It is often argued that concerns about the equity of a global climate agreement might appropriately be addressed in the language of human rights. The human rights approach has been promoted by a number of international political actors, including the UN Human Rights Council. As such, human rights are instrumentally applied as a solution to what could be called the “justice problem” in climate negotiations. In order to assess the degree to which human rights could be a useful approach to the justice problem with regard to to climate change, four major issues need to be examined. First, there is the distinction between human rights as protection against climate change versus the right to emit greenhouse gases. Both understandings are found in the debate on climate justice, but they are often not made explicit. Second, the “human rights as protection” approach with a focus on (a) right holders, both presently and in the future, needs to be elucidated, as well as (b) the human rights principles that are at stake, and (c) the duties and duty holders involved. Third, the human right to emit greenhouse gases needs to be clarified in the context of subsistence rights and equal per capita emission rights. Finally, there is the question of whether the cosmopolitan conception of human rights is at odds with the goal of ensuring that individuals assume responsibility for their own carbon-dependent lifestyle.

To what extent does John Rawls’ theory of international justice meet the normative challenges posed by climate change? There are two broadly compatible Rawlsian ways of addressing climate change. The first alternative is based on the two principles that Rawls applies to the domains of international and intergenerational justice (the Principle of Assistance, and the Principle of Just Savings). The second alternative starts from Rawls’ general theory of international justice, in particular his idea of a Society of Peoples, which is an idealized vision of a peaceful and stable association of peoples that are internally well-ordered, and share a desire to respect and uphold international law. Given (a) the statutes peoples are willing to observe, (b) the defining characteristics of peoples, and (c) the fact that Rawls indicates that his own rendering of international law is incomplete, there may be grounds for proposing an additional statute, or an amendment, to The Law of Peoples, that pertains to climate change and that does not contradict, but rather follows from, the general framework of the theory. The latter alternative provides a more viable account of climate justice than critics has hitherto acknowledged.

The recent debate about justice and responsibility increasingly tries to accommodate a new type of agentive situation in which local short-term actions have global long-term consequences due to the action’s embedding in complex interactional networks. Currently the debate is shifting focus from the spatial to the temporal dimension of such wide-scope results of individual actions. This shift from “global ethics” to “intergenerational ethics” and, in particular, “climate ethics” requires some new analytical concepts, however. A definition of wide-scope responsibility aimed at articulating our moral concerns about emergent effects in complex systems, such as climate change, is needed. Working from Iris Marion Young’s “social connection model of responsibility,” a notion of shared ecological responsibility with global and intergenerational scope can be developed. This account is not affected by the so-called non-identity objection to intergenerational ethics. From an action-theoretic rather than normative perspective, the account is “ethically parametrized” in the sense that it can be combined with different conceptions of structural and intergenerational justice. The account can be used to support a concrete climate policy proposal: the “Greenhouse Development Rights Framework.”

Climate change raises questions of justice. Some people are enjoying the benefits of energy use and other emissions-generating activities, but those activities are causing other people to suffer the burdens of climate change. Political philosophers have begun to pay more attention to the problem of “climate justice.” However, contributors to the literature have made quite different methodological assumptions about how we should develop a theory of climate justice and defend principles of climate justice. So far, there has been little systematic or detailed discussion of these methodological issues. One way to approach these issues is by developing a methodological framework for thinking about climate justice, or more specifically, a five-stage framework, drawing on recent work on two issues: first, the distinction between “ideal” and “non-ideal” theory; and second, the distinction between “integrationist” and “isolationist” approaches to environmental and climate justice. This methodological framework can also be used to inform critical analysis of extant theories of climate justice, for example, through a critical discussion of two key features of the theory of climate justice developed by Simon Caney.

Insight into worldviews is essential for approaches aiming to design and support (more) sustainable pathways for society, both locally and globally. However, the nature of worldviews remains controversial, and it is still unclear how the concept can best be operationalized in the context of research and practice. One way may be by developing a framework for the understanding and operationalization worldviews by investigating various conceptualizations of the term in the history of philosophy. Worldviews can be understood as inescapable, overarching systems of meaning and meaning making that to a substantial extent inform how humans interpret, enact, and co-create reality. Moreover, worldviews are profoundly historically and developmentally situated. An Integrative Worldview Framework (IWF) can operationalize worldviews by differentiating five interrelated aspects: ontology, epistemology, axiology, anthropology, and societal vision. The evolution of the worldview concept is suggestive of an increasing reflexivity, creativity, responsibility, and inclusiveness—each of which are qualities that appear to be crucial for the global sustainable development debate.

If the value of intrinsic value accounts lies in the establishment of an impetus to accept duties with respect to nature and to make sense of specific feelings of attachment and affection toward nature, then these goals can be met equally well through the virtue of compassion. Compassion is an other-directed emotion, and is thus not anthropocentric when directed toward nature. It requires us to be capable of relating to and identifying suffering in another. However, basing an ethic on compassion requires a hermeneutic shift in how we think about nature and particular places such that we consider more closely how time is related to suffering. Since suffering is inevitable, there are several ways that compassion might be embodied in our actions, all of which share the feature of promoting the wildness of a place.

If we are to accurately gauge the validity of Lynn White, Jr.’s thesis as articulated in his article, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis” (1967), we must bring together recent research not only in the fields of environmental ethics and ecotheology but also in environmental history. We must also consider White’s work as a whole, including his Medieval Technology and Social Change (1962), which has been ignored for the most part by non-medievalists. Environmental history provides a corrective to White by anchoring medieval attitudes and practices in specific times and places and demonstrating that the medieval period was not monolithic or uniform with respect to attitudes toward nature. Recent work by medieval environmental historians confirms that while many of the broad claims made by White in “Roots” and Medieval Technology and Social Change must be strongly qualified, his central point that medieval agriculture was an important part of European environmental history has been largely sustained.

Within Arthur Schopenhauer’s pessimistic philosophy he set aside a special place for animals. Not only did Schopenhauer show great affection for other species and repeatedly criticize Western anthropocentrism, but he also argued that we could know a great deal about animals by intimately knowing ourselves. Although currently underdeveloped, Schopenhauer’s introspective methodology sheds light on how we can begin to mend the epistemic human-animal boundary through his emphasis on immediate, concrete knowledge and intuition. In practice too, Schopenhauer’s metaphysically grounded ethical system of compassion offers an alternative to both utilitarianism and deontology to bridge the human-animal moral boundary. For Schopenhauer, if a person recognizes the identical, underlying substance of their self and the animal kingdom, he or she will extend loving kindness and justice to all creatures.

Hunting is typically valued for its instrumentality for food procurement, wildlife management, conservation, heurism, and atavism. More importantly, some hunting is valued intrinsically. A particular form of hunting (i.e., fair-chase hunting) is a game and game playing, categorically, is often valued intrinsically. This view can be further supported with an application of a concept of caring and an accompanying argument that hunting generally, and fair-chase hunting in particular, is cared about deeply by millions of its practitioners. There are normative grounds for a shift in the way that hunting is valued. While hunting as game playing is valued and cared about deeply by millions of fair-chase practitioners, which is (morally) far more important than any of its various instrumentalities, the position that such hunting is morally villainous can be sustained.

Humanity’s food production activities profoundly affect our planet’s biosphere. While people commonly apply various ethical frameworks in making food choices, few consider the individual’s relationship with or obligation to our biosphere, the source of all food. A practical ethical framework capable of evaluating the relative biospheric goodness of various food production systems is needed. Toward that end there are three foundational concepts: (1) an elaboration of Marx’s concept of value here extended to incorporate the life activity of all living beings, (2) a refocusing of ecological thought to include the value and the spaces created by nonhuman communities, and (3) a characterization of power which also works to include all life and to obviate certain human/biospheric dichotomies. This approach joins the Marxist theory of value and exchange—which has well developed ethical principles—with ecology, which offers key insights into biotic relationships, but as a science eschews ethical positions. It is important to attend not only to the value resident in nonhuman bodies, but also to the value that these co-inhabitants invest in biospheric spaces—a matter often overlooked in both the social and natural sciences.

The abandoment of the use of local natural resources has caused serious ecological degradation in some parts of the world. Such situations highlight the importance of a democratic approach to the revitalization of commons. According to traditional systems of resource management, a clear boundary should be set between users and non-users: a closed community has been regarded as the basis for appropriate governance of resources. To the contrary, when restoring commons, it is more important to create an open platform that gathers people from various backgrounds and generations and to consider together possible means for sustainable resource governance. In terms of field research in environmental restoration conducted on Sado Island, Japan, there are three conditions that need to be stressed in the process of establishing a collaborative platform: (1) accepting a variety of participants, (2) maintaining a fair and neutral stance, and (3) respecting various sorts of knowledge. In addition to these conditions, cultivating the ability to engage in adaptive rule making is crucial to the realization of an autonomous community for sustainable resource governance.

One aspect of J. Baird Callicott’s foundational project for ecocentrism consists in explaining how moral consideration for ecological wholes can be grounded in moral sentiments. Some critics of Callicott have objected that moral consideration for ecological wholes is impossible under a sentimentalist conception of ethics because, on both Hume and Smith’s views, sympathy is our main moral sentiment and it cannot be elicited by holistic entities. This conclusion is premature. The relevant question is not whether such moral consideration is compatible with the moral psychologies elaborated by Hume and Smith themselves, but, rather, whether it is possible given the moral psychology human beings actually possess. To answer this question, we must turn to empirical moral psychology and consider the possibility of a sentimentalist ecocentrism based on the community, autonomy, diversity (CAD) model, a very promising model of human moral psychology developed by psychologists Richard Shweder, Paul Rozin, and Jonathan Haidt. This model can be used to assess the possibility of grounding ecocentrism in human moral sentiments. In light of this assessment, ecocentrism should be understood as a new form of naturalistic ethics informed by the moral emotions of disgust, shame, awe, and wonder.

Hans Jonas’ anti-visionary conservation-oriented environmental philosophy—prominently articulated in his seminal book The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age (1979)—had a tremendous impact on public and philosophical debates throughout the 1980s and the 1990s. Jonas argues that the “environmental crisis” reveals an underlying fundamental “crisis” in the human-nature relation. The crisis challenges the metaphysical foundations of our Western culture—including the dominant way humans view and deal with nature. Environmental ethics, therefore, requires critical reflection on and revision of the underlying philosophy of nature: ethics and philosophy of nature, Jonas argues, are twin sisters. This approach provokes severe criticism: (1) the diagnosis objection, (2) the origin analysis objection, (3) the justification objection, and (4) the problem-solution objection. Most objections are not as sound as they claim to be—although Jonas’ argumentative justification is in fact a bit weak. However, a systematic critique of the objections of the critics from an analytic perspective shows that he developed a political and practical “philosophy of nature” in which anthropology, ethics, and politics are conceptualized as a converging domain as one of the core constituents of environmentals ethics for this century.

One of the most pressing challenges facing environmental philosophers is how to address social and economic inequality while pursuing ecological sustainability. Bioregionalism is a view that is theoretically and practically well-equipped to grapple with the ecological, sociocultural, and economic complexity of the ecological crisis. However, its virtue ethics-oriented communitarianism as well as its spatial understanding of the just human polity render it unable to adequately address the on-the-ground reality of environmental degradation and political injustice as they occur in urban regions. Indeed, legacies of environmental racism and present patterns of social exclusion and economic inequality give good reason to designate multibioregional urban areas as the principal polity. Iris Young’s conception of justice as the “being together of strangers” critically yet sympathetically helps bioregionalism address these problems and that of the proper scale of the polity. The New York City region is a case study.

As the extent our impact on the environment becomes ever more clear, the search for ways to limit or even remedy some negative effects of our actions broadens. From science to religion, scholars in almost every field have been working hard to try to contribute to a healthier relationship between human beings and the natural world. In the humanities the issue is somewhat difficult. Because the topic is relatively new, there are few thinkers or traditions that deal with relevant environmental problems. One of the traditions that has been popularly associated with discussions of environmentally friendly philosophies is Daoism. In fact, the word Daoism, or dao jia (道家) in Chinese, takes dao (道) as central for its philosophy. In the daodejing (道德经), dao is given an ontological priority that makes it sound something like “nature” and would thereby provide an early Chinese model for environmentalism. The difficulty is, however, that dao can never be separated from anything in the world, including humans, which means that it cannot be understood as a nature that may provide ethical or moral guides for how one should behave. Strictly speaking, there is no classical Chinese equivalent to the nature of modern ecology. But this does not result in a dead end for environmentalist readings of Daoist texts. In fact, viewed from the perspective of using things, and how people interact with tools and consider profits, it is precisely because the Daoist have no conception of “nature” that they have so much to offer environmentalism.

It is sometimes argued that the idea of wilderness—land which humans willfully leave alone and let be—stems from and reinforces the vice of misanthropy insofar as it assumes that humans are a destructive and deterministic species. This misanthropy is allegedly reflected in three prevailing conceptions of wilderness: (1) wilderness as an escape from people, (2) humans as a taint on wilderness, and (3) humans as having no positive role in nature. These alleged links between wilderness and misanthropy are false. The first two conceptions are not goals of wilderness but are means to the goals of experiencing and protecting wild nature, which are not misanthropic goals. The third conception might be misanthropic, but is based on a category error; the U.S. Wilderness Act of 1964 is itself an example of a positive role for humans in nature. Contrary to the charge of misanthropy, the wilderness idea does not require the assumption that humans are inherently destructive. This issue is important because the oft-repeated (and too-often tolerated) false charge of misanthropy unfairly gives wilderness a bad name and illicitly undermines some of the support it might otherwise have, and is a common accusation of business-as-usual development interests that are hostile to conservation policies and wish to subvert them.

African policy makers have ignored indigenous environmental ethics. The relation between responsible use of the planet’s resources and ethics remains apparent in many cultural and social systems of traditional Africa. The local people have developed detailed interactive knowledge of the natural environment, and preserved biodiversity resources, which they have nurtured and developed since time immemorial. African environmental ethics is based on the worldviews of the African people, and can contribute to biodiversity conservation and environmental rehabilitation and protection. It can enlighten policy makers by providing a theoretical foundation for sustainable living. Furthermore, African environmental ethics can expose environmental injustice committed by different groups in Africa, and assist local communities to secure environmental justice and protect their environment. It can create awareness within countries and globally about the actions of transnational corporations, irresponsible countries, and local industries which damage the environment. African environmental ethics may also alert the African people to understand the long-range effects of environmental degradation that are beyond the purview of local people and understanding of which is otherwise unavailable. Modern environmental knowledge about global environmental problems will provide peasant farmers and pastoralists an opportunity to look at their own local concerns and issues within the context of a greater global perspective. Only by involving peasant farmers, pastoralists, and indigenous people at the grass-roots level will African policy makers have the political strength and will to implement serious changes needed to address serious environmental and developmental problems. If policy makers continue to neglect the major contributors to biodiversity conservation and environmentally friendly practices, environmental policies will not have significant impacts on development and environmental protection in Africa.

The inner and outer Benin City moats are human-made military artifacts from the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteen centuries. Two sets of questionnaires given to indigenous and non-indigenous people living in Benin City show that some people want the moats preserved for a variety of reasons: for historical purposes, for aesthetic purposes, and for the purpose of beautifying Benin City; to channel city floods; and to serve as a tourist attraction. These variegated viewpoints from the standpoint of Bini indigenous values, urban values and aesthetics, and worldview can to some degree be regarded as existential and phenomenological approaches to environmental matters. An argument, nevertheless, can be developed that the moats should be properly regarded as earthworks such that the more common Eurocentric instrumental-intrinsic value categories are applicable to them for purposes of environmental ethical considerations. On both intrinsic and instrumental grounds, there are adequate justifications for preserving the moats. Utilitarian ethical considerations are one way of understanding those who would wish the moats to be used to channel city floods. Developing the moats for tourism can be interpreted as an attempt to link utilitarian and aesthetic viewpoints. Blending urban aesthetics with utilitarian considerations, some designs (including the design of railroads) can provide a way of concretely promoting tourism and its concomitant aesthetics.