Intuition and introspection are very interesting terms in Elzenberg’s thought. The intuition is connected with the earlier phase of Elzenberg’s philosophy. Intuition is a form of world cognition. It is tool of selection of the contents. In Elzenberg’s philosophy introspection is a later term than intuition. It may lead intuition but is not a necessity. Process of cognition can finish with introspection which is a phase of information collection. In this meaning introspection creates circumstances for intuition. Introspection is a form of analysis internal human world but intuition permits discovery of new worlds. According to Elzenberg we can find intuition in art and in mysticism. Introspection in ethical and aesthetical texts has often existed. Intuition has most spectacular character than introspection generally. Intuition is a form of discovery of different human worlds while introspection is form of research of them.

In his ethical considerations famous Polish philosopher Henryk Elzenberg proposes an authentic cognition of moral values. He discerns a conflict between two ways of thinking, scientific and evaluating. According to Elzenberg the more often a statement is rational the less it grasps reality. Therefore he considers intuitive cognition of value as the most effective one. His attitude towards neopositivism and scientism is definitely negative. In his new epistemology of values attention should be paid primarily to a method of evaluation since a cognitive effect is strictly dependent on this method. Elzenberg’s ascetics, approached as concentrating on higher aims, necessity of universal cognition of a subject of evaluation and confronting newly formulated judgments with the ones by competent people, can our imperfect intuitions of perfect values make trustworthy. Our image of the world defines the boundaries of our evaluations. Utilitarian values constitute just a prelude to entering the world of perfect values.

The wager for values proposed by Henryk Elzenberg seems to be an interesting and important problem in axiological thinking. That is why one should take a close look at Elzenberg’s reasoning and at certain consequences of such point of view. We analyze this problem as a parallel to Pascal’s Wager for God. One should live and act as if God existed—it is an effect of Pascal’s Wager. One should live and behave as if perfect values existed—this is the essence of Elzenberg’s wager. Paralel analysis of both standpoints lets us formulate numerous hypotheses and statements especially in axiology.

The article takes up some fundamental topics of Henryk Elzenberg’s axiological and ethical thought, whose philosophical attitude was called a religion of values. Author focuses his attention especially on Elzenberg’s recognizing value as a process of giving life meaning and importance and the role of reason in intuitive cognition of value, on attempt to gain insight into world of negative values, on effort of ordering of relative values, on the process of displacing imperative function of ethics by advisory and recommending function. In the end the author considers the place of transcendentalism in the ethics of Elzenberg.

Elzenberg opposes the rightness of violence. This is a horizon on which appears a space for freedom in its two dimensions, which contemporarily is defined as negative and positive. Elzenberg’s negative freedom—necessary and essential—is freedom from one’s own biologicality but also from violence, whilst positive freedom—desired and valuable—the freedom to pursue values, is conditioned by the first.Man can be enslaved by his own body, the force applied by political authority or by ideology. He will not pursue truth then. He can do this only by freeing himself through satisfying his elementary needs and by way of asceticism from biological determinism, ignoring the sphere of political pressure, and reaching the truth in order to contemplate and realize beauty and good. Freedom is opposed on the one hand by biology and on the other, by violence. Force therefore, even when it is used in the name of truth, opposes the very principle in whose defense it has been enlisted.