161.
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Wendy C. Hamblet
Beyond Guilt and Mourning:
A Critique of Postmodern Ethics
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162.
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b. l. g.
To the Reader
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163.
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Issue: 2
Court Lewis
Reframing Islam as a Nonviolent Force:
Review of Chaiwat Satha-Anand. Nonviolence and Islamic Imperatives
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164.
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Sanjay Lal
Ahimsa as a Way of Life:
Review of Predrag Cicovacki and Kendy Hess, editors. Nonviolence as a Way of Life: History, Theory, and Practice
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165.
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William Gay
Undermining Neoliberalism:
Review of Todd May. Nonviolent Resistance: A Philosophical Introduction
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166.
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Barry Gan
Remembering Gene Sharp:
Theorist of Political Nonviolence
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167.
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Contributors
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168.
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Jack DuVall
Gene Sharp and the Twenty-First Century
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169.
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Greg Moses
Editor's Introduction
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170.
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Matthew Rukgaber
Guns as Lies:
A Kantian Criticism of the Supposed Right to Bear Arms
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rights & permissions
Using Kant’s argument that lies are evil and reprehensible in themselves regardless of the benefits that may result, I show that guns can be understood in similar terms. In a unique reading of Kant’s radical and often ridiculed ideas, I maintain that lies have this status because of the way they pervert our relationship to the truth and thus to morality and reason. Lies turn truth and reason into mere means to be used rather than to be obeyed. Kant believes that the result is arrogance, insincerity, and self-deception in the form of moral impurity and depravity. This gives way to the morally bankrupt logics of the passions for honor, dominance, and possession. I argue that this destruction of virtue and of our relation to the moral law can be found in our relation to guns. Guns are not just killing machines; they are deception machines. It is for that reason, regardless of the costs and benefits, that the Kantian should deny that we have any right to them.
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Charles K. Fink
Nonviolence and Tolstoy’s Hard Question
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rights & permissions
Pacifists are often put on the defensive with cases—real or imagined—in which innocent people are threatened by violent criminals. Is it always wrong to respond to violence with violence, even in defense of the innocent? This is the “hard” question addressed in this article. I argue that it is at least permissible to maintain one’s commitment to nonviolence in such cases. This may not seem like a bold conclusion, yet pacifists are often ridiculed—sometimes as cowards, sometimes as selfish moral purists—for their refusal to use violence in defense of others. In this article, I try to show that such scorn is unjustified.
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b. l. g.
To the Reader
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173.
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Andrew Fitz-Gibbon
Is Love Non-Violent?
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174.
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Alan S. Carroll
Thinking the Unthinkable:
Stopping the Next War Before It Starts
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175.
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Duane L. Cady
Gandhi’s Experiments With Truth:
Essential Writings by and About Mahatma Gandhi
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176.
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Paul R. Dekar
Gandhi, Satyagraha and the Israel-Palestine Conflict
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177.
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Predrag Cicovacki
Albert Schweitzer’s Ways Of Peacemaking
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178.
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Michael Allen Fox
Gandhi and the World Environmental Crisis
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179.
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Elizabeth A. Linehan
Knowing How to Punish Justly:
A Gandhian Reflection
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180.
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Issue: 1
Sanjay Lal
Affirming a Vital Connection:
Nonviolence and the Disavowal of Death as a Harm
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
Having freedom from the fear of death is a quality needed not just by peace activists; however, it is in particular need of affirmation by those espousing a philosophy of nonviolence. A rich philosophical literature explores the supposed harmfulness of death, but the topic is scarcely discussed by peace theorists. This paper shows the significance of the topic for highlighting the attractiveness of nonviolent philosophy given certain non-religious understandings of death that are well suited for advancing nonviolence. Classic Stoic and Epicurean disavowals of the harmfulness of death are presented, criticisms of the Epicurean position are outlined, and the example of Mahatma Gandhi is provided as an ally to Epicureans in response to the criticisms discussed. The second part of the paper more concretely illuminates the implications that a Gandhian rejection of the harmfulness of death has for living nonviolently in everyday life.
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