Cover of The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy
Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 81-100 of 276 documents


articles
81. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Ruth Garrett Millikan Naturalizing Intentionality
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
“Intentionality,” as introduced to modern philosophy by Brentano, denotes the property that distinguishes the mental from all other things. As such, intentionality has been related to purposiveness. I suggest, however, that there are many kinds of purposes that are not mental nor derived from anything mental, such as the purpose of one’s stomach to digest food or the purpose of one’s protective eye blink reflex to keep out the sand. These purposes help us to understand intentionality in a naturalistic way. The naturalist challenge here is to show, first, that natural purposiveness can explain the intentionality of explicitly represented purposes, hence that it is associated with “aboutness” (as in Brentano’s usage). Second, it needs to show how the same kind of analysis can also be used to naturalize intentionality in cases where facts are represented rather than purposes or ends.
82. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Pierre Jacob Can Selection Explain Content?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
There are presently three broad approaches the project of naturalizing intentionality: a purely informational approach (Dretske and Fodor), a purely teleological approach (Millikan and Papineau), and a mixed informationally-based teleological approach (Dretske again). I will argue that the last teleosemantic theory offers the most promising approach. I also think, however, that the most explicit version of a pure teleosemantic theory of content, namely Millikan’s admirable theory, faces a pair of objections. My goal in this paper is to spell out Millikan’s pure teleosemantic theory; then to present two objections; and finally to ask the question whether a teleosemantic framework can be saved from the objections.
83. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
James H. Fetzer Computing is at Best a Special Kind of Thinking
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
When computing is defined as the causal implementation of algorithms and algorithms are defined as effective decision procedures, human thought is mental computation only if it is governed by mental algorithms. An examination of ordinary thinking, however, suggests that most human thought processes are non-algorithmic. Digital machines, moreover, are mark-manipulating or string-processing systems whose marks or strings do not stand for anything for those systems, while minds are semiotic (or “signusing”) systems for which signs stand for other things for those systems. Computing, at best, turns out to be no more than a special kind of thinking.
84. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
James H. Moor Thinking Must Be Computation of the Right Kind
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper I argue for a computational theory of thinking that does not eliminate the mind. In doing so, I will defend computationalism against the arguments of John Searle and James Fetzer, and briefly respond to other common criticisms.
85. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
John L. Pollock Rationality in Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
I argue here that sophisticated AI systems, with the exception of those aimed at the psychological modeling of human cognition, must be based on general philosophical theories of rationality and, conversely, philosophical theories of rationality should be tested by implementing them in AI systems. So the philosophy and the AI go hand in hand. I compare human and generic rationality within a broad philosophy of AI and conclude by suggesting that ultimately, virtually all familiar philosophical problems will turn out to be at least indirectly relevant to the task of building an autonomous rational agent, and conversely, the AI enterprise has the potential to throw light at least indirectly on most philosophical problems.
86. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Mary Tjiattas Functional Irrationality
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The mere possibility of irrationality has been challenged by a long-standing tradition which strongly supports the normative primacy of ideals of rationality. In this paper, I consider the possibility that a coherent account of irrationality can nonetheless be provided and furthermore that some forms of irrationality may be seen as justifiable on the basis of their functional roles.
87. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Michael DePaul Character Traits, Virtues, and Vices: Are There None?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Recently, Gilbert Harman has used empirical results obtained by social psychologists to argue that there are no character traits of the type presupposed by virtue ethics—no honesty or dishonesty, no courage or cowardice, in short, no virtue or vice. In this paper, I critically assess his argument as well as that of the social psychologists he appeals to. I suggest that the experimental results recounted by Harman would not much concern such classical virtue theorists as Plato—particularly the Plato of the Republic—because they are pretty much exactly what these theorists would have predicted. The more difficult thesis that virtuous or vicious character traits exist, I do not here argue. Instead, the results of this paper focus on clarifying some of the ways in which character traits are understood by virtue ethicists, especially those who look to the classical philosophers.
88. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Olbeth Hansberg The Role of Emotions in Moral Psychology: Shame and Indignation
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Both indignation, and sometimes shame, can be considered moral emotions because whoever feels them needs a sense of moral values and distinctions, and a grasp of what is correct and incorrect, just and unjust, honorable and dishonorable. However, there are differences in the moral aspects associated with each. Shame is related to self-respect and, sometimes, for this to be upheld, something moral is considered necessary. But shame, unlike indignation, is not moral in the sense of being other-regarding. The person who becomes indignant acknowledges the violations of the rights of others and their suffering. The focus here will be on explicating shame and indignation as emotions that require concepts, beliefs and desires related to morality.
89. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Mark Leon Believing Autonomously
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Recent discussions on the nature of freedom have suggested that freedom of action depends on freedom of the will and that the conditions for the freedom of the will preclude the possibility of the antecedents of free actions being determined or alternatively require that the agent be responsible for those antecedents. In this paper, it is argued that the first thesis is correct but that the second on either interpretation is wrong. What I argue is that if we take one essential component of the antecedents of action, namely belief, and look at the conditions for freedom of belief, or better, autonomy of belief, we will see that rather than determinism being precluded as a condition for autonomy, a certain sort of determinism would make best sense of that autonomy. It is argued that contrary to oft-cited intuitions, were this form of determinism to obtain, our autonomy would be enhanced.
90. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Lynne Rudder Baker What Am I?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Eric T. Olson has argued that any view of personal identity in terms of psychological continuity has a consequence that he considers untenable—namely, that I was never an early-term fetus. I have several replies. First, the psychological-continuity view of personal identity does not entail the putative consequence; the appearance to the contrary depends on not distinguishing between de re and de dicto theses. Second, the putative consequence is not untenable anyway; the appearance to the contrary depends on not taking seriously an idea that underlies a plausible view of persons that I call ‘the Constitution View’. Finally, Olson’s own “Biological View of personal identity” has liabilities of its own.
91. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Diana Tietjens Meyers Authenticity for Real People
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper I shall offer an account of the authentic self that is compatible with human intrapsychic, interpersonal, and social experience. I begin by examiningHarry Frankfurt’s influential treatment of authenticity as a form of personal integration, and argue that his conception of the integrated self is too restrictive. I then offer an alternative processual account that views integration as the intelligibility of the self that emerges when a person exercises autonomy skills.
92. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Adolf Grünbaum Does Freudian Theory Resolve “The Paradoxes of Irrationality”?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper, I criticize the claim made by Donald Davidson, among others, that Freud’s psychoanalytic theory provides “a conceptual framework within which to describe and understand irrationality.” Further, I defend my epistemological strictures on the explanatory and therapeutic foundations of the psychoanalytic enterprise against the efforts of Davidson, Marcia Cavell, Thomas Nagel, et al., to undermine them.
series introduction
93. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 8
Jaakko Hintikka, Robert Cummings Neville, Ernest Sosa, Alan M. Olson, Stephen Dawson Series Introduction
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
volume introduction
94. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 8
Daniel O. Dahlstrom Volume Introduction
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
articles
95. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 8
Marilyn Myerson Feminist Approaches to Sexology
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Sexology, or the formal study of sexuality, positions itself as an authoritative voice wearing a cloak of neutrality. Sexology offers the seal of “scientific truth” to pronoucements that have been arrived at through processes that are ostensibly objective, but covertly value-laden; thus sex research has been effective in perpetuating innocent claims about the human condition and human sexual behavior. Closer examination reveals these claims to be controversial. In the texts and literature of sexology, we find that there is a coherent and significant cluster of assumptions about what is so-called natural sexuality. These assumptions express major paradigms that not only inform the theoretical basis of contemporary sexological thought, but which also happen to be constituent elements in contemporary patriarchal ideology. In this paper I will look at these major paradigms.
96. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 8
Cheryl Hall Feminism’s Essential Eros
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This essay examines the feminist literature on ‘eros’ inspired primarily by Audre Lorde’s essay, “Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power.” The central argument of this literature is that “our erotic knowledge empowers us” by guiding and inspiring us to pursue what we truly value in life. This literature is useful in emphasizing a human quality that is often overlooked, even by other feminists. Yet it is plagued by the prevailing assumption that our deepest passions and desires will necessarily lead to ethical choices. The underlying assumption is that there is a core, ‘pure’, good eros—which is in turn an expression of a core, pure, good self. This is a form of essentialism. Specifically, it is an attribution of a ‘true’, natural property to women that does little more than reverse the valuation of the traditional attribution of natural ‘emotionality’ to women.
97. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 8
Natalie Stoljar The Politics of Identity and the Metaphysics of Diversity: Conceptions of Essentialism in Feminist Philosophy
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The terms “essentialism” and “antiessentialism” have rhetorical, metaphysical, and political force in feminist philosophical literature. This paper develops the relation between the metaphysics and the politics of essentialism. I argue that there are broadly two metaphysical conceptions of essentialism implicit in the literature: the idea that there is a universal womanness that all women share, and the idea that each individual woman has certain essential properties. The first conception is false because it is incompatible with the existence of “multiple identities” pointed out by proponents of the “politics of identity.” The second conception, while it may be true, is politically innocuous. In order to explain the observations of the politics of identity, we need a “metaphysics of diversity.” This paper argues that adopting a kind of resemblance nominalism will provide the required metaphysics of diversity.
98. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 8
Louise M. Antony Situating Feminist Epistemology
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
I understand feminist epistemology to be epistemology put at the service of feminist politics. That is, a feminist epistemology is dedicated to answering the many questions about knowledge that arise in the course of feminist efforts to understand and transform patriarchal structures, questions such as: Why have so many intellectual traditions denigrated the cognitive capacities of women? Are there gender differences in epistemic capacities or strategies, and what would be the implications for epistemology if there were? I argue here that such questions situate feminist epistemology much more in mainstream epistemological discussion than probably most feminists would admit, finding that, at least for issues in these areas, the naturalistic approach to the study of knowledge advocated by W. V. Quine has been extremely useful.
99. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 8
Sally Haslanger Defining Knowledge: Feminist Values and Normative Epistemology
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
With some notable exceptions, feminist epistemologists have not focused (like many contemporary analytic epistemologists) on the the semantics of claims to know: What are the truth conditions of claims of the form S knows that p? My goal in this paper is to suggest a way of approaching the task of specifying the truth conditions for knowledge while (hopefully) making clear how a broad range of feminist work that is often deemed irrelevant to the philosophical inquiry into knowledge is, in fact, highly relevant. My discussion may also show (though I’m not going to take this up explicitly) that there are reasons why the search for truth conditions for knowledge could have a legitimate place in feminist epistemological inquiry.
100. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 8
Peter Caws Temporary Necessities and Permanent Possibilities: Structuralism and Poststructuralism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
How is it possible to speak of structuralism at the end of the millennium, except in the past tense—historically? But has structuralism really sung its swan song? It is hard not to fall prey to the historicism that has been so pervasive in Western thought in the last two hundred years. Yet this is a congress of philosophy, not history nor sociology. What philosophy looks for in structuralism is quite different from what history, or sociology, or even anthropology may find. Therefore, I begin from an avowedly ahistoricist stance since I am not interested in structuralism as a movement, but as a position, and I intend to discuss it as such.