individual (or smaller group) could be justified if such a harm spared a significantly smaller harm dealt out to a much larger number of other individuals. I will argue that on Utilitarian’s own grounds, the aggregation thesis is not warranted.
85. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Alex R Gillham Epicurean Tranquility and the Pleasure of Philosophy
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86. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Samuel Kahn A Problem for Frankfurt Examples
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In this paper I intend to raise a problem for so-called Frankfurt examples. I begin by describing the examples and what they are used for. Then I describe the problem.
87. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Joseph Swenson Saying What One Means: Nietzsche and the Experience of Literary Philosophy
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Few would dispute that Nietzsche writes differently than most philosophers, especially when judged by the standards of contemporary philosophical writing. There is plenty of dispute, however, about why Nietzsche has chosen to present his thinking in the ways that he does. When one turns to much recent Nietzsche scholarship, it would appear that the literary quality of his writing is often treated as something that is merely accidental rather than integral to his philosophical project. Here one finds a working assumption that it is possible to paraphrase Nietzsche’s unconventional style of writing into more conventional forms of philosophical prose without losing sight of the philosophical goals that he is trying to achieve. This paper argues that this working assumption underappreciates the fact that Nietzsche’s chosen style of writing is intended to perform a variety of functions within his philosophy. One underappreciated function of Nietzsche’s writing, I will argue, aims to promote a radical disruption and revaluation of his readers’ basic habitual attitudes towards their experience of their own lives. Such therapeutic and transformative experiences, I conclude, are not only basic to Nietzsche’s philosophical project but are also intimately connected to the literary quality of his writing and cannot easily survive philosophical paraphrase.
88. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Richard R. Eva Religious Liberty and the Alleged Afterlife
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It is common for religiously motivated actions to be specially protected by law. Many legal theorists have asked why: what makes religion special? What makes it worthy of toleration over and above other non-religious deeply held convictions? The answer I put forward is that religions’ alleged afterlife consequences call for a principle of toleration that warrants special legal treatment. Under a Rawlsian principle of toleration, it is reasonable for those in the original position to opt for principles of justice that accommodate actions with alleged afterlife consequences. And, under a utilitarian principle of toleration, a greater psychological harm is eased by such accommodations. Additionally, this alleged afterlife consequence is found in most of the religions that are thought to warrant some level of special toleration—not only do the Abrahamic religions have alleged afterlife consequences, but many eastern religions do as well, e.g. reincarnation.
89. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Ava Thomas Wright Why Moral Rights of Free Speech for Business Corporations Cannot Be Justified
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In this paper, I develop two philosophically suggestive arguments that the late Justice Stevens made in Citizens United against the idea that business corporations have free speech rights. First, (1) while business corporations conceived as real entities are capable of a thin agency conceptually sufficient for moral rights, I argue that they fail to clear important justificatory hurdles imposed by interest or choice theories of rights. Business corporations conceived as real entities lack any interest in their personal security; moreover, they are incapable of exercising innate powers of choice. Second, (2) I argue that the structure and functionally individualized purpose of a business corporation—to increase value for its shareholders—undermines the implicit joint commitment necessary to derive corporate rights of free speech from non-operative shareholder-member rights. Since one cannot transfer innate moral rights such as free speech, any exercise of this right on behalf of another must be limited in scope.
90. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Tanner Hammond Objective Purport, Relational Confirmation, and the Presumption of Moral Objectivism: A Probabilistic Argument from Moral Experience
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All else being equal, can an objective-seeming character of moral experience support a presumption in favor of some form of moral objectivism? Don Loeb (2007) has argued that even if we grant that moral experience appears to present us with a realm of objective moral facts—something he denies we have reason to do in the first place—the objective purport of moral experience cannot by itself provide even prima facie support for moral objectivism. In what follows, I contend against Loeb that granting the objective purport of ordinary moral experience is sufficient to shift a presumptive case in favor of moral objectivism, and this by constituting non-explanatory, relational confirmation that incrementally raises the prima facie probability that moral facts exist. More specifically, I appeal to a modest confirmational principle shared by Likelihoodists and Bayesians—namely, the Weak Law of Likelihood—in an effort to show that (i) at a minimum, granting the objective purport of moral experience establishes a middling scrutable probability for a sufficient but not necessary condition of moral objectivism being true, and that (ii) this moderate probability in turn constitutes evidence that makes it prima facie more probable than not that at least some form of moral objectivism is true.
91. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Jack Warman Reflections on Intellectual Grandstanding
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In this short paper, I present a philosophical account of intellectual grandstanding. In section 2, I identify a putative case of intellectual grandstanding. In section 3, I introduce Tosi and Warmke’s account of moral grandstanding (Tosi and Warmke, 2016, 2020). In section 4, I highlight some of the similarities and differences between intellectual and moral grandstanding. In section 5, I conclude by proposing some further lines of inquiry.
92. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
G. M. Trujillo, Jr. The Benefits of Being a Suicidal Curmudgeon: Emil Cioran on Killing Yourself
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Emil Cioran offers novel arguments against suicide. He assumes a meaningless world. But in such a world, he argues, suicide and death would be equally as meaningless as life or anything else. Suicide and death are as cumbersome and useless as meaning and life. Yet Cioran also argues that we should contemplate suicide to live better lives. By contemplating suicide, we confront the deep suffering inherent in existence. This humbles us enough to allow us to change even the deepest aspects of ourselves. Yet it also reminds us that our peculiar human ability—being able to contemplate suicide—sets us above anything else in nature or in the heavens. This paper assembles and defends a view of suicide written about in Cioran’s aphorisms and essays.
commentaries
93. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Mark Silcox Comments on “A Separability Principle, Contrast Cases, and Contributory Dispositions” by Zak Kopeikin
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94. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Andrew Russo Comments on “Six Arguments against ‘Ought Implies Can’”
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95. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
John Harris Hypothetical Consent’s Unnecessary Shuffle
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96. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Robyn Gaier Comments on Bryan Smyth’s “De-Moralizing Heroism: Ethical Expertise and the Object of Heroic Approbation”
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97. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Paul Carron Emotion Regulation and the Cultivation of Virtue: Comments on “The Broader Threat of Situationism to Virtue Ethics”
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98. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Daniel Carr Comments on Tim Lord’s “Eliminative Materialism, Historical Consciousness, and R. G. Collingwood’s Philosophy of Mind”
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99. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
C.E. Abbate Commentary on Deborah Heikes’s “Epistemic Ignorance and Moral Responsibility”
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100. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Richard Galvin Maxims, Contraries, Contradictions and Kant’s Universal Law Formula
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