The association of passion with desire has a long history, from Aristotle to contemporary philosophers. The Aristotelian conception of passion as involving desire has exerted a considerable influence on modern philosophers. I shall take this idea to be the thesis that emotion implies desire. In order to elaborate this thesis, in this paper, I shall focus on Hume’s theory of passion in Book 2 of Treatise. To this end, I first of all present an interpretation of Hume that relies on an account of desire as such that I have developed. Secondly, I demonstrate what kinds of authority, if any, desires have in Hume’s view of the explanation of action.

The labor philosophy is a concept formatting by reflection on practical philosophy in contemporary China and a regression from the understanding of Marx’s philosophy foundation to Marx text. That Marx’s philosophy is explained to be practical philosophy by Italian Labriola, Gramsi and Yugoslavia practice school in 20 century produced great effect on research filed of Marx’s philosophy. Practical philosophy has been rising in the study of Marx’s philosophy in China mainland since more than 20 years ago, it is the mainstream discourse in philosophical circles of modern China mainland. In the study course of contemporary China practice philosophy, it general falls into four theoretical patterns: practice epistemology, practice ontology, communicative practical theory and practice materialism and they once promote the study of Chinese Marx’s philosophy effectively. Practice is the key category of Marx’s philosophy. But practice category presents gradually the trend of totalization in the study course of practice philosophy, That the practice form being presented diachronically such as material production labor, the activities of dealing with social relations and science experiment etc. is coordinated synchronically makes the historicity of practice be masked, thus the characteristic of Marx’s philosophy is weakened and the rationality problem of practice philosophy appears slowly: the practice category being totalized has not been a origin category of Marx’s philosophy. The basic connotation of practice in Marx’s philosophy is material production labor. Just on the base of labor category, Marx exploited existence theory in existentialism; Only let labor category be logic starting point can we clarify the basic characteristic of Marx’s philosophy in existentialism dimension. The paper refers to the concept of labor philosophy in order to emphasize that the labor category is the origin of Marx’s philosophy and the breakthrough of his philosophy revolution. With the logical development of labor category, we can give a new explanation on the system, contemporariness and cosmopolitism of Marx’s philosophy in order to reach a new realm of the study of Marx’s philosophy.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate what Descartes’ purpose of philosophy is by raising questions concerning the style of Descartes’ writing. In particular, I shall focus on investigating the characteristic style of Descartes’ Discourse on the Method. It is often considered that Descartes is not only the founder of modernphilosophy but also the father of foundationalism in epistemology. In fact, Descartes’ most celebrated argument of cogito is sometimes understood only in the context of epistemological foundationalism. However, Descartes’ epistemology is quite different from the one that is often understood as the theory of knowledge in the contemporary scene of philosophy. Paying attention to Descartes’ style of writing, we realize that it is necessary for us to see his epistemology in a different framework from the contemporary philosophers’. I shall show that the purpose of philosophy for Descartes is not to present disputations for propounding anddefending his own theory in philosophy, but to let the readers of his writing engaged with philosophy.

Hegel’s critique of traditional metaphysics is well-known. The first half of the Phenomenology, in particular, attempts to expose the faults underlying the metaphysics of the thing, and the subject-object dualism that arises out of it. This section in the Phenomenology aligns Hegel with Modern Philosophy, thematizing the tensions between thing-in-itself and appearance, the one and its properties, and substance and accidents. For Hegel, the thing is exposed as Spirit, albeit Spirit frozen and isolated from itself. By bringing up Locke in this context, I show how Locke’s own conclusions confirm Hegel’s. A close reading of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding shows that Hegel’s conclusions about the thing is immanent to the empiricist’s very own formulations of the problem. The theme of the presentation is both an apology for Hegel and a critique of Locke.

The paper investigates Kant's usage of the legal-political symbolism of war and peace in his self-interpretation of the historical role of the critical philosophy. The focus is on Kant's late essay, "Announcement of the Imminent Conclusion of a Treatise on Perpetual Peace in Philosophy" from 1796. The essay is placed in thecontemporary context of Kant's controversy with the historian and publicist, Johann Georg Schlosser, who had reduced Kant's transcendental philosophy to the mechanical operations of a "manufacturing industry for the production of mere form" and had misread Kant's moral philosophy as requiring complete cognition ofnature for arriving at the formation of the categorical imperative. Kant's reply to Schlosser places the refutation of the latter's charges into the broader context of the cultural function of philosophy as an area for intellectual warfare. On Kant's view, neither dogmatic pseudo-victories nor skeptical pseudo-truces are able to assure a lasting peace in philosophical debates. Only the critical balance between the theoretical restriction of reason to possible experience and its practical enlargement to unconditional principles of action is able to pacify the world of thought into a peace of mind armed with strong arguments.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant uses the term “logic” in a bewildering variety of ways, at times making it close to impossible to determine whether he is referring to (among others) general logic, transcendental logic, transcendental analytic, a "special" logic relative to a specific science, a "natural" logic, a logic intended for the "learned" (Gelehrter), some hybrid of these logics, or even some still-more abstract notion that ranges over all of these uses. This paper seeks to come to grips with Kant's complex use of "logic." Kant is standardly regarded as saying that since Aristotle, there need be no more concern about logic as a discipline or a field of study, and that Aristotle (with some minor embellishments, in terms of presentation) is the last word in logic. I argue here that, in spite ofHegel, Peirce, Strawson, and others, one must take into consideration Kant’s sophisticated critique of Aristotle’s logic in order to see Kant’s own conception of logic in contrast to that of Aristotle’s. In this way, Kant's strategy in the First Critique—grounded as it is in logic—becomes more plausible, defensible, and, consequently, more attractive.

Mishel Fuco not only influenced the consciousness of modern West, but changed the modus of thinking, the way of perception of many traditional notions, transformed the opinions about the reality, history, person. Philosopher’s principle research programme which attaches the entirety to his works is “archeology of knowledge” programme, the search of human knowledge’s original layers. Let us mark that all Fuco’s works in 1960s are devoted to main aim: to clear up the conditions of historical origin of different mental aims and social institutions in the culture of the Modern Time. Though in the whole this common aim remained for Fuco invariable, but the level on which he realizes his research search is changing constantly and rather logically. Relations of power, and to be more exact,accumulations of power and knowledge, social and cognitive which define all the aggregate of specific possibilities of culture in each given historical period. More than that the philosopher offers the particular prospects of sight of modern society and precisely totality of power relations, its ubiquitous nature and specific productivity which produces itself in each moment in any point or rather in any attitude from one point to another. From Fuco’s point of view the power is everywhere and not because it involves everything but because it comes from everywhere. The power is productive in that degree in which it is not associated with one definite imperious instance but pierces all kinds of activity in society, putting on its indelible stamp, developing under definite angle and due to this factit causes products, produced by them. The power induces and at the same time determines the fact which appears as a result of its inducement. The thirst of supremacy, which surrounds the individual and is focused on it as on the center of its use of force, comes out as a defining sign. It should be noticed that Fuco’s conception of power is not reduced to the understanding it as anonymous impersonal net of relations, piercing all society. It is supplemented by power treatment,coming out in “designed” look of definite imperious structure or imperious institute.

The challenges, resulting from modernity’s secularized results, to philosophy mainly present as the following three aspects. First, whether philosophy also undergoes a similar secularizing process? Whether metaphysics should be abandoned, and enters into a “post-philosophy age”? In such a transformingprocess, how philosophy can find a right position for itself? Second, the challenge from the issue of monistic /pluralistic in modernity studying is the most central one. In order to answer the issue philosophically, it needs us to reconsider deeply the concepts of “one and multiple”, “universal and particular” as well as theirrelations. This indicates not only that philosophy has to do explanations, but also that philosophy has to offer grounds for explanations. Thirdly, is philosophy of language able to become a paradigm for cognition? Can it have universality when the philosophical paradigm, abstracted from reflections on language,applies to explain things? Although the results of “linguistic turn” in 20th century enrich our understanding of language, but if philosophy wants to provide new grounds for knowledge, society and culture, then it ought to go out the circle of philosophy of language, and to find its new base.

The paper discusses the metaphysical theory developed in the early eighteenth century in France by the so-called égoïstes, and explores some of its ramifications. In the eighteenth century French, the term égoïsme was used not only in the ethical sense, but also in the metaphysical sense, that is, to denote the extremist view that only oneself exists. The paper focuses primarily on Jean Brunet's work Projet d'une nouvelle métaphysique, published in 1703, which has since been lost, analyzing its fundamental principle that the egoist's thought is the cause of the existence of all creatures, as found in a contemporary review of the book. Examining Brunet's "new metaphysics" within the framework of its own epistemology, the paper shows that the egoist philosopher himself was not trulyconvinced of the central tenet of his own metaphysical theory, that is, he did not sincerely believe that other minds were nothing other than modes of his thought or ideas that refer to nothing outside his mind, and argues that the very existence of Projet d'une nouvelle métaphysique in the form of a book in the mind of its author was contrary to the metaphysical theory expounded in it.

An extract from the author's «A Philosophy of Non-being». The Universe is a fluctuation of being originating spontaneously in non-being (i.e., in a non-existing reality). Substance as a whole and cosmic space in the first place are the result of non-being which has lost its state of balance. Fluctuations of being, (i.e., spontaneous transitions from non-existence to existence), are immanent in the nature of unstable non-being. The world of non-being is neither a separate sphere nor a parallel world, but the very bosom of being. Non-being is here, there, and everywhere, it shrouds, penetrates and saturates being. It is substantial. Тhere will inevitably appear conditions for new fluctuations of being. And this will ever be because it is never. And this is everywhere because it is nowhere. Forthe time which non-being lacks is eternity, and the space which it does not possess is infinity. The Universe represents the superposition of cycles with the following phases: non-being - being - non-being, or nothing - something - nothing. Transition from non-being-before-being to being, and further, to non-being-after-being determines the irreversibility of processes and directivity of time from past to future through the present time. The above-mentionedcyclic processes prove to be infinite, continuous, general, and by virtue of their superposition, constantly running; they form the unified world flow of states that differ in quality. Closely related with the processes cyclicity is the law of the being regeneration which expresses the essence of movement caused due to intertransitions of non-being and being. The real world has eternal and continuous origin. It begins always and constantly terminates. And it resumes constantlyand continuously in the process of eternal and infinite regeneration of being.

There are three conditions which an item has to fulfill in order to be listed into an inventory. Based on those three conditions, the logically basic entities are introduced: they are points, sets, and collections. These logically basic entities are related with three different logical relations, i.e., “is an element of”, “is a subset of”, and “is a part of” –relations, to constitute concepts. Those three logical relations have different relational properties, and thus they are to be distinguished. The logically basic entities are said to exist whereas the concepts constituted by them are said to subsist. One of the most important results is that we should not mix two inventories together, since otherwise inconsistencies follow.

I propose a certain classification of entities which are introduced in various theories of intentionality under the label ‘intentional objects’. Franz Brentano’s immanent objects, Alexius Meinong’s entities ‘beyond being and non-being’, or Roman Ingarden’s purely intentional objects can serve as examples of suchentities. What they all have in common is that they have been introduced in order to extensionalise the so called ‘intentional contexts’ (‘intentional’ with ‘t’). But not all entities which function this way deserve the name of intentional objects. In particular, neither Frege’s senses nor mental contents of the early Husserl are tobe classified as intentional objects in my sense. Roughly speaking, to be properly called ‘an intentional object’ a postulated entity must be supposed to function as a quasi-target of the subject’s intention. In other words: intentional objects are supposed to stand ‘before the subject’s mind’, so that they, in a sense, ‘replace’ the common sense objects of reference. It turns out that the intentional objects that were introduced in the history of philosophy make up groups which,from the ontological point of view, are very heterogeneous. Nevertheless it is possible to formulate certain systematic criteria of classifying them.

This article is devoted to the crisis of the modern philosophy caused by the generally accepted approach towards the ontology issues of existence and the ways to solve these problems. Before Kant’s theory the fundamental principle of the universe organization in the ontology was the determination of the existence as the number of objects that were independent from the subject and explored as they were. Kant showed then that the subject deals only with the images of its own conscience. The existence became not the thing-in-itself, but the thing, that opens to the human mind. But this experience gave no answer to the question about the differences between the immanent perceptions of conscience and the universe itself. This article reveals that the transition from the understanding of things as independent existing objects toward the understanding of their subjective origin as objects themselves demands more radical conclusions. These conclusions consist of that fact that the ontology should concentrate more exploring existence as the unformed organic whole and not to forget about its general problemsand presentations about the conscience. Currently we can get non-verbal knowledge about the existence itself and take steps of getting verbal one. Separation of the existence as the unformed organic whole from the presentations of conscience prevents from mistake of determining the things created by the subject in the process of universe perception as its attributes (the plurality of interpretations turns into the ontology pluralism).

I show in this paper how Putnam’s model-theoretical argument can be modified so as to generate a new general tool for Nominalism. I call such a tool “Ockham’s New Razor”. Section I illustrates how the model-theoretical technique that I have in mind can be applied to argue against Meinongian theories. Section II shows how the technique can be generalized to other cases as well. It also contains a brief discussion of the major assumption in the technique. Section III discusses possible objections to my so-called “Ockham’s New Razor”.

The peper like tone flowed through thoughts of Taoist, Confucian, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Spinoza, Goethe, Hegel, Marx, Rousseau, Sun Yat‐Sen, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Kant, etc.. Not for pursuing a philosophy to combine cultures between Chinese and Western, but for return to the shared Spring of the Truetone. What is the Truetone? <Holy Bible> says: “God is Spirit.” The spirit of Hebraic is ruagh that means the Truetone of Tao, so it can be also translated as “God is the Truetone.” All things are controlled by both the invisible Truetone and conceittone with different purpose. The Truetone is for the Grace of life, but the conceittone is for destruction. The Truetone made the Spring, the Spring made the Word. The Trinity of the Truetone, Spring, and Word, makes all things. The characteristic of Chinese is invisible tone, the characteristic of Western philosophy is visible word. The paper trys to allow all beings to be released from the conceittone and return to the Grace of Jesus because He is the Spring of the Truetone, and then all persons can get the full graces in different cultures given by the Truetone.

This article is devoted to the crisis of the modern philosophy caused by the generally accepted approach towards the ontology issues of existence and the ways to solve these problems. Before Kant’s theory the fundamental principle of the universe organization in the ontology was the determination of the existence as the number of objects that were independent from the subject and explored as they were. Kant showed then that the subject deals only with the images of its own conscience. The existence became not the thing-initself, but the thing, that opens to the human mind. But this experience gave no answer to the question about the differences between the immanent perceptions of conscience and the universe itself. This article reveals that the transition from the understandingof things as independent existing objects toward the understanding of their subjective origin as objects themselves demands more radical conclusions. These conclusions consist of that fact that the ontology should concentrate more exploring existence as the unformed organic whole and not to forget about its general problems and presentations about the conscience. Currently we can get nonverbal knowledge about the existence itself and take steps of getting verbal one. Separation of the existence as the unformed organic whole from the presentations of conscience prevents from mistake of determining the things created by the subject in the process of universe perception as its attributes (the plurality of interpretations turns into the ontology pluralism).

By 1989, the neo-liberal logics of identity and difference took over the Socialist, as well as the Christian basic notions of identity and difference. This means, neither Socialist solidarity nor Christian love for brethren eases the power of difference. In such cases, difference is not a simple difference, value, or ideology any more, but ontology, moreover, it acquires logical character. While in the divided world difference was based on hidden identity, now neo-liberal - human-rights identity is being filled with concrete contents by an unreconcileable difference. The power of difference is the final state of being different. In the relations of the present, the logic of identity doesn't simply dominate, but it seems to be a higher, maybe straight unexceedably final variant of identity - we are not simplyidentical with one another, but as a result of the grounding on human rights we are identical in our most dignified nature. But in actual fact, political and social spaces show a row of mutations differing from this. This doesn't mean the ideology of identity would have got unveiled, but that identity - logic has become selective in a new way. While the identity - logic is working in the foreground, in the background, a difference - logic stronger than ever before, is operating ruthlessly.

The bundle theory, supposed as a theory concerning the internal constitution of individuals, is often conjoined with a constitutional approach to individuation entailing the thesis ‘no two individuals can share all their constituents’ (CIT). But then it runs afoul of Black’s duplication case. Here a new bundle theory, takingdistance relations between bundles to be a sufficient ground for their diversity, will be proposed. This version accommodates Black’s world. Nonetheless, there is a possible objection. Consider the ‘triplication case’—a world containing three indistinguishable spheres, each 5-meters from each other. Since distance relations are dyadic, this version must fail to distinguish the threespheres world from Black’s world. In response to this objection, I maintain that we must construe distance relations as irreducibly multigrade and n-ary. Then these two worlds will be distinguished by appealing to a triadic relation—R3—that three things enter mutually. Aren’t all polyadic relations in principle reducible to dyadic relations? I won’t deny that. But I will aim lower and argue that R3 cannot be reduced to dyadic relations that obliterate the distinction between the three-spheres world and Black’s world.

From the very beginning of Philosophy. The Onto was just the target object of human’s thinking. Aristotle ever demonstrated that the Onto is a pure format being. (本体是纯 形式体) Then, what is this Onto? What is this pure format being? I present an answer in my this paper. If an object could exist independently, then, I call it “ZHUTI”（主体）; If a “ZHUTI” could be felt , then, I call it “SHITI”(实体), such as the stone, the tree; If a “ZHUTI” could not be felt , then, I call it “XUTI”(虚体), such as the law ,the rule in the nature.“SHITI” or “XUTI” is the special being of the Onto. Refers to the Onto, its attribute is the common attribute of all the “ZHUTI”. Weknow the movement is the common attribute of all the “ZHUTI”. Then, we could say the movement is also the attribute of the Onto. From where the movement come? Besides from external, the movement come from the contradiction inside the “zhuti”, for a pair of contradiction units within a same “zhuti” could produce the force for the movement. The Onto move of course by its inside force. So, in the Onto there should be a pair of contradiction units which produce the force. Nothing could dominate the Onto. So, the pair of contradiction units in the Onto should be not another “zhuti”, but the Onto itself. This means the pair ofcontradiction units in the Onto is the Onto itself. So, the Onto is just that uniform contradiction being. It is there independently, but can not felt, so, it is “XUTI”. In the word of Aristotle, it is the pure format being（纯形式体）。The uniform contradiction being is the Onto. The Onto is the uniform contradiction being. Any “zhuti” is a kind of special uniform contradiction being body. Human, is also a kind of special uniform contradiction being body. Then, what is the uniform contradiction being body in human? This is another topic for further study. As per above answer of the Onto, we could get the way to find out what is the uniform contradiction being body in human, after we find out this answer, then, we could find out all the knowledge about the human being. These study, in fact, is already just the study ofOntology and Cognition. Here are several key words and the define in this paper: “ZHUTI” (主体) “SHITI” （实体） “XUTI” （虚体）*** “BENTI” （本体）