341.
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Faith and Philosophy:
Volume >
20 >
Issue: 2
David C. Williams
Natural and Divine Law:
Reclaiming the Tradition for Christian Ethics
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342.
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Faith and Philosophy:
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Issue: 2
Michael Bergmann
Agent Causation and Responsibility:
A Reply to Flint
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343.
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Faith and Philosophy:
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Issue: 2
Kai-man Kwan
Is the Critical Trust Approach to Religious Experience Incompatible with Religious Particularism?:
A Reply to Michael Martin and John Hick
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344.
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Faith and Philosophy:
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Issue: 2
Mark C. Murphy
Pro-Choice and Presumption:
A Reply to Kenneth Einar Himma
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345.
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Faith and Philosophy:
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20 >
Issue: 2
Kevin Corcoran
Material Persons, Immaterial Souls and an Ethic of Life
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346.
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Faith and Philosophy:
Volume >
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Issue: 2
Peter C. Meilaender
The Problem of Having Only One City:
An Augustinian Response to Rawls
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347.
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Faith and Philosophy:
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Issue: 2
Andrew Gustafson
Utilitarians and Religion
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348.
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Faith and Philosophy:
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Issue: 3
J. R. Lucas
God and Time:
Essays on the Divine Nature
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349.
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Faith and Philosophy:
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20 >
Issue: 3
Daniel Howard-Snyder
In Defense of Naïve Universalism
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350.
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Faith and Philosophy:
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Issue: 3
Katherin A. Rogers
Does God Cause Sin?:
Anselm of Canterbury Versus Jonathan Edwards on Human Freedom and Divine Sovereignty
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351.
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Faith and Philosophy:
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Issue: 3
Michael J. Murray
Natural Providence (Or Design Trouble)
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352.
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Faith and Philosophy:
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20 >
Issue: 3
Robert Sloan Lee
Hume's Abject Failure:
The Argument Against Miracles
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353.
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Faith and Philosophy:
Volume >
20 >
Issue: 3
Merold Westphal
The God Who Will Be:
Hermeneutics and the God of Promise
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354.
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Faith and Philosophy:
Volume >
20 >
Issue: 3
Hugo A. Meynell
The Philosophy of Dooyeweerd:
A Transcendental Thomist Appraisal
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355.
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Faith and Philosophy:
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Issue: 3
J. William Forgie
The Alleged Dependency of the Cosmological Argument on the Ontological
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356.
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Faith and Philosophy:
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20 >
Issue: 3
Wes Morriston
Must Metaphysical Time Have a Beginning?
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357.
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Faith and Philosophy:
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Issue: 4
Robert McKim
Paul Griffiths: PROBLEMS OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY
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358.
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Faith and Philosophy:
Volume >
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Issue: 4
Patricia Altenbernd Johnson
Sarah Coakley: POWERS AND SUBMISSIONS
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359.
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Faith and Philosophy:
Volume >
20 >
Issue: 4
Lynne Rudder Baker
WHY CHRISTIANS SHOULD NOT BE LIBERTARIANS:
AN AUGUSTINIAN CHALLENGE
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rights & permissions
The prevailing view of Christian philosophers today seems to be that Christianity requires a libertarian conception of free will. Focusing on Augustine’s mature anti-Pelagian works, I try to show that the prevailing view is in error. Specifically, I want to show that---on Augustine’s view of grace-a libertarian account of free will is irrelevant to salvation. On Augustine’s view, the grace of God through Christ is sufficient as weIl as necessary for salvation. Salvation is entirely in the hands of God, totally independent of anything that any human being might do. And faith, the human response to salvation, is best understood in terms of a compatibilist account of freedom.
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360.
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Faith and Philosophy:
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Issue: 4
Scott MacDonald
PETIT LARCENY, THE BEGINNING OF ALL SIN:
AUGUSTINE’S THEFT OF THE PEARS
abstract |
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rights & permissions
In his reflections on his adolescent theft of a neighbor’s pears, Augustine first claims that he did it just because it was wicked. But he then worries that there is something unacceptable in that claim. Some readers have found in this account Augustine’s rejection of the principle that all voluntary action is done for the sake of some perceived good. I argue that Augustine intends his case to call the principle into question, but that he does not ultimately reject it. His careful and resourceful analysis of the motivations of his theft adds subtlety to his own understanding of voluntary action and allows hirn to introduce an important component of his general account of sin, namely, that it essentially involves prideful self-assertion in imitation of God.
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