The aim of this article is to critically explore both the theories of “Confucian actual-possession criteria” and “the Confucian principle of love of gradation” and their views on the moral status of human embryos. “Confucian actual-possession criteria”, as accounts proposed for distinguishing person from non-person, and related ideas of Confucian gradualism and Confucian social personhood are discussed first. Their views on the moral status of human embryos are significant, though controversial, and therefore worthy of in-depth analysis. The article discusses then the claim appealing to “the Confucian principle of love of gradation” to justify the destructive use of human embryos for the sake of the welfare of humankind.I argue in this paper that none of the aforementioned Confucian theories of personhood is derivable from nor compatible with Confucianism. Moreover, the justification of sacrificing embryos based on “the Confucian principle of love of gradation” is not only ungrounded but also untenable from the viewpoint of the basic principle of non-maleficence.

This essay is to reject the so-called “bleak implication”—human beings are irrational in nature, which was said to follow from experiments on human reasoning in the eighties. The rejection is advocated by way of re-constructing for the cognitive scientists their argument for the bleak implication. Meanwhile, Stich constructs what he calls the “Selection argument” for human rationality, and then rejects it. This essay examines his arguments and argues that his objections are defective. This essay then revises the selection argument to show how human rationality is connected to the design and performance of human reasoning mechanism with the hope that we may re-open the possibility of defending human rationality from an evolutionary point of view.

The criticism of Plato most often leveled by Aristotle against Plato is that his philosophy is oversimplified. On his view, Plato shares the Socratic assumption about words and definitions. When asked “What is F?” (justice, courage, etc.), Socrates thinks that a single definition can always be found. However, Aristotle claims that some of the crucial words and concepts in his philosophy, such as “being,” “goodness,” “justice,” and “friendship,” are homonymous or multivocal (said in many ways). In his eyes, therefore, Plato oversimplifies the issue: Plato mistakenly ignores homonymy and simply supposes that the same word is always said in the same way. Put briefly, the Platonic accounts of “being, ” “goodness, ” and “justice” should be rejected because homonymy and multivocity are ignored.However, Ch. Shields holds that two of the crucial concepts of the Aristotelian philosophy – “being” and “goodness” – cannot be shown to be homonymous; although Aristotle often issues special warnings against the homonymy of “being” and “goodness, ” all of his arguments fail. Shields claims that there is no defensible Aristotelian doctrine about the homonymy of “being” because this doctrine is false; he also thinks that the homonymy of “goodness” cannot be established because it is inferred from the problematical doctrine of the homonymy of “being”. In this article, I shall show that Shields’ critiques of Aristotle’s arguments for the homonymy of “being” and “goodness” do not succeed. In this way, I shall reconstruct the basic framework of Aristotle’s attempt to establish the homonymy of “being” and “goodness”.

In Wang Yangming’s theoretical premises, the concept of “Li” tends to relate to “the moral domain,” though its affinity with “the amoral domain” is also suggested. He furthermore expounds this concept of “Li” by the notion of “Xin.” In this paper I investigate Wang’s twin-track approach upon “Li,” and propose that his tenet of “Xin Ji Li” suits a moral conception of “Li.” I also point out the predicaments Wang encounters when carring out a forced application of the notion of “Xin” in expounding an amoral conception of “Li.” In addition to my attempts to categorize and elucidate Wang’s concept of “Li,” the proper application range of “Xin Ji Li” will also be explored.

Lewis’s arguments for the triviality results are considered as a powerful rejection of the truth-conditional accounts of conditionals: the absurd consequencethat for any propositions A and C, p(C/A) = p(C) is derived from the classical probability calculus, conditionalization, and Stalnaker’s semantics for conditionals.In this paper, it is argued that the triviality results need not be a threat to Stalnaker’s semantics, for we can derive a generalized triviality result from the classicalprobability theory and any thesis about conditional probability. The lesson, I suggest, is that we should reconsider the classical probability theory or set a restriction on the rule of conditionalization such that the triviality results may be avoided.

Mou Zong-san’s “intellectual intuition” contains two internal contradictions: first, a contradiction between intellect and sensibility regarding moral feeling; second, a contradiction between being and creation of the thing-in-itself. These contradictions are caused by his acceptance of Kant’s theoretical assumption of a dichotomy between sensibility and intellect as well as by the characteristics of non-sensibility and creativity in Kant’s theory of intuition. In turn, this has led to unresolvable difficulties in Mou’s “intellectual intuition” reading of Chinese philosophy. While Husserl’s theory on the intentionality of perception resolved Kant’sdichotomy between sensibility and intellect, his distinction between sensation and perception also provides a phenomenologically based theoretical foundation for solving the internal contradictions of Mou’s “intellectual intuition”: while sensation is equivalent to intellectual intuition as a way for intuiting the thing-in-itself, it involves sensibility and non-creativity, and therefore avoids Mou’s two theoretical contradictions.

This essay investigates the problem about the modularity of central cognitive architecture, focusing on how to grasp the debate between Fodorian minimal modularism and the Massive Modularity Hypothesis (MMH) proposed by evolutionary psychologists. Both conceive of the idea of "modularity" in different ways. While minimal modularism takes "informational encapsulation" to be essential to modules, the MMH does not. Furthermore, their idea of "domain specificity" does not even agree. This essay does not take the debate to be mere verbal issue. Instead, this essay argues that from the minimal modularist point of view, due to the holistic and isotropic features essential to central mechanisms, such mechanisms are informationally unencapsulated and hence are not modular in the Fodorian sense. This is something not denied by evolutionary psychology. This essay then raises six objections to the MMH and concludes accordingly that even on the MMH conception of modularity, the central cognitive system need not be massively modular.

Professor Mou Zongsan once proclaimed: “Kant has no great successors in the West.” Recently, Professor Karl Ameriks also uttered: “A supposed childless professor, Kant the metaphysician left behind a fertile family of illegitimate heirs.” By contrasting Mou’s and Ameriks’ perspectives employed to express a somehow shared sentiment, this paper intends to extract the philosophical imports from this seemingly mere sentiment taking place in the history of philosophy.Mou believes that Kant is often too polite to attribute “intellectual intuition” exclusively to God. Instead, Mou, by taking the stand of Chinese practical philosophy, attributes “intellectual intuition” to humans, thus dissolves the gap between “phenomena and thing-in-itself” and further establishes an “absolute realism” based on values. Ameriks, on the other hand, thinks that Kant’s philosophy is apologetic and modest in comparison to its direct successors in German Idealism. The transformation of Kant into the German Idealism through advocating “the primacy of practical reason” by K. L. Reinhold, however, also misunderstands Kant's very basic discourse of critical philosophy. On the other hand, in the absence of English translation of Reinhold’s Letters on the Kantian Philosophy, theAnglo-American Kantians, get Kant’s philosophy expressed in a completely different direction. By following the thread of exact science, they convert the Kantian philosophy to logical positivism, scientific realism and pragmatism, and thus miss the critical flavor of Kant's original insights. Only the early Romantics, in Ameriks’ view, have inherited Kant's critical philosophical thinking.

The category of “li” as it appears in the Yueji (Record of Music) chapter of the Liji (Book of Rites) is of considerable significance. On the one hand, the Liji Yueji contains the first instance of the word ‘lunli’ in the history of the category of “li.” On the other hand, following Zhuangzi, it contains an early use of the concept of “tianli” (principle of nature) and broadens this to “tianli renyu” (principle of nature and human desires). From all meanings of the character ‘li’ in the pre-Qin period, the Yueji inherited its aspects of “internal property and operational pattern of all things and events,” “consciousness of destiny and life,” and “ethics” (lunli). From a school perspective, the Yueji blends the thought of the Confucian, Daoist and Mohist schools, yet with Confucianism as its main framework. It moreoverbuilds a three-level tacit structure with li as body (ti), etiquette and music as performance (xiang), and the practice of social traditions and customs as function (yong). Moreover, the Yueji also generates close connections between “li” and other philosophical categories, thereby revealing the intellectual context of the category of “li” in the pre-Qin period.

尋覓一套適切的語言，以便用於有關上帝的言說（God - talk），歷久以 來都是神學及哲學的一個重要課題。比喻作為一種語言的工具，自古已被應 用到不同的知識範疇，但對宗教論述而言，類比的方法卻是經由中世紀的托 馬斯‧阿奎那推廣後，才開始被廣泛採用。但阿奎那式的類比法也並非普遍 被接納。其中的主要爭論，是在於文字究竟是否只可以作單一意義的闡釋，還是可以像比喻那樣具有多重涵義。當代學術界的研究，對宗教語言的討論 更是火上加油：邏輯實證論者堅持認為有關上帝的言說都是毫無意義的，因 為真理的宣稱永不能在這個範疇得以立定。有些批評者更認為，宗教是屬於 「不能言說」的世界，人們只能以沉默來回應。這些批評驅使宗教思想家們急於作出回應。前牛津大學基督宗教哲學教授藍聖恩（Ian Ramsey）對此挑 戰作出了當面的回應。他的回答可分為兩方面。首先，他固然是要在這些哲 學的批判之前為宗教語言作出辯護。與此同時，他也渴望說明護教學其實能 夠從邏輯經驗主義的理論找到支持。藍氏所建構的「模型」（model）與「揭 示」（disclosure）進路，恰能證明宗教語言在經驗世界的基礎。他的進路也 顯示出，宗教言說所涵概的足以超越經驗主義對真理與意義的狹隘定義。本 文的目的，是將阿奎那的類比法與藍氏的模型理論作一個比較，並特別指出 兩個方法同樣是從可見的到不可見的進路來言說上帝。與此同時，本文也會 指出，兩者因着不同的本體論引申而來的基本區別。

The epistemological positions of Kant and Hegel are greatly different, and the meanings they give to the idea of God play a clear indication to it. Both of them have the same idea of God as “ens realissimum,” but they understand it differently. The reasons why there is a great difference between the two philosophers could be seen in the fact that the purport of their dealing with the problems of God is different and their theological views of the world are not the same. In this article I propose to contrast Kant’s statement on the idea of God with Hegel’s on the basis of their respective metaphysical ideas and methods.

Wang Tingxiang is one of the most highly regarded Qi theory ideologists. Originally developed by Zhang Zai, Qi theory is about the human nature. However, Wang Tingxiang often quoted Cheng Hao’s Qi theory which was different from Zhang Zai’s. He pointed out that since Zhang Zai, neo-Confucian scholars have divided human nature into philosophical connotations and natural disposition. This division is accordingly deviated from traditional Confucian philosophy. He believed instead that human nature is a natural disposition and supported the idea of inherent qualities. He suggests that human nature includes both good and evil, persisting that all these arguments can be directly supported by Cheng Hao’s ideas. In this way, it seems as if the two scholars had the same view on thetheory of human nature. However, in the latest perspective of Neo-Confucianism researches, Wang Tingxiang is regarded as a representative of Monism of Qi from the Ming Dynasty, while Cheng Hao is a representative of the Theory of One Origin. From this perspective, there must be some significant differences between the two. This essay attempts to identify these differences. The former discussed human nature in an analytic way and the latter did it through the idea of integration. Of greatest importance is Wang Tingxiang’s refusal of the aspect of integration. Although both basing their discussion of human nature on natural disposition, Cheng Hao accepted the division between philosophical connotations and natural disposition in his integration theory, whereas Wang Tingxiangabsolutely refused the possibility of philosophical connotations. By taking their theories of human nature into account, this essay attempts to discuss thesimilarities and differences between Cheng Hao and Wang Tingxiang from the following three questions: What is human nature? Is human nature good, evil or both? Is it possible to remove evil and follow the good?

The main concern of this paper is Henry Allison’s interpretation of Kant’s theory of freedom which received heavy criticism. Basically he divides Kant’s theory of freedom into two different periods, namely the period of semi-critical moral theory around 1781 and the period of mature theory of freedom in second Critique. In the first part of Kant’s Theory of Freedom by Allison, he tries to develop the first period of Kant’s theory of freedom based on the texts of the first Critique. His main thesis is the following: In the semi-critical period, Kant tries to construct a theory of rational agency based on the concept of practical freedom. In the third partof Kant’s Theory of Freedom, Allison argues further that Kant develops a new theory of freedom in order to justify the use of practical freedom, and in the center of this justification lies the concept of transcendental freedom. Allison claimed that Kant did not solve the problem of transcendental freedom in Groundwork III until the publication of the second Critique. He called Kant’s arguments “Reciprocity Thesis” and “Doctrine of fact of pure reason”.

Jia Yi (賈誼) was a political philosopher active in the West Han Wendi (西漢文帝) period. At this time, Li (‘禮’) was growing in importance and Jia Yi was one of its leading proponents. Most academics point out that Jia Yi’s conception of Li was influenced by Xunzi (荀子). However, in Jia Yi’s book Jia Yi Xinshu (賈誼新書), we cannot find any obvious influence from Xunzi. On the contrary, when Jia Yi spoke about Li he quoted ancient documents such as Guanzi (管子), Qingshishi zhi ji (青史氏之記), Xueli (學禮), Quli (曲禮), Wangzhi (王制).This article will first examine Jia Yi’s conception of Li based on the analytical constructs of ‘visualization (可視化)’ and ‘discipline (規訓化)’ in Jia Yi Xinshu. Second, it will discuss the relationship between Xunzi and Jia Yi Xinshu. Though there is a strong resemblance between the two, Jia Yi Xinshu does not refer to Xunzi. Why is this? On the one hand, Jia Yi was very conscious of the Qin (秦) dynasty, at which time one premier, Li Si (李 斯), was a student of Xunzi. However, in the early days of the Han dynasty, the Qin was not held in particularly high esteem and thus Jia Yi could not overtly refer to Xunzi. Furthermore, Jia Yi had read not only Xunzi, but also many other ancient documents, no longer extant today, and so he did not necessarily need to quote from Xunzi. We should not neglect these points, and accordingly, we must reconsider the role of Xunzi’s thinking at the beginning of the Han dynasty.

With the recent unearthing of such Warring States bamboo manuscripts as “Taiyi sheng shui” of Guodian and “Heng xian” of the Shanghai Museum corpus, thestudy of Chinese metaphysics has gained a wealth of new materials and concepts for exploration. Yet new materials continue to come forth, such as the recentlypublished Shanghai Museum v. 7 manuscript “Fan wu liu xing” (in two copies), a text rich in metaphysical significance and of tremendous value to the study ofpre-Qin intellectual history. In a form similar to the Chuci text “Tian wen,” this text is made up of a series of fundamental questions—all in rhymed stanzas—such as“By what means are all things able to take form?” or “Once things take form, by what means do they survive?” It constitutes an important early example ofmetaphysical inquiry in the Chinese tradition, with interesting similarities to and differences from major received philosophical texts from the same time period and region. This essay aims to provide a credible reading of the first half of this important new document and make a brief inquiry into its metaphysical significance.

In Hegel’s philosophy God is “the sole object of philosophy”, in other words, philosophy has to attain in God the complete knowledge, to relate everything to God and to explain everything through God; thus philosophy in essence is a theology and is a worshiping of God. In the context of Hegel’s philosophy, God is considered to be both the final result and the precondition of philosophy, both its final goal and its starting point.The speculative philosophy of Hegel has been formed in the context of the dialogue between various philosophical theories. Regarding knowledge aboutGod, Hegel rejects the validity of the “three agnosticisms” of the Enlightenment: the rationalist theology of Wolff, the critical philosophy of Kant and Jacobi’stheology of feeling. The agnosticism of Wolff’s rational theology was founded on objective view, whereas Kant’s critical philosophy and Jacobi’s philosophy offeeling refuted the possibility of knowing God based on subjective standpoints. Hegel held that these three theories are all based on the faculty of intellect ratherthan on the one of reasoning. He argued that reasoning can attain knowledge not only of the existence of God but also about God Himself.

Traditional epistemology embraces an inferential concept of justification: a belief is justified just in case it can be reasonably inferred from other beliefs. Inferential justification immediately incurs the problem of infinite regress, since the justifying beliefs themselves are in need of further justification. In this paper I will try to explicate a new idea of inferential justification that does not regress indefinitely. I will begin by analyzing the traditional notion of inferential justification as involving three principles, namely narrow inferentialism, formalism, and linear regress justification. All three principles are critically examined, and in their place, three new ones are proposed: broad inferentialism, materialism, and interactive justification. The principles constitute a new inferential approach which admits of no infinite regress.

This article is concerned with the problem of how to avoid the Third Man Argument which Plato put forward in Parmenides. According to Gregory Vlastos, this argument is based on two tacit assumptions: the Self-Predication and the Non-Identity Assumption. In recent years there have been a number of interpretations which attempted to avoid the Third Man Argument by proving that the Self-Predication Assumption is not an acceptable part of Plato’s theory. However, in this article I will show that the fallacy of the Third Man Argument does not lie in the Self-Predication Assumption, but in the Non-Identity Assumption. That is, we may avoid the Third Man Argument by proving that the Non-Identity Assumption is false.Moreover, in this article I will point out that by putting forward the Third Man Argument, Plato does not really intend to raise a criticism of his own theory. Rather, the two versions of the Third Man Argument, which are set out in Parmenides 132a1-b2 and 132d1-133a7 respectively, should be considered as his warnings against the possible misunderstandings concerning the relationship between Forms and particulars, i.e. the relationship of “participation.” In other words, if we mistakenly interpret the conception of participation in a materialistic manner, the Theory of Forms will inevitably be caught in the “Largeness Regress”; and if we comprehend the relationship of participation in terms of the “likeness” between Forms and particulars, and consider the later to be a symmetrical relation, then the Theory of Forms must fall into the “Likeness Regress.”

This paper argues against grounding the normativity of the judgment of taste on morality, and argues that the uniqueness of aesthetic normativity can beclarified through the distinctive status and function of the modality of the judgment of taste, and that the normative content of the judgment of taste constitutes the content of the judgment itself. Two distinct notions of sensus communis－pure sensus communis and ideal sensus communis—are strictly discriminated by applying the constitutive/regulative distinction, which can be seen in the following two contexts: the distinction between law of understanding and principle of reason, and the distinction between mathematical law and dynamic law. ‘Pure sensus communis’ is the effect of the free play of imagination and understanding; it is not only a feeling, but also a capacity for feeling (taste) and a constitutive norm and principle of the judgment. ‘Ideal sensus communis’ is the a priori connection between pure sensus communis and moral feeling; it is the effect of the harmony among imagination, understanding and reason. With respect to the normative force, pure sensus communis is analogous to dynamic law of understanding (for example, the law of causality); nevertheless, ideal sensus communis is regulative for the judgment of taste, just as principle of reason is regulative for empirical judgment. Beauty can symbolize morality precisely because the pleasure of taste is pure, but not vice versa; otherwise the autonomy of taste would be violated. Taste can be guided in its purposive self-sharpening and self-purifying by ideal sensus communis to enhance humanity, so that it becomes “pragmatically” possible to ground a world in concordance with moral ideal through the enhancement of humanity. In the end, this paper argues that the reason why Kant seems to ground beauty on morality lies in the pragmatic significance of his critical natural teleology.