Complexity theorist Stuart Kauffman writes Reinventing the Sacred: A New View of Science, Reason, and Religion to defend ontological emergence and refute theism. He argues naturalistic emergentism is the preferable alternative to a naturalistic reductionism that views all reality as reducible to particles in motion. Among the central claims naturalistic emergentists make is that they have built their worldview on the firm foundations of science. In this paper I argue that naturalistic theories of ontological emergence are incompatible with the philosophical preconditions necessary for practicing science.

Kant’s negative, distorted views on black Africans, human sexuality, and revealed religion led him to undervalue the case for racial equality, healthy sexual intimacy, and the virtues of Christianity as a revealed religion with its commending worship, prayer, and rites. Kantian anthropology and critique of revealed religion is contrasted with the more capacious approach of the Cambridge Platonists. Challenging Kant’s methodological bias is important in removing the obstacles facing a fair assessment of matters of race, sexuality, and the virtues of Christianity as a religion based on revelation.

I contend that Kant’s philosophy, as it stands, is strictly deistic in a strictly epistemic sense, but its own internal theological momentum suggests this epistemic deism may be overcome in the eyes of faith because of ontological considerations surrounding God and God’s work in the world. I sketch six “signposts” in defense of this claim that emerge out of the New Wave. Because these signposts lead directly to two philosophically viable and theologically acceptable roadways for overcoming the charge of deism, I conclude that “maybe” is the best answer to the question “Can the New Wave Baptize Kant’s Deism?”

In recent decades there has arisen what Keith Yandell labels the “new wave” of Kant interpretation. These “new wavers” argue that Kant has a more robust view of God and religion than traditionally granted. This article is part of an exchange with Chris Firestone, originally presented at the AAR’s annual meeting, on the question “Can the New Wave Baptize Kant’s Deism?” In what follows, I argue no, contending that the theologically robust Kant of the new wave still builds on a foundation that is fundamentally incompatible with historical Christianity. Thus, Kant’s theology and Christianity can never be brought into harmony.

In “Idolatry and the End of Apologetics,” I worried that while continental philosophy can aid Christian philosophers and theologians, it can also tempt us toward the “Idolatry of Linguistic License”—an idolatry which sets God so far beyond our words that we deny God’s normative place in the community of speakers while safeguarding our autonomy vis-à-vis God. My essay suggested that some passages in Myron Bradley Penner’s helpful book, The End of Apologetics, might pass too close to the Idolatry of Linguistic License. In Penner’s irenic reply he affirmed that the Idolatry of Linguistic License is a real worry, but protested that I had misread him at several points. This response seeks to continue that irenic tone in a discussion of three points where I still have some questions.

There are good reasons to think there is a universal, fundamental length, specifically, at the order of the Planck length. If this holds, we then have an empirical answer for (1) Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and the tortoise, (2) a potential impasse in the second premise of the kalam cosmological argument, and (3) creation ex nihilo. In this paper, I establish metaphysical, empirical, and epistemic reasons suggesting there is a universal, fundamental length. Along the way, I propose a “contingent necessity” for such a notion. I then detail how a universal, fundamental length is a preferred solution for issues (1)–(3).

Bradley N. Seeman has argued that The End of Apologetics comes perilously close to what he calls “the idolatry of linguistic license.” Despite my recent reply, Seeman continues to have a few concerns about my position. I offer a clarification regarding my description of theological language as “poetics,” and argue that it is a way of acknowledging the contingency of all theological descriptions and vocabularies. I also counter Seeman’s insistence on trans-language game truth-makers by noting that it begs the central issue of my “alethic quasi realism,” and argue that this is not a thoroughly deflated concept of truth.

Some Christian theorists define love in terms of benevolence (that is, willing or desiring someone’s good for her own sake), or benevolence plus some minor addition (e.g., being emotionally responsive to the one loved). Here I rely on a thought experiment involving a fully benevolent human, dubbed “Benevolent Billy,” to show that benevolence accounts of this kind are insufficient as a distinctly Christian account of love. This is because those who exemplify ideal Christian love for another must be intrinsically motivated to form or maintain caring, reciprocal relationships with those loved (at least when all other things are equal); yet there is nothing about Billy’s perfect benevolence that so motivates.

There is an old argument rooted in the classical natural law tradition that says that the “perverse” or “unnatural” use of a human faculty is immoral. This short essay offers a derivation, overview, and brief defense of this “perverted faculty” argument (PFA). I shall argue that the PFA is entailed by some commonsense theses about the nature of goodness.

In this article, I examine and respond to Charles Taylor’s phenomenology of language. Taylor argues for the constitutive theory of language by refuting the designative theory of language. According to Taylor, designative theory fails to grasp the constitutive nature of language which opens up human meanings and values, shapes our emotions, and defines our social footings. Metaphors and symbols convey important insights about human reality through extending our language capacity. By comparing with Paul Ricoeur’s and Avery Dulles’ analysis of symbols, we can also see the significance of figurative speech in religious life. Finally, the anticipated criticism of Taylor’s argument of moral felt intuition is also defended.

I develop a theodicy (Non-Identity Theodicy) that begins with the recognition that we owe our existence to great and varied evils. I develop two versions of this theodicy, with the result that some version is available to the theist regardless of her assumptions about the existence and nature of free will. My defense of Non-Identity Theodicy is aided by an analogy between divine creation and human procreation. I argue that if one affirms the morality of voluntary human procreation, one should affirm the morality of divine creation; conversely, denying the morality of divine creation commits one to denying the morality of human procreation.

A number of theologians have propounded what we will call proposition (P): If God creates from an internal necessity, then God cannot have aseity (i.e., be from himself ). According to (P), there is inconsistency between divine aseity and the idea that God creates from an internal necessity. In this article, however, I develop an argument for the consistency of divine aseity and the idea that God creates from an internal necessity, thus claiming that proposition (P) is false. The argument is founded upon the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo along with two operative principles implied by this doctrine.

In this paper we argue that Robert Kane’s theory of free will cannot accommodate the possibility of a sinless individual who faces morally significant choices because a sinless agent cannot voluntarily accord value to an immoral desire, and we argue that Kane’s theory requires this. Since the Jesus of the historic Christian tradition is held to be sinless, we think Christians should reject Kane’s theory because it seems irreconcilable with historic Christian Christology. We consider two objections to our argument and argue that both fail.

Though William Lane Craig believes his anti-Platonism is compatible with objective, Christian morality, I argue that it is not. First, I survey the main contours of his nominalism. Second, I discuss how he sees those points in relation to objective, Christian morality. Then, I argue that his view cannot sustain the qualitative aspects of moral virtues or principles, or even human beings. Moreover, Craig’s view loses any connection between those morals and humans, thereby doing great violence to objective, Christian morals. Finally, I sketch two advantages of a Platonic realism in regards to Christian morals.

In his monograph, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism, Erik Wielenberg offers arguably one of the most sophisticated defenses of the autonomy thesis to date. Wielenberg argues that (I) the divine command theory is problematic because it cannot account for the moral obligations of reasonable unbelievers; (II) Godless normative robust realism (GRNR) can be formulated in a way that avoids the standard objections to the autonomy thesis; and (III) GRNR provides a better account of intrinsic value. In this paper, I will argue Wielenberg’s defenses of the autonomy thesis fails. I will argue that his objection to divine command theories fails, that he fails to address two standard challenges to the autonomy thesis adequately, and, finally, that Wielenberg fails to show that GRNR better accounts for the intuition that certain things are intrinsically good than various forms of theistic alternatives.

According to Nicholas Wolterstorff’s analysis, the biblical view of justice defends the inherent natural rights of the most vulnerable minorities. As homosexuals are such a vulnerable minority, he argues that church and state ought to recognize same-sex marriage. My aim is to critique Wolterstorff’s argument for failing to apply his own theory and to acknowledge the natural rights of children, who are the most vulnerable persons involved. By ignoring the natural law emphasis on the natural structures of marriage, such as gender complementarity, he ends up undermining children’s natural right to know and be reared by their biological parents.

According to Peter van Inwagen, C. S. Lewis failed in his attempt to undermine naturalism with his argument from reason. According to van Inwagen, Lewis provides no justification for his central premise, that naturalism is inconsistent with holding beliefs for reasons. What is worse, van Inwagen argues that the main premise in Lewis’s argument from reason is false. We argue that it is not false. The defender of Lewis’s argument can make use of the problem of mental causal drainage, a long-standing issue in philosophy of mind, to show how van Inwagen’s objection fails.

In response to the recent resurgence of idealism among a cluster of Christian theologians and philosophers, this article raises a difficulty for Christians to be idealists. Unlike traditional accounts of Christianity that must explain why God permits or allows evil, idealists face a different and more difficult problem—namely why does God willfully and directly produce experiences of evil. Because the metaphysics of idealism requires God to produce experiences of evil directly and willfully, it is difficult to reconcile it with the essential goodness of God. The existence of matter, therefore, may play an important role in maintaining God’s innocence while allowing creatures to exercise free will.

A key sentence of the Nicene Creed: “We believe in one holy, catholic, and apostolic church.” This paper attempts to explain how a Protestant Christian can be part of the catholic church. What is essential to genuine or “mere” Christianity is adherence to the doctrines in the Nicene Creed. This account is consistent with a Protestant affirmation of “Scripture alone.” Scripture has the highest authority only when properly interpreted, but this requires that the Bible should be read in accord with the “rule of faith” summarized in the Nicene Creed.