In order to make out a case for idealism, I will, in this essay, first present two forms of idealism in their bare outlines (these two being, in my view, the most interesting and defensible forms) and then a set of premises for an argument for idealism. I will then respond to what are the more pertinent difficulties with these, and finally, make some general remarks regarding idealism as a theory.

Since its emergence in Marx by way of German idealism, what has come to be known as critical theory has remained powerfully appealing while being plagued with fundamental problems which its more sophisticated proponents have to some extent recognized and wrestled with. I shall connect these problems to a serious equivocation within critical theory concerning the kind of theory it aims to be, an equivocation which can be traced to Marx and which has manifested itself in different ways throughout the tradition of critical theory. My central objective is to indicate that what critical theory sees as its defining theoretical move in fact gives rise to the equivocation and is the ultimate source of its persistent and most vexing problems.

This paper challenges Putnam's claim that his internal realism is a revival of Kant's empirical realism. I agree with Putnam that there are good reasons to revive Kant's rather neglected empirical realist doctrine. However, internal realism is not the way this should be done. At the center of the following discussion lies the important difference between Putman's "real within a scheme" model and Kant's assertion of the independent existence of empirical objects. The strategy for the paper is as follows. I intend to first detail the real and important connections that exist between the analyses of experience offered by Putnam and Kant. These similarities should not be discounted. In fact, I think we can distinguish the two projects only if we first appreciate the conceptual overlap that naturally gives rise to the perceived union of the two programmes. I will then develop a representative response that is invoked commonly by Kantians who disagree with Putman's identification. This will be followed by a brief discussion concerning why this standard reply fails. I will conclude by canvassing a more powerful epistemological reason for dissociating the two programmes.

In this paper I defend certain features of F. H. Bradley's moral, and to a lesser extent political, philosophy in the wake of recent feminist critiques of ethics. I attempt to establish congeniality with Bradley's ethical and political theory to current discussions in feminist ethics. Not only is Bradley's idealism consistent with feminist ethics, but it is able to meet several standard feminist objections to traditional moral theory. In spite of making sexist comments characteristic of the nineteenth century, Bradley's ethical-political doctrine does not necessarily imply sexism, and is indeed coextensive with much current feminist theory. Before proceeding to this duscussion it is necessary to undertake a brief review of the intellectual origins of, and current state of debate in, feminist ethics.