81.
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Environmental Ethics:
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21 >
Issue: 3
Thom Heyd
Crazy Mountains:
Learning from Wilderness to Weigh Technology
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82.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Issue: 3
NEWS AND NOTES
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83.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Issue: 2
Timothy Sprigge
Environmental Ethics and Process Philosophy
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84.
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Environmental Ethics:
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22 >
Issue: 2
Christopher J. Preston
Philosophy and Geography I:
Space, Place, and Environmental Ethics
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85.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Issue: 2
David Rothenberg
The Great, New Wilderness Debate
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86.
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Environmental Ethics:
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22 >
Issue: 2
C. John Powers
Buddhism and Ecology:
The Interconnection of Dharma and Deeds
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87.
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Environmental Ethics:
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22 >
Issue: 2
Philip Ryan
Gare, MacIntyre, and Tradition
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88.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Issue: 2
Shari Collins-Chobanian
Beyond Sax and Welfare Interests
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
In “The Search for Environmental Rights,” Joseph Sax argues that each individual should have, as a right, freedom from environmental hazards and access to environmental benefits, but he makes clear that environmental rights do not exist and their recognition would truly be a novel step. Sax states that environmental rights are different from existing human rights and argues that the closest analogy is welfare interests. In arguing for environmental rights, I follow Sax’s direction and draw from the work of those who are the most relevant in establishing environmental rights. I consider Joel Feinberg’s notion of welfare interests, Henry Shue’s notion of basic rights, and James Nickel’s right to a safe environment. I draw from Mill’s harm principle, the superfund legislation, and the Clean Air Act to illustrate the existing ethical and legal bases for establishing environmental rights. Finally, I discuss positive and negative duties that such rights might carry
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89.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Issue: 2
Amy L. Goff-Yates
Karen Warren and the Logic of Domination:
A Defense
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rights & permissions
Karen Warren claims that there is a “logic of domination” at work in the oppressive conceptual frameworks informing both sexism and naturism. Although her account of the principle of domination as a connection between oppressions has been an influential one in ecofeminist theory, it has been challenged by recent criticism. Both Karen Green and John Andrews maintain that the principle of domination,as Warren articulates it, is ambiguous. The principle, according to Green, admits of two possible readings, each of which she finds flawed. Similarly, Andrews claims that the principle is fundamentally inadequate because it cannot distinguish cases of oppressive domination from cases of nonoppressive domination. In this paper, I elucidate Warren’s views and defend her against these and other criticisms put forward by Green and Andrews. I show that Warren’s account of “the logic of domination” successfully illuminates important conceptual features of oppression.
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90.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Issue: 2
Rick O’Neil
Animal Liberation versus Environmentalism
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rights & permissions
Animal liberationism and environmentalism generally are considered incompatible positions. But, properly conceived, they simply provide answers to different questions, concerning moral standing and intrinsic value, respectively. The two views together constitute an environmental ethic that combines environmental justice and environmental care. I show that this approach is not only consistent but defensible.
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91.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Issue: 2
David Macauley
The Fate of Place:
A Philosophical History
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92.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Issue: 2
Greta Gaard
Woman the Hunter
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93.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Issue: 2
NEWS AND NOTES
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94.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Issue: 2
Christian Hunold
Geopolitics and the Green Revolution:
Wheat, Genes, and the Cold War
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95.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Issue: 2
Vinay Lal
Gandhi and the Ecological Vision of Life
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rights & permissions
Although recognized as one of the principal sources of inspiration for the Indian environmental movement, Gandhi would have been profoundly uneasy with many of the most radical strands of ecology in the West, such as social ecology, ecofeminism, and even deep ecology. He was in every respect an ecological thinker, indeed an ecological being: the brevity of his enormous writings, his everyday bodily practices, his observance of silence, his abhorrence of waste, and his cultivation of the small as much as the big all equally point to an extraordinarily expansive notion of ecological awareness.
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96.
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Roger J. H. King
Environmental Ethics and the Built Environment
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rights & permissions
I defend the view that the design of the built environment should be a proper part of environmental ethics. An environmentally responsible culture should be one in which citizens take responsibility for the domesticated environments in which they live, as well as for their effects on wild nature. How we build our world reveals both the possibilities in nature and our own stance toward the world. Our constructions and contrivances also objectively constrain the possibilities for the development of a human way of life integrated with wild nature. An environmentally responsible culture should require a built world that reflects and projects care and respect toward nature.
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97.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Issue: 2
Allen Carlson
Placing Nature:
Culture and Landscape Ecology
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98.
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Environmental Ethics:
Volume >
43 >
Issue: 1
Nina Witoszek, Martin Lee Mueller
The Ecological Ethics of Nordic Children’s Tales:
From Pippi Longstocking to Greta Thunberg
abstract |
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rights & permissions
For decades now, environmental philosophers from Arne Næss to Freya Mathews have dreamt of environmental ethics that “make things happen.” We contend such ethics can be found in Nordic children’s tales—those scriptures of moral guidance, and influential propellers of environmental action. In this essay we discuss the moral-imaginative worlds of fictitious in Nordic children’s tales, choosing some of the most canonical stories of the Nordics as our focal point. We argue the complex and often inconsistent philosophical mediations between human and more-than-human worlds as imagined by Astrid Lindgren, Selma Lagerlöf, Thorbjørn Egner, or Tove Jansson are as viable philosophical works as other, more systematic studies in environmental ethics. Further, we argue that places, or indeed larger geographical regions, animate the moral imagination of the characters who live there, suggesting there is a reciprocal and mutually enhancing relationship between dwelling, thinking, and acting, between being animated and becoming animateur. Indeed, we may speak of this animated and animating, cultural-ecological topos as part of a genuine Nordic Ecosphere. Coruscating in this ecosphere are the sparkles of ‘literary ecological ethics,’ which influence human actions, not as much through analysis, documentation, or argument as through world-making stories, images, and models of environmental heroines.
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99.
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Dan Shahar
Harm, Responsibility, and the Far-off Impacts of Climate Change
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Climate change is already a major global threat, but many of its worst impacts are still decades away. Many people who will eventually be affected by it still have opportunities to mitigate harm. When considering the avoidable burdens of climate change, it seems plausible victims will often share some responsibility for putting themselves into (or failing to get out of) harm’s way. This fact should be incorporated into our thinking about the ethical significance of climate-induced harms, particularly to emphasize the importance of differential abilities to get and stay out of harm’s way. Currently, many people face serious obstacles to reducing their vulnerability to climate change, such as poverty, lack of education, and political or legal obstacles to mobility. Climate policy discussions should do more to emphasize the alleviation of these sources of difficulties, thereby empowering people to choose what risks they will bear in a warming world.
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100.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Benjamin Howe
The Personal Responsibility to Reduce Greenhouse Gases
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Many theorists who argue that individuals have a personal responsibility to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs) tie the amount of GHGs that an individual is obligated to reduce to the amount that an individual releases, or what is often called a carbon footprint. The first section of this article argues that this approach produces standards that are too burdensome in some contexts. Section two argues that this approach produces standards of responsibility that are too lenient in other contexts and sketches an alternative account of personal responsibility that treats it as an obligation to take certain kinds of opportunities to reduce GHGs, regardless of how little or much gas an individual releases through her own actions. Section three argues that this alternative conception of personal responsibility is well positioned to rebut the Argument from Inconsequentialism, widely considered the most significant challenge to the assumption that individuals are capable of bearing a responsibility to reduce GHGs.
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