The classical unresolved problem of the active intellect, raised by Aristotle in De Anima III.5, has received several interpretations in the history of philosophy. In this paper, I will recover the old hypotheses according to which the active intellect is the god of Aristotle's metaphysics. I propose that if the active intellect is god, it is not an efficient cause but the final cause of human thought-the entelecheia of the human rational soul. Nevertheless, the problem of the active intellect is insoluble simply because we do not count with all the elements required to obtain a sound solution. Yet it can be attenuated by an approach that renders much more coherence to De Anima III.5 than other attempts. To this end, I will (1) analyse the classical conception of Aristotle's two intellects, (2) work on the explanation par excellence of the active intellect, the metaphor of light, distinguishing the double conception of potency and act that may be found in it, and (3) analyse the concept of entelecheia as the process by which the active intellect actualizes intelligibles in the sense of the final cause.

Plato’s Socrates exemplies the progress of the dialectical method of inquiry. Such a method is capable of actualizing an interlocutor’s latent potential for philosophizing dialectically. The dianoetic practice of Plato’s Socrates is a mixture of dialectical assertions and questions arising out of his ethical concern for the interlocutor. The Dialogues act as educational models exhibiting how one inquires and learns as well as how one must teach in order that others learn to be participants in (or practitioners of) the dialectic. This is the maieutic art of Plato’s Socrates with which he draws his interlocutors into stating and reflecting upon the implications of their uncritically held opinions. We could say that the real subject-matter of many of the Dialogues is at least as much education in the dialectical process while still respecting the literary form of the Dialogues as exhibitive construction. The lack of philosophical closure that often characterizes many of the Dialogues lends additional credence to this position. The subject-matter of many of the dialogues is, therefore, reflexive: it is about itself in the sense that the tacit lesson (practicing the dialectic) will be remembered after its ostensible subject (some philosophical problem) has ceased to be debated. Dialectic is, then, renewable and replicable as an educational method, using "psychagogy"—an instrument of maieutic—to determine first each student’s individual needs for guiding him toward understanding.

I analyse the dramatic setting of the Gorgias by contrasting it with that of the Protagoras. The two dialogues are closely related. In the Gorgias Socrates states that the rhetorician and the sophist are basically indistinguishable in everyday life. In both the Protagoras and the Gorgias, his confrontation with his interlocutors is metaphorically related to a descent to Hades. However, while the events in the Protagoras are narrated by Socrates himself, the Gorgias has readers face the unfolding events without mediation. The temporal and spatial framing of the Gorgias is indeterminate, while both aspects are described in detail in the Protagoras. I maintain that the magical passage from an indeterminate "outside" to an indeterminate "inside" in the Gorgias is significantly related to the characters' attitude towards the boundaries of each other's souls, which are constantly ignored or attacked. As a matter of fact, the dialogue presents a very impressive amount of anger and exchange of abuse, which never ceases until the end. I suggest that the temporal framing demonstrates that the beginning and the end of the dialogue are closely connected. Socrates unexpectedly arrives and refutes Gorgias by asking him unexpected questions. The last myth of judgment indicates that Gorgias' attitude is comparable to that of the mortals who lived during Kronos' age, while Socrates brings about a liberation from appearance which is analogous to the innovations brought about by Zeus.

This paper argues that Aristotle conceives happiness not primarily as an exercise of virtue in private or with friends, but as the exercise of virtue in governing an ideal state. The best states are knit together so tightly that the interests of one person are the same as the interests of all. Hence, a person who acts for his or her own good must also act for the good of all fellow citizens. It follows that discussions of Aristotle’s altruism and egoism are misconceived.

Twice in the Poetics, Aristotle contrasts poetry with history. Whatever its didactic value, the contrast has not seemed to readers of special philosophical interest. The aim of this paper is to show that this contrast is philosophically significant not just for our understanding of tragedy but also for the light it sheds on Aristotle’s overall methodology. I shall show how he uses the method sketched in the Topics to define tragedy and explain why the same method will not define history. In particular, tragedy admits of definition because its parts constitute a unity, and much of the Poetics aims to show how, despite being defined through six distinct parts, tragedy can be one. In contrast, history, though a proper preliminary to poetics and concerned also with human action, does not admit of scientific treatment because it contains no essential unities. Aristotle’s understanding of ‘science’ is used here to explain why any attempt to create a scientific history would turn history into poetry.

Aristotle maintains that paideia enables one to judge the method used by a given speaker without judging the conclusions drawn as well (I.1 De Partibus Animalium). He contends that this "paideia of principles" requires three things: seeing that principles are not derived from one another; seeing that there is nothing before them within reason; and, seeing that they are the source of much knowledge. In order to grasp these principles, one must respectively learn to recognize what distinguishes the subject matters studied in different disciplines, see first principles as coming from experience and acquire the habit of seeking them in one’s experience and, finally, see first principles as being the source of conclusions. While the second and third points might at first seem to pertain to "nous" and science, respectively, rather than to paideia, the case can be made that paideia involves more of a firm grasp of principles than "nous" and a less perfect way of relating conclusion to principles than science.

Aristotle argues that temperance is the mean concerned with pleasure and pain (NE 1107b5-9 and 1117b25-27). Most commentators focus on the moderation of pleasures and hardly discuss how this virtue relates to pain. In what follows, I consider the place of pain in Aristotle’s discussion of temperance and resolve contradictory interpretations by turning to the following question: is temperance ever properly painful? In part one, I examine the textual evidence and conclude that Aristotle would answer no to our question. The temperate person does not feel pain at the absence of appropriately desired objects. In parts two and three, I reconstruct some reasons why Aristotle would hold such a view based. My discussion here is based upon Aristotle’s discussion of continence and the unity of the virtues.

In the dialogue, Crito, Socrates justified his decision to accept his death penalty. His decision was praised as principled and just. However, such a view was one of the greatest myths in the history of philosophy. Contrary to the accepted ideas, I wish to show that Socrates’ argument was erroneous, the crucial error being his failure to distinguish between substantial and procedural justice. In fact, the whole of the Crito refers to some deeper problems of the philosophy of law and morality.

A perennial problem in the philosophy of love has centered around what it is to love persons qua persons. Plato has usually been interpreted as believing that when we love we are attaching ourselves to qualities that inhere in the objects of our love and that these qualities transcend the objects. Vlastos has argued, along with Nussbaum, Price and many others that such an account tells against a true love of persons as unique and irreplaceable individuals. I argue that Plato’s account of love as present in the Lysis and Symposium is not so easily rejected. My concern is to show both that Plato can meet the objections and that his theory can still offer helpful insights into the understanding of love in our lives. In particular, I will identify two manners of loving persons; one which is context and individual specific, and another which might be termed metaphysical, thereby preserving aspects of the Platonic ascent of love. I will further argue that the two aspects are often noncontroversially linked, and that such linking helps explain something of the mysterious nature of love.

Antisthenes of Athens was an older student of Socrates who had previously studied under the Sophists. His philosophical legacy also influenced Cynic and early Stoic thought. Consequently, he has left us an interesting theory of paideia (reading, writing, and the arts) followed by an even more brief one in divine paideia, the latter consisting of learning how to grasp the tenets of reason in order to complete virtue. Once properly grasped, the pupil will never lose it since it is embedded in the heart with true belief. However, there is a danger of being confused by human learning, which may delay or obviate completing divine paideia. Nonetheless, with the help of a teacher who gives a personal example, like Socrates or the mythical Centaur Chiron, the pupil has a chance of reaching his or her goal. Through a series of myths, Antisthenes gives us the foundations of his logical and ethical theory together. Reasoning is both a way to grasp virtue and also to fortify it. Although he would have chaffed under a modern university educational system, we may learn from him to value concise philosophical studies as a necessary adjunct to basic lessons in liberal arts.

This paper is an initial attempt to develop a dynamic conception of being which is not anarchic. It does this by returning to Aristotle in order to begin the process of reinterpreting the meaning of ousia, the concept according to which western ontology has been determined. Such a reinterpretation opens up the possibility of understanding the dynamic nature of ontological identity and the principles according to which this identity is established. The development of the notions of energeia, dynamis and entelecheia in the middle books of Aristotle’s Metaphysics will be discussed in order to suggest that there is a dynamic ontological framework at work in Aristotle’s later writing. This framework lends insight into the dynamic structure of being itself, a structure which does justice as much to the concern for continuity through change as it does to the moment of difference. The name for this conception of identity which affirms both continuity and novelty is "legacy." This paper attempts to apprehend the meaning of being as legacy.

‘Paideia’ connotes the handing down and preservation of tradition and culture, even civilization, through education. Plato’s education of philosophers in the Academy is inimical to such an essentially conservative notion. His dialectical method is inherently dynamic and open-ended: not only are such conclusions as are reached in the dialogues subject to further criticism, so are the assumptions on which those conclusions are based. In these and other ways explored in this paper, Plato demonstrates that paideia has no harbor within philosophy.

In ancient Greek theories of health, it was the equal balance or mixing of the humors or elements (i.e., the isonomic mean) that comprised the ideal healthy state. In the Aristotelian Problema XXX.1, however, there is a description of a form of melancholic constitution that is both 1) itself characterized as a mean, and 2) thought to lead to intellectual outstandingness. This is theoretically problematic since the melancholic constitution was by definition a constitution in which there was a natural preponderance of black bile. Thus, there appear to be two incompatible means that are descriptive of the ideal in ancient Greek medicine: the isonomic mean that underlies the ideal healthy state, and the melancholic mean that describes the melancholic who is capable of greatness. This paper attempts to understand the melancholic mean as described in Problema XXX.1 by considering the two different but related models of this mean that are suggested in the text. A reconciliation of the two somatic ideals is argued for on the basis of what else is said in the Problema, as well as ideas found in the Hippocratic work Airs, Waters, Places and other Aristotelian Problemata.

Some scholars have found the dealing of the problem of predication, or attribution, in the Sophist (251a-e), a "digression," or a treatment of "a trivial question" and "an insignificant example." We propose to reconsider the importance of Plato’s doctrine on the subject from the point of view of the epistemology- ontology relationship in Plato. This leads to a replacement of the passage inside the whole dialogue. Beginning with the definition of the sophist, Plato goes on to treat the "mimetic" art and finds himself confronting a perplexing difficulty: how to understand falsehood, either in thought or in discourse. This is an epistemological difficulty, which raises the central difficulty of how to attribute non-being to being. So, the heart of the matter is the possibility of predication, as Plato states very clearly (238a). The solution arises from the doctrine of the community of species, making possible any attribution of one thing to another. In looking carefully to the dialogue as a whole, we find that the passage 251a-e, dealing with the general problem of predication, occupies a central position, in all meanings, even numerically (between 236e and 264a).

It is interesting to see Aristotle's observation of natural law in order to renew the ideal of law against the Marxist theory of society, to renounce the normative theory of the nation, and to study the liberal theory of information. All this allows us to expect the realization of social justice and human rights from the institutionalization of markets (agora) and the precondition of the boundary of the general culture (paideia), namely the communitarian ethics and the moral reformation against the genealogist tradition. We find in the tradition inaugurated by Aristotle the function of ethical discussion about the common good, thus imbricating the differences stratified by the economic evolution in the polis.

The author argues that the true unity of the Theaetetus is to be found in its purpose as an example of philosophical teaching to the students of the academy.

Con Platón se produce el reconocimiento de la educación como el lugar en que una comunidad mantiene su peculiar instalación en la realidad y por ello como el terreno de la acción politica eficaz. La problemática, presente ya desde los textos socráticos, es ubicada en el pasaje de la Apologia de Sócrates en que la mención de las ‘acusaciones antiguas’ permite ver el juego de distintos elementos-la paideía, la opinión pública, el saber-en un momento de crisis. Esta crisis, tanto de la base política tradicional como de la política pragmática, se traduce en un oscurecimiento de que lo que son el hombre y la pólis que da lugar a Sócrates y a su tarea como consciencia de la quiebra del mundo polítoco. Se desarrolla el alcance ontológico de ella y susparadójicos-consecuencias políticas y educativas.

In this paper, I will show the deep roots of dialogue in Plato’s thought, in order to examine the validity of the so-called ‘esoteric Plato’. The confrontation between dialogicity and unwritten doctrines is the main theme of this article. These two views — Hermeneutics and Tübingen School — are not far away on concrete contents, with more or less variations. But it must be noticed that both conceptions of Platonic thinking are contradictory and that is reflected in their explanations of Plato’s own philosophical project.

Who is the Plotinian spoudaios and what is his function in the Enneads? This question turns out to be fundamental, especially when trying to make out an ethical dimension in Plotinus. Treatise I 4 [46] offers, concerning that question, not only the longest sustained discussion of the spoudaios, but also shows how highly problematic it is to figure out more precisely his characteristics. This is due to the terminological ambiguity with the term sophos, which is also the reason why the two terms are often considered synonymous by translators. It appears in I 4 that this ambiguity is closely related to the question of aisthesis. And this is also perhaps the main problematic point concerning the spoudaios: he is instituted by Plotinus as the paradigm of the ‘living man,’ but is still described as someone who has detached himself from the bounds of the sensible world. So this leads to several conclusions concerning the Plotinian conception of ethical implication.

Socrates' great educational innovation was in ascribing moral worth to the intellectual activity reflectively directed at one's own life. His concept of eudaimonia was so different from the ordinary that talking about it took on sometimes a paradoxical air, as in Apology 30b3. For him, reason is not a tool for attaining goals independently thought worthwhile; rather, rationality itself, expressed in the giving of reasons and the avoidance of contradictions, confers value to goals and opinions. Persons are reasonable, but obviously not the empirical human being. But education is aimed at the empirical man or woman and inevitably employs psychological means. How then is it possible that the result of education should grow out of the depths of each individual and be nevertheless valid for all individuals? In the Symposium, Plato gives Aristophanes the crucial move. Each of us is only half the whole person and we are moved by our desire for what we lack. In this context, to claim that the soul is immortal is to claim-at least-that the soul has a non-empirical dimension, that its real objects are not the objects of desire as such, and that a person's sensible life is not the true basis for the evaluation of his or her eudaimonia. However, in the soul which is not free from contradictions there is no advantage to right but unexamined options. There is in the life of the naïve just an insecurity which is not merely pragmatic. Even if a person never falters to the end of life, this is no more than moral luck. One is still guilty on the level of the logos, and liable to blame and punishment not for what one does, but for what one could have done.