The paper seeks to demystify Nietzsche’s concept of genealogy. Genealogy tells the story of historical origins in the form of a myth that is betrayed fromwithin, while readers have naively assumed it tells a story that Nietzsche endorses—whether of history or naturalized origins. Looked at more closely, genealogy,I claim, tells the story of human consciousness and its extraordinary fallibility. It relates the conditions and limits of consciousness and how these are activelyavoided and forgotten, for the most part in vain. The lessons are these: there is no human time before consciousness; no unconscious activity that is uncontaminated by consciousness or culture; no period of prehistory that isn’t already historical or historicized, hence subject to dehistoricization (for prehistory, Urzeit, always comes after history, in the form of a myth); no primordial “innocence of becoming,” let alone any future condition free of these same constraints. Genealogy is the critique of the myth of knowing critique.

This essay explores the nihilistic coincidence of the ascetic ideal and Nietzsche’s localization of science in the conceptual world of anarchic socialismas Nietzsche indicts the uncritical convictions of modern science by way of a critique of the causa sui, questioning both religion and the enlightenment as well asboth free and unfree will and condemning the “poor philology” enshrined in the language of the “laws” of nature. Reviewing the history of philosophical nihilismin the context of Nietzsche’s “tragic knowledge” along with political readings of nihilism, willing nothing rather than not willing at all, today’s this-worldly and very planetary nihilism includes the virtual loci of technological desire (literally willing nothing) as well as the perpetual and consequently pointless threat of nuclear annihilation and the routine or ordinary annihilation of plant and animal life as of inorganic nature.

In his four Unmodern Observations (Unzeitmässige Betrachtungen) of the 1870s, Nietzsche confronted early philosophical versions of positions more recentlydiscussed under such rubrics as globalization and the end of history. What he intended by marking these essays as “unmodern” or “untimely” was to designatetheir critical stance toward both the philistine self-congratulation of the era and the Hegelian philosophy with which it explained and justified itself. Basic to thisHegelian conception of history is a concept of the world-historical “great event,” a turning point that manifests itself in the world of political states. The Unmodernseries broke off with Nietzsche’s essay on Wagner, where he attempted to articulate his own non-statist version of a great event. The current essay diagnoses theinterruption of this project as a failure to fully abandon Hegelian thinking, and outlines a reading of Nietzsche’s later, more compelling (and unHegelian) conceptof the great event.

Contrary to wide-spread caricatures of Nietzsche, he has definite standards of value that are largely defensible, though on another basis than he provides. Thenadir is the Last Man; the zenith is the Overman. Contrary to the otherworldliness of Plato and the Christian tradition, Nietzsche demands fidelity to the earth anda love of the body. The modern virtue of truthfulness dissolved the tradition, but eventuated in the Last Man who lives in “wretched contentment.” The Overmanrequires organizing the chaos of one’s life and submission to centuries-long practices without contempt for the earth. He demands the unity of conscious and unconscious, sensitivity to beauty, love of each individual thing and the love of eternity. He seeks broad vision grounding the unity of humankind in which each individual can find his or her highest potential. All these are eminently defensible values.

Throughout Nietzsche’s writings we find discussion of various human maladies and sicknesses, such as the historical malady and decadence, along withvarious conceptions of a possible cure or therapy. In this essay I argue that Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy’s therapeutic role centres on the protection and promotion of authenticity and explore his preoccupation with authentic existence in each one of his three main intellectual periods. After an opening section on therapeia and paideia in Nietzsche, I focus first on writings from his early period, notably the untimelies on history and Schopenhauer; in the next main section I select Dawn from the middle period as a text that highlights Nietzsche’s continued preoccupation with authenticity; and in the final main section I focus on the late Nietzsche and note the continuities in his lifelong project of self-cultivation and emphasis on the goals of culture.

This paper examines Nietzsche’s philosophical self-understanding and focuses particularly on the concept of intellectual honesty. It discusses, first, thewritings of his middle period, particularly Human, All Too Human, Daybreak, and The Gay Science, and analyses Nietzsche’s critique of religion, Christianity, andWestern philosophy and science. In so doing, it introduces his (Socratic) emphasis on the role of modesty and intellectual honesty as a key to understanding his(early and) middle philosophy. The paper then moves on to show that and why his later philosophical works express less of a concern for intellectual honesty thanhis earlier works. It examines the radical (Dionysian) character of Nietzsche’s later philosophy and draws attention to the intrinsic paradoxes of his later thought. Itthus discusses an important development in Nietzsche’s philosophy and dialectic within modern thought that deserves close attention if an adequate understanding of the course of modern thought is at stake.

Thus Spoke Zarathustra expresses a revolt against the quest for “afterworlds.” Nietzsche is seen transferring rationality to the body, welcoming the many in akingdom of the un-unified multiple, with a burst of enthusiasm at the figure of recurrence. At first, he values an acceptation of suffering through reconciliation with time, and puts the onus on the divine to refute the dismembering of the oneness of meaning and unity of the soul’s quest for joy in eternity. Then confrontingChristianity, he sees its refusal to sacrifice anyone, at the cost of making all sick with a unique healer, and rejects it as incompatible with his ideal of plenitude. Inthe absence of an ontology of the person, the affirmation of the individual and his value, opposed to the antagonistic affirmation of the many put in front of theone God and destroyed by him, ends up dislocating the reality of the self. The Nietzschean option resisted any leveling down—this is its merit—yet the mysteryof the Trinity needs to be brought into the reflection to respect Nietzsche’s own terms in defining the final problem which is also the one option: Dionysus orthe Crucified?

What contemporary social and political significance, if any, can we draw from Nietzsche’s philosophy? The present essay looks into this question by first examining the broader debate regarding anti-foundational tendencies in post-Nietzschean discourses and their alleged threat to liberal democracies. Thatthese tendencies can indeed be traced back to Nietzsche, specifically through Martin Heidegger’s problematic transmission, will then be discussed along withthe more general theme of how metaphysics stands in socio-political practices and why metaphysics should be overcome. The sorts of problems stemming fromHeidegger’s transmission of Nietzsche are philosophical and historical in nature, both of which make the contemporary socio-political significance of Nietzsche’sphilosophy difficult to discern. The essay examines some of these problems through a discussion of an historical encounter between Heidegger and Eugen Fink. The essay concludes with the thought that despite the various ways in which the name of Nietzsche haunts contemporary discourses, a promise for liberal democracy is also contained therein.

At early ages, Buber, Scholem, and Rosenzweig encountered Nietzsche’s work. Nietzsche’s philosophy was reduced to short catchwords or barely mentionedin their later writings. His views on Jews and Judaism seemed to have mattered little, and he first and foremost aided their rebellious breaks with both traditionaland enlightened concepts of God. Nietzsche’s proclamation of God’s death thus served them to articulate their own unease with religious traditions. Yet in manyways the confrontation with Nietzsche was both attenuated and accentuated by the concept of Erlebnis and elevation of aesthetical categories. Ironically, Nietzsche’s challenge to Jewish thought was less in his alleged anti-religious stance, than in the celebration of an unmitigated experience, which was incompatible with any attempt of forging a new critical Jewish philosophy.

Nietzsche subjects traditional philosophical causality to a skeptical critique. With the moderns, he rejects form as superficial. Against the moderns, he findsphysical laws and their ground in a free consciousness equally superficial, and he thinks that the principle of utility is ultimately life denying. However, Nietzscheis not a skeptic, and he has his own doctrine of causality centered on the noble power of the philosopher. The philosopher has the ability to impose new purposes, and this power is the culmination of nature and history. The philosopher believes himself to be a kind of exemplar cause, the consummation of the whole. His is not an instrumental good but one sought for its own sake.

Focusing on Nietzsche’s madman parable from The Gay Science, this essay shows how the language/imagery of aphorism 125 draws on a Cynical critique ofmorality that has far-reaching consequences for understanding Nietzsche’s notions of nihilism, transvaluation of values, and amor fati. My claim is that the work ofDiogenes of Sinope will shape both the rhetorical structure and the philosophical thematics of The Gay Science. As the “Socrates gone mad,” Diogenes/the madman brings his lantern to the marketplace to seek a God who has fled, the deus absconditus. Countering Christian-Platonic metaphysics with Diogenean satire, Nietzsche advocates the embrace of physis as the sphere of human creation and valuation. Against this Cynical background we can see how the madman parable’s announcement of God’s death has less to do with atheism or the argument about the existence of God than it does with the existential concerns of the human being.

As a lifelong Lutheran who resisted numerous attempts by Catholic acquaintances to convert him, one might reasonably expect Leibniz to have followedthe orthodox Lutheran line on disputed doctrinal issues, and thus held amongst other things that the doctrine of purgatory was false. Yet there is strong evidencethat Leibniz personally accepted the doctrine of purgatory. After examining this evidence, I determine how Leibniz sought to justify his endorsement of purgatoryand explain how his endorsement sits alongside his frequent rehearsal of familiar Protestant arguments against the doctrine. I then examine some of Leibniz’s other theological and philosophical commitments, including those on the afterlife, in order to tentatively tease out further details of the form of purgatory that wonhis approval. In considering these issues, I aim to make clear the extent to which Leibniz’s philosophical thinking underpins and shapes his theological beliefs.

This article argues that Maritain’s philosophy of human intellection was more indebted to Bergson’s views on the centrality of intuition, metaphysics, andthe instrumental character of scientific reason, than some of Maritain’s published criticisms of Bergson might lead one to believe. Toward the end of his life Maritain spoke of twentieth-century Thomism’s debt to Bergson.

This essay makes a number of distinctions between the motives of love and of duty, and argues that ideally they act in concert so as to generate constancy in loving relations. The essay revolves around a case in which a husband or wife is tempted to infidelity. It is argued that resistance to the temptation is optimally grounded in love for the spouse rather than simply in a duty to resist initiated perhaps through promise or vow. This is not, however, to undermine altogether the significance of promises of this sort; it is rather to put a proper emphasis on the sentiment of love as an effective spring to action and to suggest that the sentiment itself ideally brings a past promise or vow of fidelity into present relief in a choice situation.

I argue that Descartes takes true representation by means of concepts (or clear and distinct ideas) to involve resemblance between those concepts andtheir extra-mental objects. On the basis of analysis of a wide range of important Cartesian texts, I contend we must attribute to Descartes a doctrine of conceptualor intellectual resemblance, according to which ideas or concepts represent objects by resembling them. This doctrine of resemblance entails a further doctrine of property-sharing which, though inherently problematic for Cartesian ontology generally, is nonetheless supported by Descartes’ use of the scholastic distinctionbetween formal and objective reality.

In a recent article in this journal, Robert Anderson criticizes my position in the Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 2004, whereinI argued for the justification of certain kinds of actions even though they involve the killing of innocents. He does not adequately assess the salient features of thekinds of cases I was defending, and he ignores my use of Philippa Foot’s distinction between the demands of justice and charity in characterizing the morally relevant principles involved in such cases. I argued that the actions involving the killing of the innocent as a side effect in such cases is not the kind of killing which justice prohibits because in such cases there is both no one who is killed unjustly and yet there are lives which charity clearly demands that we save. In this paper, I respond to Anderson’s criticism of my 2004 paper.

This essay seeks to ground the ontological integrity of natural things by examining the dialectic between substantial form, which is the “being-in-itself ”of substances, and second acts, the “being-toward-others” of substances. It is found that a new category of causality needs to be established, that of “expressivecausality.” The effects of expressive causality—second acts—are expressions of their substantial form, their cause. It is determined that second acts are sufficientconditions for substantial form, while substantial form itself is a necessary condition for its second acts. This implies that substantial form is ontologically priorto its second acts, which are proper attributes. These proper attributes are distinct from yet essentially connected with substantial form, and can never exhaust thecontent of the form.

In this paper, I examine two different ways of understanding Aquinas’s account of the infused and acquired virtues. I argue that one of these ways, at least asit is commonly described, is unable to accommodate one of Aquinas’s most central claims about the difference between the infused and acquired virtues.

Perhaps the best known criticism of Pascal’s wager is the many Gods objection. As so often with anglophone criticisms of Pascal, the many Gods objectiontypically treats the wager in isolation from the rest of Pascal’s thought. In this case, the truncated reading has issued in the view that Pascal was indifferent toor ignorant of the possibility that Gods other than the one described by Catholic theology might exist. This view is false. Even a cursory glance beyond the wagerfragment reveals that Pascal considers a number of religious and philosophical positions and argues that, given the nature and needs of the human being, onlya God of a specific description could count as God for the human being and, so, be the object of the wager. This essay sketches Pascal’s view to show that the many Gods objection is not sufficient to address his argument meaningfully.

Religion in the perverted form of idolatry/ideology is at the root of violence for Simone Weil and René Girard. For Girard, “mimetic desire” expresses the idolization of another and ultimately of the self: when the individual’s expectations of achieving autonomy through another remain unfulfilled, he seeksa scapegoat. For Weil, everyone is subject to “force” as recipient or perpetrator of violence which is catalyzed by ideology, a form of idolatry. While Weil focuseson the idolatry of ideas, both writers agree that the subject’s desire for absolute autonomy is the source of idolatry and violence. Furthermore, both presupposesuffering as the individual’s driving force, seeking relief in idols or scapegoats; accepting this suffering by imitating Christ is the solution, freeing one from selfish,idolatrous desires.