Kitaro Nishida, a famous Japanese Philosopher and the founder of the Kyoto-School, for the first time in history transformed Zen-Buddhism, which here means especially a Japanese school of Buddhism and whose characteristics consists in its methodological meditation, into a philosophical theory of our existence. On the other hand he transformed western philosophy into a very original form of thought, which at the same time contains oriental elements. As Nishida did the bilateral transformation between western and eastern philosophies, he developed a new perspective on the inquiry concerning the individuality of our personal existence and the relation between Self and the other. In his first Work, “An Inquiry into the good” Nishida examines the characteristics of pure experience, which is not understood from the outside, indirectly, and it is not a passive and static experience like for example in ordinary empiricism. It must be understood as active and creative experience which is experienced from within. In reading Thinkers as Ernst Mach and William James he came to realize that there must be a prereflective, pre-individual, unitary pure experience. This pure experience as ultimate reality on which the individual is based, is systematically self developing and Self-unfolding. In Nishidas understanding the pure experience is the common basis for, and is realized prior, to the distinction between subject and object, the Self and the Other, the Knower and the known. I try to explain how Nishidas approach overcomes this subjectivistic perspective and discuss in which way this standpoint offers a new understanding of the Self and the Other. Abe Masao, Ives Christopher: Translation of “An Inquiry into the Good”, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1990. S. xviii.

The author pays attention to the contemporary culture’s two challenges: 1) differentiation; 2) general acceleration. Extrapolation → inevitable impotence of an individual to understand Other/himself. The author’s concept “strictio intervallorum constantiae” expresses the catastrophic accelerated tightening of the temporal distance from the past which has already become obsolete in the essential life relations, indistinct, strange… Two revolutions in time’s feeling: 1) christianization → time’s linearity; 2) strictio intervallorum constantiae → the new experience of time. An extrapolation of the contemporary principial trend of an informationdinamics leads to inevitable impotence of an individual to understand neither Other, neither himself!

Contemporary philosophers writing on the issue of personal identity agree that, whatever is disputable about fission cases, there is little doubt that, if there could be fission, there would be psychological continuity between the original person and her offshoot (if the branching is one-one), or between the original personand her offshoots (if the branching is one-many). The belief is one with a long history dating back to John Locke; it has, over time, acquired the status of self-evident truth. This paper is not an attempt to refute this deeply rooted belief, though I think the near universal acceptance of it is rather unfortunate. My main goal in what follows is to make an initial case for three forms of psychological discontinuity that I believe would exist between the fission ancestor and the offshoots. If I am right about the existence of the three forms of psychological discontinuity, contemporary Lockeans on the issue of personal identity will need to rethink their position, or so I will argue in the last section of the paper.

Looking at contemporary Japanese images of the self and how Japanese scholars have conceptualised the notion of the subjectivity three remarkable concepts of “the self” can be identified and distinguished from another: the Inner Self, the Political Self, the Social Self. In my paper I will discuss these concepts by high lightening their hybridity, plurality and their emphasis on the identity as an effect of self-realization. I shall argue that the investigation in the Japaneseunderstanding of the self is particularly fruitful for a global understanding of subjectivity, because Japanese selfhood does not represent the “otherness” of the western thought but is actually crisscrossed by western and eastern ideas. What can be marked as the Inner Self combines ideas of the Buddhist “Non-Self” (anatman) and the European Idealistic Ego (Ich). Embedded in practises of meditation the Inner Self in the Japanese understanding is realized through the activity of finding and loosing oneself. The Political Self can be perceived as an amalgamation of the Asian art of the regime of the group and the western thought of Liberalism and personal identity. Somewhat discovered in Japan as a possibility of the self in the 19th century the Political Self comes into existence througheducational practise. Furthermore the Social Self brings together Chinese Confucian ethics and ancient Japanese Shintoism. Understood as a particle in the flow of social relations the Social Self is realized in Japan within the rituals of everyday live and physical hence tactical education in the childhood of a person. The Japanese concepts of the self exemplify on the level of their formal configuration the qualities of what can be called a plural anthropology.

In given clause features of mentality of western and east person are considered. The author comes to opinion that there is a significant difference of outlooks of the people living in the East and the West. The author writes, that features of mentality of the West and the East were affected with features of labour activity, themaintenance of religious and philosophical forms of public consciousness. In the end of clause the author comes to conclusion, that despite of differention of mentality of the East and the West, they are necessary each other as they supplement and rich each other.

The approach of a "transformative phenomenology" was wonfrom a comprehensive analysis of Asien philosophies. In most Asianphilosophies the knowledge about life is not only a descriptive onebut rather a transformative knowledge. This means that the analysisof the life changes and realizes our life in a new way and transformsit from within. It is tried in using the approach of eastasienphilosophies as an startingpoint to deepen and transform certaintrends of phenomenology. Going beyond a "descriptive" and"hermeneutical phenomenology" a "transformative phenomenology"is proposed in which the process of its own execution will be aconstitutive element of the method itself. The analysis of phenomenaisn't longer an act of pure objectivation but a transformation for myperception and existence. The transformation which is performed bythe phenomenological work is in this way always connected with myway to live. In the work I encounter my own experience with allpossible consequences which an intensive meeting can have.Phenomenology don't mean any longer to describe phenomena as a"pure spectator" but transform myself as a process of Bildung withinthe encounter with my own social, bodily and thinking experience.

In Husserl’s phenomenology, there are two essential moments; one is the Epoché which makes the phenomenology possible, the other is the teleology of science which directs it to its own goal (telos). The former, later appeared in Husserl’s text, does not seem quite consistent with the latter – on the contrary, theseseem so exclusive that a question arises as to whether Husserl could reconcile Epoché with teleology consistently claimed from the beginning of his career. My aim in this paper is to reveal their conflict in Husserl’s phenomenology, confining my argument to the science as teleological activity which had been claimed from Logical Investigations (1900) to his last work Crisis (1936). The plan is as follows; firstly we will confirm that Husserl defined the idea of the science as an activity which tends to one universal science; secondly we will examine that when he innovated the Epoché as the phenomenological method (Ideas 1, 1913), he confined the range of Epoché in such a science; thirdly we will prove that in his last work, this idea of the science remained in the form of “teleology of history”claimed by Husserl to be possible only by the Epoché; finally we will examine the inconsistency between the Epoché and the teleology, making reference to the critique of Jan Patočka.

Der Vortrag hat folgendes zum Ziel – das Dasein und die Universalität der Lebenswelt-Problematik sogar in solchen Fällen zu betonen, wenn sie vom philosophischen Grundeinschlag und der Orientierung auf eine streng wissen¬schaftliche Weltsicht sowie Bildung der entsprechenden theoretischen Konstruktionen scheinbar ausgeschlossen wird, wie es in der Philosophie I. Kants der Fall ist. In diesem Vortrag möchte ich über Lebenswelt als eine primäre, theoretisch unreflektierte Struktur der Weltauffassung und Weltsicht sprechen, die selbst wissenschaftlich-theoretischen Konstruktionen zugrunde liegt. Es besteht kein Zweifel daran, dass die Lebenswelt ausschliesslich von einer Ganzheit historisch wandelbarer Phänomene, einem eigenartigen “historischen aapriori” gebildet werden kann. Mein Vortrag richtet sich gegen den Partikularisierungsprozess und die antiratio-nalistischen Tendenzen im Postmodernismus, gegen Versuchungen das Allgemeine (d. i., auch die Lebenswelt) in beliebigen Äußerungsformen zu verleugnen.

According to Yoga Philosophy though the right knowledge of any phenomena is based on direct cognition, inference or testimony but the cognizance conjured up by words without any substance is devoid of objectivity. The consciousness is an aspect of the ultimate reality or substance, which is functioning, and manifesting itself in five progressive stages at five levels. What we experience or sense as consciousness is the first to five level experiences and the phenomenal cognizance in these stages, which can be described in words, is instrumental one and modification of our mind. Therefore the state of consciousness as we experience is an out come of the five mental modes, viz. valid knowledge, error, imagination, deep sleep and recollection. So cognizance conforming to a word/language is devoid of a phenomenal object. Since we may speak of the unicorn though there is no real phenomenal object as such and thus the word/words may produce cognition, even though its object is nonexistent. The real consciousness and the study of consciousness cannot be instrumental one. The Yoga Sūtra suggests that the direct and unwavering awareness is required and that pure consciousness is devoid of any thing known by way of perception, memory, imagination, reasoning and intuition. The Consciousness in Yoga Sūtra is characterized as one of the four states of consciousness namely Vitarka accompanied by reasoning, Vicāra accompanied by reflection, Ānanda accompanied by bliss and Asmitā accompanied by sense of pure being. And then, after transcending these states of consciousness the one enters into the realm of real consciousness, that is the purest and non-intentional state of the self or the Knower or the Consciousness itself.

In this paper I want to discuss the implications of adopting different general philosophical approaches for assessing the relation between perception and imagination. In particular, I am interested in different views resulting from ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ approaches to cognition. By ‘top down’ approaches I meanapproaches that conceive of cognition as a process or activity that is guided by intellectual or conceptual (‘top’) elements. (I consider broadly speaking Kantian accounts typical.) By ‘bottom up’ approaches I mean approaches that conceive of cognition as a process that emerges from perceptual or embodied (‘bottom’)elements of cognition. (I consider phenomenological and situated cognition accounts typical.) My considerations are framed by a particular interest in the ensuing consequences of assuming different general frameworks for integrating the issue of imagination within a theory of situated cognition.

Heidegger is perhaps best known for stressing the function of time as temporality on the phenomena of life. There is a sense, however, in which the full significance of these insights can be best understood only through an exploration of the function of space as spatiality in the phenomena of life. At their juxtaposition, there is a privileged perspective on the meaning of life, and most importantly on what is the most meaningful life on the Heideggerian account, thephilosophical life. The following short exploration uncovers this standpoint through an analysis of the word “clearing” as temporally expansive space. Through this device, there is a clear view of the role of philosophy, of truth, and of the meaning of life in Heidegger’s Being and Time.

There are three conceptions of expression in Husserl: (1) expression as a physical or sensible entity (expression-token), (2) expression as a repeatable entity (expression-type), and (3) expression as an act that connects token and type to each other (act of expressing). Only when all three notions are considered canHusserl's theory of expression and its meaning be correctly interpreted. However, such an interpretation does not ensure the correctness of Husserl’s theory itself. Rather, the distinctions of the three notions reveal implausibility in the theory, because using an expression-token is nothing other than having a presentation(Vorstellung) of it. In his manuscript of 1914, Husserl attempts to overcome that implausibility but in a way that gives rise to another difficulty.

Sartre builds up his notion of Bad Faith and then develops it by borrowing the method used in psychoanalytic theory. Thus, he treats Bad Faith as the model of a mental illness and inquires into its nature, origins, symptoms, and treatment. Following this procedure, he isolates consciousness as the origin of Bad Faith and describes in his examples from Nausea (1938) to Saint Genet. Actor and Martyr (1952) a variety of symptoms of varying degrees of severity. These and other questions are extensively treated in Being and Nothingness. Some critics, however, tend to relate Sartre’s ideas of Bad Faith solely to this latter exposition. I believe this is a mistake, and that Sartre’s conception may be shown to have changed and developed in other writings.

Undoubtedly, Edmund Husserl's work is one of the most important contributions to the philosophy of the Twentieth Century to the field of culture, specifically influence on the formation of a new psychiatric - psychological paradigm embodied in the phenomenological psychology and psychiatry - existential. Thispaper aims to draw a brief introduction to the issues concerning the constitution originating from the life of the subject as the psychological level of objectivity and intersubjectivity, with emphasis on aspects related to the synthetic processes taking place in the Genesis passive. Highlight how interesting from the notion ofintentionality of consciousness phenomenological analysis husserliano realizes the formation of the conscience of the time, the embodiment of the spatiality and intersubjectivity whose origin lies in the synthetic processes taking place since preyoica instinctive affection in intrauterine life.

The present paper aims to view three ways of thinking time by Emmanuel Levinas. We distinguish existential, historical, and eschatological time demonstrating how they are connected with his central notion of responsibility toward the Other. The following analysis reorders and interprets what Levinas has said in response of Martin Heidegger’s and Hegel’s position. The text does not make any other claims but aims to offer a possible reading and exegesis of Levinas’s philosophy and open a further discussion on these topics.

From the very beginning of philosophy, people know the reality, the onto is hided in the phenomena, philosophy’s task is to find out the essence, the reality hided in the phenomena. At the time about early 20th century, there came out a kind of philosophy, called Phenomenology, ever developed ardently during last century for several decades, even now, it is still there, continue split philosophy, bring confusion to philosophy. Philosophy was produced by study the essence of object, especially the onto of everything, but in Phenomenology, there is no essence or the onto hided in the nature, it regard the phenomena as the study object, it deny the onto exists. The onto is the target object of philosophy over the past 2000 more years, but the phenomenology deny the onto, then, how could the phenomenology still regard itself as “philosophy”? Obviously, the phenomenology is not philosophy. Of course, the onto is there, longlive with the nature, the sun, the space. To get to know the onto, is the long live study for human. So, the phenomenology is wrong, at least wrong in the regard of the philosophy. Because ofphenomenology’s ridiculous study object and theme, it produced various kinds of ridiculous answer and explain, by its main study such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and latter, The structuralism, post structuralism and post modernism etc. Finally, philosophy was split, falling apart in everything, it seemed any kind thing or phenomena could produce a kind of philosophy, what more ridiculous is any kind of phenomena ever expected to explain the nature the world the space by its several points of view about itself. This make philosophy look like garbage, loss the glory it ever had. Now, it is high time to say that the phenomenology, since it deny the essence and the onto in the nature, is not philosophy. it shall not be called as philosophy. Philosophy’starget object is the onto, which is the root basis of everything, the root theory in the space.