The advancement in the field of medical science and technology has made the issue of euthanasia more relevant and important for the present day society to discuss. Life saving machines and drugs are helping the patients who become incapable of leading their lives independently and to live artificially with thehelp of these life prolonging machines and medicines. But today it is possible to prolong their life, which may be full of pain and suffering. This suffering of the 'person' forces us to think as to how far we are morally justified to help such patients to go on living a useless, helpless and painful life. Isn't it obligatory on us to relieve them of their pain? Such issues have made the concept of ‘euthanasia’, which involves 'good death', an important one. One should take a utilitarianpoint of view in analyzing the concept of euthanasia. One should keep the interests and benefit of people in mind. When one decides that a particular case is a case of euthanasia, then not only the 'net benefit' of the patient should be borne in mind, but also the 'general benefit of the society and individuals looking after the patient should be taken into consideration.

The most important moral question concerned with the problem of political obligation relates to the limits of obedience of a citizen owed to the state. The problem of political obligation raises the questions such as – (1) To what extent the citizen has an obligation to obey the laws of the state? (2) Is the citizen of a state, whether democratic or otherwise, under an obligation to obey the unjust laws of the state? There are two different viewpoints concerning the character of obligation to obey the laws of the State. (1) The first position states -- “one has an absolute obligation to obey the law and therefore disobedience to the state law is never justified”. (2) The second position asserts -- “one has a prima facie obligation to obey the law, but this obligation can be overridden by conflictingobligations. Hence disobedience to the state law can be justified in the presence of outweighing circumstances”.

Aristotle’s and Plato’s doctrine has been used by Christian thinkers in the defense of and explanation of the faith. The end of the 20th century and the beginnings of this century have been marked by an unprecedented attack on the family as a natural institution, that is, it has an unchanging essence that does not change with time. The family as a natural institution is based on a monogamous relationship of a man and a woman with a clear function to serve the individual members of this institution and the society. Proponents of other family forms rally on the contrary, could the Stagirite corpus doctrinae specifically those he enunciated in his work The Politics and Nicomachean Ethics shed light on contemporary issues and provide satisfactory ammunition for Christians? The paper will develop in three parts: first, an exposition of the Stagirite doctrine; second, an overview of the problems and threats to the traditional family and finally an evaluation of the doctrine.

As we can see, the side effects caused by the continuous development of science and economy have gradually brought human society into a risk society. While currently, the power of globalization is unceasingly forming a world risk society. German renowned philosopher and sociologist Ulrich Beck has opened a unique and novel researching angle to review science difficulty and abuse of modern world risk society, and has made comprehensive and profound analysis. World risk society has three main characters: First, the emergence of the world risk society is linked to the two fundamental changes still influencing our lives, which is the so-called “end of nature” and “end of tradition”. Second, in world risk society, mankind lose their dependence on “expert system”. The religion is replaced by the concept uncertainty and uncontrollable. In addition, there are other series of problems and abuses between world risk society and traditional society. The prime mover of social changes in world risk society exists in the side effects instead of the instrumental ration in traditional times, etc. The problem in world risk society’s science ethics are as follows: First, expansion of ration. It is mankind’s extreme confidence in ration that causing unlimited development of technology and exploitation of resources. Thus almost everywhere in nature becomes man‐made nature. Second, rupture of knowledge. From “knowledge is virtue and virtue isknowledge” (Socrates) to “knowledge is power” (Bacon), now “knowledge is money” (Bacon). Third, displacement of science value. In traditional society, science research is scientists’ personal interests. Now science research turns its target to meeting social needs, and scientists gain more profits from the technologicalproducts directly. Beck has raised the theory of risk society, and attempted to use “reflexive modernity” as the strategic plan to respond the global consequence of modern science crisis, and expressed revelatory viewpoint on diagnosis of the essential of “reflexive modernity”. Similarly, Lash emphasizes risk culture toremind human to pay attention to the ecological threat and risk. In addition, Bauman and Habermas also have some statements, etc. So my conclusion is, we should consider the autonomy of science development and its inherent relationship with economic interests. In addition, what we concern is the science dual identity of both defendant and expert. Also, the public’s understanding of the uncertainty provides a space for democratization.

Two fundamental problems in all thought can be identified: One, life and world affirmation and second, life and world negation. Indian approach is characterized as the second and hence it is claimed that moral problems have not been persistently pursued and successfully tackled in India. Points like the advaita concept of liberation, law of karma, the system of social stratification, stages of life and duties associated with them are picked up to show that theIndian system is ethically bankrupt. But along with the science of salvation, the science of statecraft (arthasastra) and four objectives of human life are emphasized. The two functions of knowledge namely, theoretical and practical (arthaparicchiti and phalaprapti) referring to fact and value are recognized and it is held that knowledge of facts lead to the pursuit of values. Value is taken as the ‘object of desire’. The concept of svadharma and ahimsa are basic to it. The ‘ought of ethics’ (Dharma) is foundational to all Indian thought. A comprehensive value system consisting of spiritual, moral, material and social values and the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic values are recognized. Contemporary ethical issues relating to human rights and women, suicide, abortion and the host of problems thrown open by science and biotechnology find proper place in it.

As one of the characteristics of the nowadays postmodernism, the multiculturalism and the globalization seems to be profoundly related to the heterogenity and to the heteronomy. Globalization is going with the multiculturalism, but in an opposite direction: globalization towards the standardization and multiculturalismtowards fragmentation. Is the Global Village also the Postmodern Village?

Derrida, especially in his late work Politics of Friendship (1997), has introduced the concept of ‘a‐humanist’ politics in the context of his general project of the deconstruction of politics as following upon his showing all such words as state, nation, democracy, justice, law, community et al to be fundamentally breached by their own opposites. All these notions may be retained at one level but also transcended and transgressed by confronting them with their binaries. Derrida’s entire discursive endeavour indeed is characterized by the motifs of transgression and extratranscendence. All the notions of rationality, sanity, normality, morality etc. need to be aporetically transcended and breached. Even the ‘humanity’, the least innocuous of the terms, would be supplanted by the opposite of ‘ahumanity’. ‘Is it possible’, asks Derrida, ‘without setting off loud protests on the part of militants of an edifying or dogmatic humanism, to think and to live … the experience of a certain ahumanity, beyond or below the commerce of gods and men?’ The politics, here, ‘exceeds the measure of man, without becoming a theologem’ (p.294). What could one say about this politics which resists becoming a ‘theologem’ but is still a politics, a politics beyond politics, politics of mysticism in other words. Itcertainly saves us from the dangers of certitude, of dogmatism, even of opinion. But does it also not deprive us of our own selves i.e. our humanity, our community and nation, our values and our God. Is the commitment to a voluntary death our only fate. Is the messiah of Derrida a saviour who saves or is he one who facilitates our death by coming into life himself? Is he the symbol of life or death – death of others, and then of himself.

This paper takes up Peter Sloterdijk’s proposition for a new thinking of the world as global foam. After quickly reminding the reader of the main characteristics of “bubbles” as “immune spheres of existence”, I retrace the three phases of the history globalization as they have been developed by Sloterdijk in the Spheres trilogy. I then focus on the third phase, also called Global Age, and try to bring together the two seemingly opposed concepts Sloterdijk has used to discuss the age of globality: “worldly interior” and “foams” by arguing that the former represents our world in its globality while the latter represents it in its irreducible plurality. The result is a system of co-fragility and co-isolation: a compact proximity between fragile entities and the necessary closure of each cell unto itself. If this is the case, the question we need to ask concerns the space left opened in the worldly interior for a ‘world-forming’ praxis. In the end politics can only consist in “managing” the worldly interior, stabilizing it and regulating its exchange with an outside. Without overview, without initiative, it is not clear in what ways politics can still be a trans-forming praxis and is not a mere function of the system.

Why is there something rather than nothing? This question, formulated by Leibniz, constitutes the basis of modern European ontology. In many ways this can be termed the main question of philosophy; but if so, a similar but less attended to question comes to mind, which I shall call the second best question of philosophy. The second best question of philosophy: Why is it better that there is something rather than nothing? seems to constitute a natural basis for moral theory. The latter question often appears in philosophy of religion, in arguments leading to the thesis that God the Creator is good. Yet, modern moral philosophy tended to shy away from such a direct grounding in metaphysics. Not anymore. Luciano Floridi’s ethics based on anti-entropy is still a new and somewhat understated theory; having originated from information ethics it seems to have a hard time establishing itself as a general moral theory. But the potential of becoming a major alternative to the main positions in moral theory is there. It is my goal in this paper to highlight the promise, as well as certain difficulties, of Floridi’s theory. I will also undertake to move the work on anti-entropy ethics one step further, towards becoming a general moral theory.

The proposed paper makes an overview of ideas about the failure of the Modern reason as they are launched in the 20th century Continental Philosophy. It begins with Edmund Husserl’s views about wrong objectivism and naturalism in science and philosophy, proceeds to the radical criticism against the project of Enlightenment practiced by the first generation Frankfurt School, and pays attention to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s dissatisfaction with cliché language and thinking dominating both public and private discourse today. Further examination of the Modern reason misfortunes discusses Emanuel Levinas’ uprising against fundamental ontology for the sake of ethics and responsibility to the Other, Julia Kristeva’s appeal to reestablish the social contract on new sensibility and new rationality, and Jean Boaudrillard’s observation that reason has surrendered to the code of simulacrum. In the second part of the paper, some suggestions proposed by the above philosophers (except Baudrillard) about resolving the deadlock of the Modern reason are viewed briefly. A conclusion is made that Baudrillard’s pessimistic position seems to be the most plausible and relevant in the current socio-political and philosophical climate.

TGiulio Preti, born in Pavia (Italy) in 1911 and dead in Djerba (Tunisia) in 1972, represents one of the most subtle Italian thinkers of the latter half of the twentieth century. After graduating in 1933 discussing a thesis about The Husserl’s historical significance, he connected more and more to the Antonio Banfi’s lesson of critical rationalism and he elected him as his master. Starting from Banfi’s The principles of a reason theory (1927), Preti studied in depth the program of historization of the Kantian transcendental both in books such as Idealism and positivism (1942), and in Praxis and empiricism (1957), in Rhetoric and logic (1968), and then in his numerous essay studies, later collected in fundamental posthumous volumes, Philosophical essays (1976, 2 vol.). Preti’s decisive problem is the following question: how is it possible to historicize human knowledge without a relativization? According to Preti, in order to answer this question, it is necessary to acknowledge the objectivity of scientific knowledge. The objective knowledge mustn’t be confused with an absolute knowledge or, least of all, with a subjective, or toutcourt relative, knowledge. Therefore it is necessary to avoid either opposite poles, but specular, in which the different epistemologicaltraditions of the last century are, on the contrary, stopped. In Preti’s opinion, the objectivity of knowledge arises from the eidetic, linguistic and operative structures, within the limits of which develops a determinate form of human scientific knowledge. In other words: every scientific knowledge, structured into a particularscientific theory and relating to a particular technological heritage, consists of a precise theoretical-practical horizon, that determines, with Husserl’s words, a specific “ontological region”, or, with Bachelard’s words, a specific “ontogenesis”. So Preti recovers the heuristic rule of the Kant’s transcendental reason. Nevertheless, unlike Kant, Preti believes the aprioristic structures of our ideas always have a conventional and historical foundation. In this way, the Kantian a priori changes into an historical and relativistic a priori. Certainly in Kant’s opinion an historical and relativistic a priori would have looked like a “round-square”, an authentic contradiction, a pure logical impossibility. According to Preti, on the contrary, this paradoxical aspect is the true distinctive feature of scientificknowledge objectivity, which has no more any eternal or absolute value, but is always built by men born to die and is always bound to determinate historical forms of civilization. Starting from these assumptions, Preti builds, in this way, a research programme on the possibility to individualize a form of “critic ontologism”, which hasn’t any more connection with the claims and the traditional metaphysical structures of the “Being qua Being”. On the contrary, Preti thinks the only “being” we can rationally talk about is the one constituted within the different cognitive ambits. Philosophy then must be able to develop a “meta-reflection” on different knowledge elaborated by single sciences. According to Preti, in fact, philosophy is the formality of human culture, it is, in other words, a form of self-reflection by the human culture about itself. Therefore philosophy has no more any privileged subject, but it must be always able to reflect, with great theoretical humility, on the different cognitive forms, in order to study languages, structures, methods, extension and limits of the human knowledge. In this way Preti’s “critic ontologism” is a kind of historical-objective transcendentalism, able to study the different configurations of the technical-scientific heritage produced by mankind during his history.

This paper discusses William James’s pragmatism in relation to nominalism. James’s views are often contrasted with Peirce’s realism. There are differences between Jamesian and Peircean pragmatisms, but several scholars argue that it is misleading to simply classify James as a nominalist. Moreover, the nominalism vs. realism issue in these early pragmatists is not purely metaphysical but also ethical, illustrating the pragmatists’ tendency to view metaphysics and ethics as deeply entangled. This challenging theme should be further developed today in attempts to rethink the nature and mutual relations of philosophical disciplines.

In this presentation we shall discuss the nature of mind vis-a-vis the brain and computers. Such a comparison presumes a general equivalence of brains and computers and models the brain as a huge biological computer, with consciousness added. The uniqueness of Mind in the lines of ancient Indian thought has been accpted as the basic concept in the analysis. Regarding the chief difference between mind and brain, material of the mind is taken to be subtle matter.The brain is made of gross matter and is a part of the physical body. Considering the brain and the computer, the brain is a biological structure made of organic molecules, whereas computer chips are inorganic objects manufactured by etching circuits on the surface of silica chips. Thus the human brain, occupying volume, is a volumetric entity whereas a computer, as electronic circuitry on a silica chip, is an areal entity. This explains the vast processing power andexceptional capabilities of the human brain.

At the beginning of the third millenium the aspect of truth comes out to be especially topical. The greatest interest is risen by existentialistic and social aspects of the truth issue. Their correlation studying is the most productive way to research the aspect of truth. An individual life passes under certain circumstances, one of them being social reality. Presence of other people, necessity of communication and correlation of individual and social substances allows emphasizing a social side of the truth aspect. The notion of truth is shaped under condition of intersubjectivity or within the process of social subjects interaction. On the one hand it provides a possibility to take the truth as an objectively existing phenomenon, on the other hand it transfers individual valuables and strivings into generally significant field. So Truth is destined to stay one of the most important and notional for a person concepts (despite of post-modernism attempts not to use it basically), as it legitimates a universal principle of common valuables availability for all people on the earth.

Философия науки возникла в итоге неспособности теории познания ответить на важные вопросы, вставшие перед научным сообществом в конце XIX века. И в дальнейшем философия науки и теория познания шли каждая свом путем, оказывая друг на друга немалое влияние, но ставя и решаявесьма разные задачи. Главным различием между ними является то, что эпистемология является теоретическим видом знания, тогда как философия науки – посттеоретическая дисциплина. Эпистемология – это теория, включающая в себя объяснительную схему, это философский проект познания, это дисциплина, содержащая набор запретов и предписаний. Философия науки представляет собой изучение научногопоиска как состоявшегося реального события, а также экспертную оценку результатов. Философия науки предполагает критическое и рефлексивное сравнение проекта и результата, тогда как теория познания совершенствует нормативы и регулятивы познавательной активности. Там, где теория познания создает метод и сама опирается на метод, философия науки обходится историко‐критической рефлексией, логико-грамматическим анализом, поиском культурных или социальных детерминант.

The Extended Mind Hypothesis (EMH) needs a defence of phenomenal externalism in order to be consistent with an indispensable condition for attributing extended beliefs, concerning the conscious past endorsement of information. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to envisage such a defence. Proponents ofthe EMH are thus confronted with a difficult dilemma: they either accept absurd attributions of belief, and thus deflate EMH, or incorporate, for compatibility reasons, the conscious past endorsement condition for extended belief attribution, implying a seemingly unavailable defence of phenomenal externalism, and thus risk inconsistency within EMH. Either way, EMH is threatened.

The aim of this paper is to focus on the phenomenon of selective attention as pointing out important psychological cases where it is arguable that we can have practical reasons without the capacity to carry out any relevant inference. Selective attention also would serve to show the possibility to have very basic demonstrative references to particular perceptual items without the possession of any concept. I will argue that if we assume 1) that believing can be taken as a kind of action and 2) that demonstrative references to particular empirical items in that so basic sense have an important epistemological role in all of our knowledge, then our conclusions would have a very large application. There would be reasons without inferences not only for acting but also for believing, anddemonstrative reference without concepts would be an uneliminable component of our knowledge.

The existence of “grandmother” cells clashes with the model of the brain as a distributive system and is implausible because such neurons would have powers of representation across visuals angles and contexts. Nevertheless, Kreiman, Koch and others have offered experimental evidence that such neurons do exist. I agree that neurons may indeed fire when the subject looks at a variety of pictures, drawings, etc. of one particular person. I argue, however, that such a “grandmother” cell is nothing but the single-neuron output stage of a neural network trained to recognize that person. The so-called “grandmother cell” does not have any extraordinary binding properties: They are properties of the neural network instead. I will thus offer a distributive explanation of grandmother cells.

Universal Game Theory - The theory that all of life is a game played by consciousness’es, (Living Beings). The board is a dream like structure of the universe. The progression is through an active process of intent witnessing, and passive meditation. Which releases the tension in the nerves of the body and leads to selfless actions, moral goodness, and eventually the finish, Enlightenment. Just like a wounded creature only cares about it’s own self. Man in tensionthrough self-centered thought only thinks about his own predicaments. Even if he is thinking about others it is only through his own objectionable view from his false-created center. The enemy or deterrents in the game is the conditioning created by society for ambition, greed, control and general brain washing to give theindividual a false sense of identity, the ego. This is achieved by Religion; tradition, culture, education, reasoning, linear thought, and the creation of time. Leaving him/her in constant anxiety about millions of future contingencies. Through witnessing one realizes the whole futility of one dimensional thought which only leads to more and more thought. Simple or constructed elaborately, thought being time, a human construction. The final step of the Universal Game Theory is understanding the whole process of thought and the eventual revelation of Enlightenment, Bliss, ecstasy. Which the person then understands that he/she is the creator of the life/dream with which they are in. That point being a sexual ecstasy similar to what happens in death to men. i.e. Human males release semenwhen they die, having a sexual ecstasy at their last breath.

In this paper I contend that abduction is essentially multimodal, in that both data and hypotheses can have a full range of verbal and sensory representations, involving words, sights, images, smells, etc. but also kinesthetic experiences and other feelings such as pain, and thus all sensory modalities. The kinesthetic aspects simply explain abductive reasoning is basically manipulative, both linguistic and non linguistic signs have an internal semiotic life, as particular configurations of neural networks and chemical distributions (and in terms of their transformations) at the level of human brains, and as somatic expressions, but can also be delegated to many external objects and devices, for example written texts, diagrams, artifacts, etc. Still in this case unconscious aspects takepart of the abductive procedure, which acquires the features of a kind of "thinking through doing".