This paper examines one approach to the ethics of companion animals, which emerges from the dominant historical tradition and is increasingly familiar in everyday life as well as in work on companion animals in the social sciences. I label it the “utilization with welfare-safeguards” model, or, more gently worded, “seeking benefits while ensuring welfare.” Some of the “benefits” considered are complex ones (like guiding the sight impaired) and others simpler (like reducing stress or providing affection). I explore several problems involved in this approach (including the sometimes jarring inappropriateness of “benefit” terminology). I then offer an alternative account where the primary moral obligation toward companion animals is to develop, nurture, respect, and protect the loving relationship between them and their human companions, since thriving in such a relationship, I claim, has become part of their evolved telos (to use Bernard Rollin’s term)or evolved nature. This priority naturally leads to ensuring welfare, but the highly pro-active approach involved takes the obligation beyond standard welfare provision and “TLC” (“tender loving care”). Some implications of this position are explored.

This essay takes a deviant stance against the prevailing perspective on globalization as an imperialistic enterprise championed by the Western nations to perpetuate their exploitative tendencies on the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. While it acknowledges that globalization has sometimes been used to exploit third world countries, nevertheless there is some salutary underpinning within globalization that can enhance growth and social order especially in the third world countries. This underpinning factor stems from certain universal, not necessarily absolute, values and principles that can regulate human social behaviour especially at the political realm. It establishes a synergy of globalization and political claims based on universal standard of morality, the jettisoning of negative cultural claims, and avoidance of authoritarianism predicated on rigid cultural identity in the guise of protecting national sovereignty. It concludes on the need for a global basis as justificationist paradigm of political claim in Africa based on common good and justice as pivots of African cultural renewal.

The majority of animal advocacy discourse is unidirectional: Humans are regarded as stewards of animal welfare, and humans control the bestowal of rights and protections upon animals. This article offers a reversal of the typical moral reflection used in animal advocacy. I suggest that our relationship with animals participates in the development of moral faculties requisite for ethical behavior. In other words, we have a lot to learn from animals, not in this instance by documenting their behavior, but from having meaningful relationships with particular animals. Quality interactions with animals can stimulate the imaginative basis for the care and empathy that are crucial for social morality. To accomplish this task, I describe “embodied care” as an extension of feminist care ethics that addresses the body’s role in morality, and argue that our relationships with animals can provide the imaginative foundation for improving human-to-human morality.

Using a general model of corruption that explains and accounts for corruption across different corporate and professional activities, the paper will examine how certain practices in the media, especially in areas where journalism, advertising and public relations regularly intersect and converge, can be construed as instances of corruption. By applying this general model of corruption the paper will then offer a taxonomy of media corruption by identifying most if not all the major types of media corruption. It will be argued that such corruption is regular and systematic.

The current armed conflict in Afghanistan (briefly, the Afghan conflict) is viewed through the lens of a just war theory. In particular, the question stated by the title is explored by means of a generalized just cause principle. For brevity, empirical, practical, and legal issues about the Afghan conflict are mostly set aside. Hence a definite answer to the question is not proposed. Instead, the main aim is to clarify the question. Specifically, the question is amplified, by distinguishing putative just causes of countering terrorism, countering an insurgency, and countering extreme violations of basic human rights. Apparently, however, U.S. government officials (e.g., President Barack Obama) and U.S. military commanders (e.g., General Stanley McChrystal) have mixed goals or motives concerning current U.S.military operations in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, from the standpoint of a just war theory, it is instructive to analytically distinguish these putative just causes, and to consider them separately. Additionally, it is instructive to consider how they might be combined. Consequently, a fourth putative just cause is considered: countering violent spoilers of peacebuilding. (This paper was completed on March 31, 2010.)

Against the backdrop of the current “ethics controversy” within the American Anthropological Association over the U.S. Army’s “Human Terrain Systems” project, this article evaluates the moral obligations of scholars and academics asked by their governments to contribute their unique expertise toward the waging or ending of wars of which those scholars morally disapprove. Citing the examples of moral dilemmas occasioned by conflicts between duties of scholarship and duties of citizenship from past wars, together with examples like “Doctors without Borders” at present, I argue that it is not automatically, or in principle, morally objectionable for scholars and academics to provide assistance to their governments or militaries, even in what they regard as unjustifiable wars, nor would suchassistance necessarily involve an inherent violation of professional principle (as the AAA Executive leadership has claimed in recent public proclamations). Rather, the permissibility, or in some cases even obligation, to assist one’s government when requested depends critically upon the government’s intention in lodging this request, as well as upon both what the scholar is being asked to do, and whether those specific activities would result in violations of accepted canons of professional practice. I illustrate the resulting decision dilemmas with cases of anthropologists or psychologists asked to assist in humanitarian military interventions or in mitigating or helping to end misguided or mistaken campaigns of counter-terrorism.

The work of Cox, Bales, Dingwaney, and others is cited in an effort to construct an argument about the special rights violations of contemporary slavery. It is contended that two forms, debt bondage and sexual slavery, are related and bear close examination.

Private industry funds more than half of all medical research in the United States. While industry involvement in research has benefits, it can also create conflicts of interest. The most common policies adopted to address conflict of interest in medical research are focused primarily on the ways in which industry sponsorship may undermine a clinician’s judgment regarding patient care. Insufficient attention has been given to the ways in which industry sponsorship may undermine judgment relative to the goal of scientific integrity in research. The most common conflict of interest policies do not adequately address this problem. Disclosure policies alone will not remove or ameliorate all conflicts. Further, severing or monitoring ties between clinicians and industries will not adequately address the problem, since in many cases it is not the clinicians who are making the relevant research judgments. In order to address the problem of conflict of interest inindustry-sponsored research, fundamental changes in strategy and practice must be adopted which either remove the power to make research decisions from industry employees, or increase the review of those decisions by independent investigators.

In this short article I call into question the view that the current United States war in Afghanistan is a war of necessity. In this effort I am primarily engaged with the thought of the famous just war theorist Michael Walzer as it has developed from 1977 until 2009.

Just war thinking applies to the conflict Afghanistan, particularly that underdeveloped part of the just war tradition that deals with war’s end and post-conflict (jus post bellum). This essay considers the some of the fundamental ethical challenges of the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan, arguing that by considering a jus post bellum framework of Order, Justice, and Conciliation we can address some of the great ethical issues faced by the US government in Afghanistan today. More specifically, this essay will focus on three ethical challenges:• The moral imperative of establishing and enduring political order.• The conflict between our ideals of justice and those of many Afghans.• Establishing a foundation for conciliation among warring parties.