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Edward Erwin
Psychoanalysis:
Past, Present, and Future
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642.
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Ishtiyaque Haji
An Epistemic Dimension of Blameworthiness
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The author first argues against the view that an agent is morally blameworthy for performing an action only if it is morally wrong for that agent to perform that action. The author then proposes a replacement for this view whose gist is summarized in the principle: an agent S is morally blameworthy for performing action A only if S has the belief that it is wrong for her to do A and this belief plays an appropriate role in S’s Aing. He focuses on explicating the role an agent’s belief that a prospective action, A, of hers is wrong must play in the production of her A-ing in order that she be blameworthy for A-ing. Towards this end, the author makes use of cases involving akrasia and self-deception.
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643.
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Virginia Held
Moral Prejudices:
Essays on Ethics
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644.
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Arda Denkel
On the Compresence of Tropes
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Once we assume that objects are bundles of tropes, we want to know how the latter cohere. Are they held together by a substratum, are they linked by external relations or do they cling to one another by internal relations? This paper begins by exploring the reasons for eliminating the first two suggestions. Defending that the third option can be made plausible, it advances the following thesis: Maintaining that tropes are held in a compresence by appropriately qualified internal relations avoids the consequence that such properties will be essential to the object. The specific targets of the second part of the paper include, first, a more precise description of the notion of a cohesive internal relation, and second, an explanation of how alteration is possible in an object the particular properties of which hold together by qualified internal relations.
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645.
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Peter Simons
Holes and Other Superficialities
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646.
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John Campbell
Replies
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647.
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Tadeusz Szubka
The Philosophy of Michael Dummett
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648.
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Raimo Tuomela
Socializing Epistemology:
The Social Dimensions of Knowledge
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649.
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Carleton B. Christensen
Meaning Things and Meaning Others
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At least phenomenologically the way communicative acts reveal intentions is different from the way non-communicative acts do this: the former have an “addressed” character which the latter do not. The paper argues that this difference is a real one, reflecting the irreducibly “conventional” character of human communication. It attempts to show this through a critical analysis of the Gricean programme and its methodologically individualist attempt to explain the “conventional” as derivative from the “non-conventional”. It is shown how in order to eliminate certain counterexamples the Gricean analysis of utterer’s meaning must be made self-referential. It is then shown how this in turn admits an “ontological difference” which undercuts all methodological individualism: meaning something by an utterance must then have a certain intrinsic, irreducible “conventionality” and “intersubjectivity”. Objections to this claim are raised and dealt with. It is suggested that any problem of origin might be resolvable by rejecting the semantic reductionism of Grice’s programme. An internal relation between self-consciousness, intersubjectivity and language is suggested. The paper ends by speculating that the self-conscious subject is intrinsically embodied and related to other subjects in that for it its body is essentially a medium of signs with which to express its “inner states” to others.
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650.
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Trenton Merricks
More on Warrant’s Entailing Truth
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Warrant is that, whatever it is, which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. In “Warrant Entails Truth” (PPR, December 1995), I argued that it is impossible that a false belief be warranted. Sharon Ryan attacked the argument of that paper in her “Does Warrant Entail Truth?” (PPR, March 1996). In “More on Warrant’s Entailing Truth” I present arguments for the claim that warrant entails truth that are, I think, significantly more compelling than the arguments of my original “Warrant Entails Truth.” This paper responds to Ryan’s objections, but it is not merely a reply to Ryan’s article. It is, rather, a free-standing defense of warrant’s entailing truth that is the product of discussion and argument for over two years with many philosophers, including Ryan, over the arguments contained in my original paper.
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651.
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John Campbell
Précis of Past, Space and Self
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652.
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Michael Levin
You Can Always Count on Reliabilism
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This article considers some recent objections to reliabilism, particularly those of Susan Haack in Evidence and Inquiry. Haack complains that reliabilism solves the “ratification” problem trivially, making it analytic that evidence relates to truth; this paper defends an analytic solution to this problem. It argues as well that reliabilism is not tacitly committed to “evidentialism.” Familiar counterexamples to and repairs of reliabilism are reviewed, with an eye to finding their rationale. Finally, it suggests that the underlying dispute between reliabilism and its critics is the existence of a priori relations between evidence and hypotheses.
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653.
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Johannes L. Brandl
Austrian Philosophy:
The Legacy of Franz Brentano
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654.
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José Luis Bermúdez
Practical Understanding vs Reflective Understanding
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655.
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Quassim Cassam
Subjects and Objects
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656.
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Timothy Williamson
Sense, Validity and Context
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657.
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Robert Merrihew Adams
Things in Themselves
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The paper is an interpretation and defense of Kant’s conception of things in themselves as noumena, along the following lines. Noumena are transempirical realities. As such they have several important roles in Kant’s critical philosophy (Section 1). Our theoretical faculties cannot obtain enough content for a conception of noumena that would assure their real possibility as objects, but can establish their merely formal logical possibility (Sections 2-3). Our practical reason, however, grounds belief in the real possibility of some noumena, and even knowledge of the noumenal reality of a free will (Section 4). Section 5 defends Kant’s conception of noumena as a good piece of philosophy, particularly with respect to its distinction between logical and real possibility. Are noumena numerically identical with experienced (phenomenal) objects? Kantian principles yield the answers that human selves are, God isn’t, and it’s harder to say about bodies (Section 6).
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Josefa Toribio
Twin Pleas:
Probing Content and Compositionality
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Dual factor theories of meaning are fatally flawed in at least two ways. First. their very duality constitutes a problem: the two dimensions of meaning (reference and conceptual role) cannot be treated as totally orthogonal without compromising the intuition that much of our linguistic and non linguistic behavior is based on the cognizer’s interaction with the world. Second, Conceptual Role Semantics is not adequate for explaining a crucial feature of linguistic representation, viz., the special kind of compositionality known as concatenative compositionality. Dual factor theories, I conclude, cannot constitute an acceptable philosophical model of content.
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659.
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David Shatz
The Metaphysics of Control
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660.
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Michael Tye
Raw Feeling:
A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness
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