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Helen E. Longino
What Can She Know?:
Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge
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Clive Stroud-Drinkwater
The Naive Theory of Colour
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James Cargile
Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy
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Sydney Shoemaker
Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense" Lecture II: The Broad Perceptual Model
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Sydney Shoemaker
Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense" Lecture I: The Object Perception Model
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Gary Rosenkrantz
The Immaterial Self:
A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind
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Louis E. Loeb
A Progress of Sentiments, Reflections on Hume's Treatise
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Nicholas Rescher
Replies to Commentators
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Peg Brand
Definitions of Art
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Annette C. Baier
Hume's System:
An Examination of the First Book of his Treatise
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Roy A. Sorensen
Vagueness:
An Investigation into Natural Languages and the Sorites Paradox
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Rolf George, Paul Rusnock
Snails Rolled Up Contrary to All Sense
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Douglas C. Long
One More Foiled Defense of Skepticism
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In my essay I contend that the three main avenues by which one might plausibly account for one's self-awareness are unavailable to an individual who is restricted to the skeptic's epistemic ground rules. First, all-encompassing doubt about the world cancels our "external" epistemic access via perception to ourselves as material individuals in the world. Second, one does not have direct cpistemic access to one's substantial self through introspection, since the self as such is not a proper object of inner awareness. Third, we cannot claim, as Descartes did, that we have indirect epistemic access to the substantial self by inference from the occurrence of experiences.The summary conclusion for which I argue is that, if we are to account for our self-knowledge, we cannot adopt the purely subjective epistemological stance that is at the heart of global skepticism.
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Sydney Shoemaker
Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense" Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience
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Terrance McConnell
On the Nature and Scope of Morality
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John Kekes
The Pragmatic Idealism of Nicholas Rescher
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T. L. S. Sprigge
Idealism contra Idealism
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Alex Neill
Film and Phenomenology
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Jack Meiland
Cognitive Schemes and Truth as an Ideal
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Derk Pereboom
Bats, Brain Scientists, and the Limitations of Introspection
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