In the present paper, i propose, first, to present some aspects of what we may call a type of "phenomenology" of the image contained in the Berlin lectures on transcendental logic – notably, in the second of these courses in Berlin. Second, i would like to return to the problem of the relationship between logic and philosophy, starting from these indications with regard to the "image", and, if possible, outline some parallel with certain theses on the same subject from the Jena years. Finally, in what i consider a novelty concerning these lessons, i would like to conclude my exposition by raising the question of the foundational character of Fichte’s project.

McDowell in Mind and World developed a post-transcendental understanding of some core philosophical puzzles of subjectivity, like consciousness, conceptual capacity and perception. One of the main assumptions in the background of his philosophical proposal is that all our possible experience has to be determined and therefore has to be acknowledged as conceptual, therefore this very experience has to be both relational and representational.After this statement of conceptual experience in the early 2000’s a debate started which still involves philosophers like Brandom, Gaskin, Wright, Heck, Stalnaker, Peacocke, Dreyfus.The discussion in the beginning was focused on the definition of the Space of Reasons, what is most lively today is the epistemological uncertainty of the possibility of perceiving imagines in a reductive view as perceptual (non-conceptual) experience. The proposal of McDowell is a quasi-Hegelian understanding of concepts. I think that is possible an alternative path, moving from a new understanding of conceptual spontaneity and of the determination in general, rooted in J. G. Fichte Sittenlehre (1812) and in the general framework of the Wissenschaftslehre (mostly the WL Nova methodo and some later expositions) in a broader and more nuanced understanding of the postkantian transcendental philosophy.

In this paper, my aim is to offer an approach to the practical meaning of the concept of image in Fichte’s Doctrine of the State of 1813. The word “image” (Bild) plays an important role within Fichte’s philosophical terminology, especially during the last period of his intellectual production and his academic life, after leaving the University of Jena. Even a superficial reading of the several different versions of the Doctrine of Science allows one to recognize that the above-mentioned term is used by Fichte more frequently during his years in Berlin (1800–1814). Despite this, the determination of the concrete meaning of the term “image” represents a difficult interpretative challenge for readers of Fichte’s philosophy. From my point of view, Fichte uses the term “image” not only at the level of theoretical or methodological reflection, but also at that of praxis. For this reason, Fichte’s transcendental reflection in the Doctrine of the State contains not only an analysis of the negative relationship between image and being, but also, necessarily, an analysis of the positive relationship between image and freedom (Freiheit). Although his Doctrine of the State is based on a theological-religious conception, which could be questioned from the perspective of a secularized rationality, Fichte maintains a consistent conception of knowledge as an image of a world ordered by the moral law. Definitively, this image plays a central role as an original model for the action of every rational being in the sensible world.

In Über den Unterschied des Geistes u. des Buchstabens in der Philosophie, Fichte writes that man’s most fundamental tendency to philosophize is simply the drive to represent for the sake of representing—the same drive which is the ultimate basis of the fine arts. The process of representing for the sake of representing is grounded in “spirit”, which is nothing other than the power of the imagination to raise to consciousness images of das Urschöne. In this paper, I suggest that the affinity between artistic activity and Fichte’s transcendental philosophy is closer than previously thought. I further suggest that for Fichte, transcendental philosophy is a performance and that such an interpretation of Fichte’s thought points to a way out of the circularity in his transcendental project.

This essay argues for the applicability and importance of the notion of the unconscious (in the limited sense of any form of mental activity of which one is not or cannot be aware) in Fichte’s Jena period, with a focus on the ,second’ Wissenschaftslehre (1796–99). The essay begins by arguing for the existence of a fundamental tension in Fichte’s philosophy: namely, between a ,transcendence’ principle – that the conditions for consciousness cannot themselves be present within experience, since they ground that experience – and an ,immanence’ principle that there is no genuine reality outside of consciousness. It is shown that this tension is particularly evident if one observes some of the conflicting ways in which Fichte employs the notions of ,intellektuelle Anschauung’ and ,unmittelbares Bewusstsein.’ Fichte seems to violate the immanence principle especially insofar as he characterizes the conditions of the possibility of consciousness as a series of ,actions,’ which, qua actions, must be ,real’ in some sense: insofar as they are both real and not present to consciousness, it is argued, they must be unconscious. Although Fichte does not wholly embrace the notion of unconscious mental activity due to his adherence to the immanence principle, his conception of the ,two series’ of the Wissenschaftslehre as well as some of his uses of the notion of ,unmittelbares Bewusstsein’ in particular allow the recognition that Fichte has a rich but inchoate conception of the unconscious.

L’atmosphère« Atmosphère » est un terme employé communément par des auteurs dans le domaine de l’esthétique que dans celui de la météorologie. Ils le comprennent pourtant de manière assez différente, chacun prétendant que leur emploi est la plus fondamentale et que l’autre est seulement métaphorique. Pour les esthéticiens, l’atmosphère réelle est une aura qui émane des choses et qui affecte nos humeurs et nos motivations; pour les météorologistes, il s’agit de l’enveloppe gazeuse qui entoure la planète. Je montre que les deux sens excluent l’air ou le réduisent à un éther immatériel. D’une part, pour la science météorologique, tout se passe comme l’air était enfermé à l’intérieur et considéré comme un ensemble d’effets mesurables et calculables. D’autre part,l’esthétique de l’affect a relié l’atmosphère aux formes solides des artéfacts et des paysages. En ramenant le medium aérien, je cherche une signification de l’atmosphère qui transcende l’opposition entre l’affectif et le météorologique. Je le fais en suivant Merleau-Ponty, qui traite l’atmosphère comme un espace d’inspiration et d’expiration. En tant que tel, il correspond étroitement à ce que Merleau-Ponty lui-même appelle la « chair ». Ce concept pourrait aussi être traduit par « meshwork » (réseau/filet/grillage), référant à ces faisceaux de lignes et de chemins par lesquels chaque être humain est cousu à la fabrique du monde. Pour Merleau-Ponty, la portée de la notion de chair réside dans l’affirmation que la perception est fondamentalement réversible. On ne peut être sentant que dans un monde sentant; c’est pourquoi, comme il le soutient, notre perception des choses dans l’environnement répond à la perception par l’environnementde notre soi. Cependant, je soutiens au contraire que ces deux mouvements d’inspiration et d’expiration ne sont pas le contraire exact l’un de l’autre. Comme le mouvement de la brasse en nataion, le premier est un mouvement de rassemblement et le second de propulsion. Nous inhalons l’atmosphère, mais nous exhalons selon les lignes du réseau. Bref, réseau et atmosphère sont deux côtés de la chair, et c’est dans leur alternance rythmique que nous trouvons la relation entre les lignes et le temps météorologique, qui est, comme je le soutiens, fondamental à la vie.L’atmosfera‘Atmosfera’ è una parola usata comunemente tanto da chi scrive di estetica come dai metereologi. Ciononostante, essi intendono con ciò delle cose piuttosto differenti, ognuno ritenendo che il proprio e il senso più fondamentale mentre l’altrui è meramente metaforico. Per chi si occupa di estetica, l’atmosfera reale è un’aura che emana dalle cose e affetta il nostro umore e le nostre motivazioni; per i metereologi è l’involucro gassoso che circonda il pianeta. Mostro come entrambi i sensi trascurano l’aria, o la riducono a un etere immateriale. Da una parte, per la scienza metereologica, è come se l’aria fosse stata portata al chiuso e presentata come una serie di effetti misurabili e calcolati. Dall’altra, l’estetica dell’affetto ha legato l’atmosfera alle forme solide degli artefatti e dei paesaggi.Nel reintrodurre l’ambiente aereo, intendo trovare un significato di atmosfera che trascenda l’opposizione tra i sensi affettivo e meteorologico. Faccio questo, seguendo Merleau-Ponty, trattando l’atmosfera come uno spazio di inalazione e esalazione. Come tale, corrisponde da vicino a ciò che Merleau-Ponty stesso chiama “la carne”. Ma questo concetto potrebbe anche essere tradotto come ‘reticolo’ (meshwork), riferendosi a quei grovigli di linee e percorsi lungo i quali ogni essere vivente è cucito al tessuto del mondo. Per Merleau-Ponty, il significato della carne risiede nella sua affermazione secondo la quale la percezione è fondamentalmente reversibile. Si può essere senzienti soltanto in un mondo senziente; quindi, ritiene il filosofo, la nostra percezione delle cose nell’ambienteè ricambiata dalla percezione che quest’ultimo ha di noi. Io mostro, al contrario, che questi due movimenti, corrispondenti all’inalazione e all’esalazione, non sono l’esatto rovescio l’uno dell’altro. Come nella bracciata a stile libero nel nuoto, il primo è un movimento di raccolta, il secondo un movimento di propulsione. Ovverossia, inaliamo l’atmosfera, ma esaliamo secondo le linee del reticolo. In breve, il reticolo e l’atmosfera sono due facce della carne, e troviamo nella loro alternanza ritmica la relazione tra le linee e il tempo che, come sostengo, è fondamentale alla vita.

La naturalisation de la phénoménologie et la nature des phénomènesLe projet de naturalisation de la phénoménologie est né comme une tentative d’intégrer réciproquement les neurosciences et la philosophie phénoménologique. Les principaux représentants de ce projet, Jean Petitot et Francisco Varela, ont étés inspirés par Merleau-Ponty en tant que référence philosophique permettant de développer de façon féconde ce point de vue. Cependant, les deux auteurs ne semblent pas assumer jusqu’au bout les enjeux réels posés par la réflexion philosophique de Merleau-Ponty qui, si d’un côté permet certainement de concevoir la pensée et l’expérience en termesd’incorporation, d’autre part, développe une ontologie phénoménologique qui échappe à l’approche réductionniste commun à Varela et Petitot. Dans les deux cas, en effet, le présupposé ontologique est encore dérivé d’une compréhension de la nature comme domaine de la matière comprise en termes déterministes, modèle que l’ontologie phénoménologique de Merleau-Ponty permet au contraire de subvertir. Par conséquent, les fructueuses indications théoriques contenues dans le projet de naturalisation de la phénoménologie doivent néanmoins faire face à une compréhension adéquate de la signification de l’idée de naturalisation, qui soit effectivement phénoménologique en n’acceptant pas de façon acritique aucune option théorique quoique significative.La naturalizzazione della fenomenologia e la natura dei fenomeniIl progetto di naturalizzazione della fenomenologia nasce come tentativo di integrare reciprocamente le neuroscienze e la filosofia fenomenologica. Gli esponenti principali di questo progetto, Jean Petitot e Francisco Varela, si sono ispirati a Merleau-Ponty come a colui che ha consentito di sviluppare nel modo più fecondo tale prospettiva. Tuttavia entrambi gli autori sembrano non fare fino in fondo i conti con la riflessione di Merleau-Ponty, che se da una parte consente effettivamente di concepire il pensiero e l’esperienza in termini di incorporazione, d’altro canto sviluppa una ontologia fenomenologica che sfugge all’approccio riduzionistico comune a Varela e Petitot. In entrambi i casi infatti il presupposto ontologico è pur sempre ricavato da una comprensione della natura come dominio della materia intesa in senso deterministico, che l’ontologia fenomenologica della natura di Merleau-Ponty sovverte. Pertanto le pur feconde indicazioni teoriche contenute nel progetto di naturalizzazione della fenomenologia devono ancora fare i conti con una adeguata comprensione del significato dell’idea di naturalizzazione, che sia autenticamente fenomenologico nel non assumere in modo inavvertito alcuna opzione teorica per quanto significativa.