Philosophy develops the direction towards the Whole opened up by the Notion of Being that makes the mind to be a mind. It isgrounded in awe that can increase as inquiry continues, though it tends to fall back into the routines of its exercise, like every otherhuman activity. In a time when it is common to think of ourselves as just another combination of elements in the evolutionary universe,reflection upon our own awareness turns the tables on materialists by re-minding the earliest phases called “mere matter” and setting the cosmos back into the encompassing realm of absolute Mystery.

The question that arises in this article is whether we can find elements of phenomenology in Bernard Lonergan’s Trinitarian theology.With help of other Lonergan scholars, I have discovered that modern thinking plays an important role in the theology and philosophy ofthis Jesuit author. Moreover, the terminology of modern philosophy coexists with the terminology of classical and especially Tomisticthought. This article is interested in the elements that Lonergan takes from the modern philosophy and emphasizes the centrality ofHusserlian phenomenology among the other modern authors used by Lonergan. Following the research of the Jesuit thinker, I speakabout two parallel realities coexisting in his Trinitarian theology. Lonergan tries to realize their synthesis, but at the same time healso recognizes their distinctiveness. The most relevant result of this coexistence is obtained through the replacement of the metaphysical differentiation between the level of substance and the level of the three Persons, so that, instead of having the elements of classical theology, Lonergan predicates at the same time that God subsists as well as the Trinitarian Persons subsist. Through this assertion he emphasizes the identity between God’s existence and the existence of the three divine Persons, and eliminates the classical differentiation that might be closer to the danger of subordinating the three Persons to the one God.

Is human reason natural? After the crisis of the modern idea that genuine philosophy is based on rational autonomy, the context forthis question has drastically changed. If a philosopher who is also a self-conscious and reflective Christian, tries to reformulate thequestion of reason’s independence, what can he or she learn from a close reading of Rom 1:18–23?

The following is an examination of two possible interpretations of the meaning of the “existence” of God. By using two different Danishterms—the word existence (Existents) and the concept “coming to be” (Tilværelse)—found in Kierkegaard’s writing, I hope to show that two very different theological outcomes arise depending upon which idea or term is used. Moreover, I posit which of these twooutcomes is closer in nature to the more famously used German term Dasein.

I compare two historical moments: Bishop Stephen Tempier’s 1277 condemnation of 219 “errors” in circulation at the University ofParis, and Pope Benedict XVI’s Regensburg Address. Both the condemnation and the address, I argue, were intended to defendparticular views of the relationship between faith and reason against forms of relativism and rationalism prevalent in their own day. Reflecting on the mixed success of Tempier’s condemnation’s in this enterprise can help to make clear some of the difficultiesinherent in Benedict’s.

The main object of this paper is to clarify and evaluate Avicenna’s view of universals, in light of some modern and contemporarydiscussions. According to Avicenna, universality is a contingent attribute of entities that are in themselves neither universal norparticular. An account of universality as a contingent attribute is offered which clarifies and gives additional support to Avicenna’sview. Nevertheless, it will be argued that Avicenna, through his use of such terms as “nature” and “quiddity,” faces the same problemswhich he attributes to his predecessors.

Central to Emmanuel Levinas’s critique of Martin Heidegger is his assessment that Heidegger’s phenomenology delimits the possibility of dealing with ethical questions in any sincere way. According to Levinas, Heidegger ontologizes these questions, reducing them to mere means to a deeper understanding of Being. Levinas, by contrast, attempts to forge a phenomenology which can providea metaphysical account of ethics which goes beyond being. In this paper we will explore the nature and validity of Levinas’s critiqueof Heidegger by comparing his approach to the question of evil to Heidegger’s as presented in his 1936 lecture course on Schelling’sFreiheitschrif.

Darwinian atheists ridicule the “God of the Gaps” argument, claiming that it is theology and/or metaphysics masquerading as science.This is true as far as it goes, but Darwinian atheism relies on an argument which is equally metaphysical, which I call the “No Gaps,No God” argument. This atheist argument is metaphysical because it relies on a kind of conceptual necessity, rather than scientificobservations or experiments. “No Gaps No God” is a much better metaphysical argument than “God of the Gaps,” because the latteris based on a clearly false conditional inference. However, there are also good, but not decisive, arguments against the “No Gaps NoGod” argument. Because metaphysical arguments never resolve as decisively as scientific research questions, there will probablyalways be a legitimate controversy at the metaphysical level on this topic, even though there is no serious controversy about Darwinianscience itself. If this fact were more widely acknowledged, it could help to defuse the controversy over teaching Darwin in the public schools.

Does the character called “God” make an essential contribution to the [Hebrew] Bible? So far as religion and religiosity are concerned, the Bible minus the character called “God” is not theoretically incomplete. In other words, the Bible is not at core a theological document. From this it does not however follow that the deity of the Bible is theoretically otiose. The character called “God” plays a role that is indispensable for anthropological reasons. The self-definition and self-understanding of men and women who define and understand themselves as you and I do cannot be accomplished without at least implicit appeal to that role. The key to the theoretical disposition of the Bible is an appreciation of the fact that it is expressly designed to counteract pagan-type views about the nature of men and women and about their position in the wider scheme of things.

This article suggests that in the delicate balance between grace and freedom, the opposite of rejecting God’s grace is not acceptance of grace, but rather is non-rejection or the openness to God that is the human person’s obediential potency. Using the insights of Karl Rahner and David Coffey, this article goes on to explain efficacious grace and sufficient grace as the one self-communication of God in the modes of acceptance and rejection. To protect the human freedom, one must emphasize that human persons can reject God’s offer of self, but to protect the gratuity of grace, one must acknowledge that acceptance of God’s grace is always undergirded and empowered by that same grace. The mediating point between these two modes is human openness or obediential potency for grace. One does not have to accept God’s grace to be this openness, but rather one must simply not reject God’s offer of grace, hence the primary categories of human freedom are not rejection and acceptance, but rejection and non-rejection.

Many Christians are split on whether they believe we should endorse or oppose capital punishment. Each side claims Biblical support for their professed position. This essay cannot hope to bring this debate to a conclusion. However, it will try to offer a different perspective. The essay recognizes that the Bible itself offers statements in support of each position. The proposed way forward is not to claim there is a contradiction, but to place greater emphasis on understanding these statements in their particular contexts, specifically with reference to their relation to Jesus’ New Covenant. Such a perspective should lead us to oppose capital punishment.

The term “anonymous Christian” is widely considered to be distinctively Rahnerian. Although other major Catholic theologians proposed similar theories for the salvation of those (formally) extra Ecclesiam, imputing an “implicit” or “unconscious” faith to justified non-Christians, it is commonly thought that none embraced his famous phraseology. Prior to Balthasar’s publication of Cordula in 1966, however, this was not the case. During this period “anonymous Christianity” enjoyed a wide currency, even among its prominent later critics. Focusing especially on Schillebeeckx’s extensive usage—and indeed, possible coinage—of the phrase, I argue for a reappraisal of the early reception of “anonymous Christianity.”

According to John Macmurray, action is the starting-point for an analysis of persons, who exist only in relation. This paper re-examines Macmurray’s argument from action and finds it lacking. However, rather than implying an obstacle to a relational definition of persons, the failure to arrive at this definition provides the opening or space wherein God, who is fully relational, can be revealed. The implications for human persons are mirrored in the dual concept of the person found in a social trinitarianism, which lends support to an unexpected affirmation. Persons are found within community, but only by granting priority to the individual does this relational unity, which is the unity of the person, spring to life.

This paper investigates the link between (radical) evil and the existence of God. Arguing with contemporary atheist thinkers, such as Richard Dawkins and Victor Stenger, I hold that one can take the existence of evil as a sign of the existence of God rather than its opposite. The work of Immanuel Kant, especially his thought on evil, is a fertile source to enliven this intuition. Kant implicitly seems to argue that because man is unable to overcome evil by himself, there is a need for God to bridge the gap. Si Deus est, unde malum? Si malum est, Deus est!

In this article I argue that the 1729 Dissertation on Liberty and Neces­sity should be attributed to Anthony Collins. This was the prevailing view until the publication of James O’Higgins’s 1970 biography of Collins. Since then, most have followed Collins’s modern-day biographer in denying that Collins penned the Dissertation. After reviewing O’Higgins’s six reasons for rejecting Collins as the author, I respond to the substantive issues in what follows. Part I is a historical positioning of the Clarke-Collins liberty-necessity debate where I discuss the debate’s context, Collins’s methods and disposition, and timeline issues pertinent to ascribing authorship of the Dissertation to Collins. Part II is a demonstration of the fittingness of the Dissertation as Collins’s response to the earlier debate regarding liberty and necessity he had with Samuel Clarke.

By carefully considering Galileo’s letters to Castelli and Christina, we argue that his position regarding the relationship between Scripture and science is not only of historical importance, but continues to stand as a perspective worth taking seriously in the context of contemporary philosophical debates. In particular, we contend that there are at least five areas of contemporary concern where Galileo’s arguments are especially relevant: (1) the supposed conflict between science and religion, (2) the status and stakes of evidence, (3) the question of biblical infallibility in light of scientific progress, (4) metaphorical approaches to biblical hermeneutics, and (5) possible dialogical constraints on public discourse.

The notion of givenness (Gegebenheit/donation) serves a key role in the phenomenological paradigms of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Jean-Luc Marion, yet can this notion be applied directly or analogously within the context of sacramental theology? This essay demonstrates how the respective understandings of givenness, in the works of Husserl, Heidegger and Marion, can be employed as hermeneutical centers for exploring the paradoxical phenomenon of the sacrament, whereby the phenomenalities of the visible and the invisible coincide. The Eucharist is called upon as sacrament par excellence for examining the dynamic of givenness within the phenomenality of the sacrament. Tracing the notion of givenness as employed in the thinking of Husserl, Heidegger and Marion, respectively, the essay concludes with a consideration of the Eucharist as event, or ‘happening.’ In such manner does the concept of givenness shed new light on traditional metaphysical understandings of sacramentality.

Christologie: Systematisch und exegetisch was published in 1972 by Karl Rahner and Wilhelm Thüsing. When in 1980 the translation appeared as A New Christology, it did not include Rahner’s five chapters from the 1972 volume, but inserted three essays by Rahner whose German originals were unidentified. The present essay identifies the source of the three chapters. It also reveals that Rahner’s original five chapters were published a second time in the 1976 Grundkurs des Glaubens, although in a different form, and in 1978 were accurately translated in the sixth chapter of Foundations of Christian Faith. The present essay concludes by tracing the genesis of Rahner’s transcendental Christology from its 1969 origins to its 1972 publication to its 1978 translation.

In this paper, we examine Abelard’s model of the incarnation and place it within the wider context of his views in metaphysics and logic. In particular, we consider whether Abelard has the resources to solve the major difficulties faced by the so-called “compositional models” of the incarnation, such as his own. These difficulties include: the requirement to account for Christ’s unity as a single person, despite being composed of two concrete particulars; the requirement to allow that Christ is identical with the pre-existent Son, despite the fact that the pre-existent Son is a (proper) part of the incarnate Christ; and finally the requirement to avoid Nestorianism, i.e., the position that Christ’s proper parts are persons in their own right. We argue that Abelard does have adequate solutions to these problems. In particular, we show that his theories of relations and predication can be put to use in defence of a compositional account of the incarnation.