I argue that Edward Feser misconstrues the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition on issues relevant to the arguments for God’s existence that proceed from finality in nature because he misapplies the A-T view that ordering to an end is inherent in natural things: (1) Feser speaks as if human action in no way serves as a model for understanding action for an end in nature; (2) he misreads, and ultimately undermines, the Fifth Way, by substituting intrinsic end-directedness in place of end-directedness; (3) he overlooks striking similarities between Paley’s argument from design and the Fifth Way. He also fails to consider the role of the good in the Fifth Way.

In his book Defending Life, Francis Beckwith claims that the question of personhood and human nature is the central question in the abortion debate. He further asserts that the unborn entity, from the moment of conception, is a full-fledged member of the human community. In this paper I try to show that the argument Beckwith offers for the moral wrongness of abortion in Defending Life is unpersuasive, his elucidation of key terms question-begging, and his claims concerning embryology and zygotic (and postzygotic) development highly controversial.

In When Athens Met Jerusalem, John Mark Reynolds makes (1) a claim about Plato’s account of the relation between myth and argument, (2) a claim about Plato’s account of knowledge and science, and (3) a claim about the relation between faith and reason. I criticize each of these claims. Regarding the first claim, I show that Reynolds’s explanation of the role of a person’s experience of Platonic forms is unclear. Regarding the second, I indicate some tensions between the antirealist character of Platonic philosophy of science and Reynolds’s insistence that some claims about the empirical world are true. Lastly, I attempt to clarify Reynolds’s explanation of the relation between faith and reason by thinking of them as two parts of a single whole whose goal is to comprehend truths about God.

We ordinarily think that the content of a belief, or an intention, or an undertaking is relevant to the actions caused by beliefs, intentions, and undertakings. Not only do we ordinarily think these things; they are no more than the sober truth. I attempt to argue that if materialism about us human beings (either reductive or nonreductive) were true, then these things would be false: it would not be by virtue of their contents that beliefs, intentions, and undertakings cause what they do. If materialism were true, facts about the content of beliefs, intentions, and undertakings would be irrelevant to their causal powers. If this argument is correct, then embracing materialism exacts a substantial cost: giving up these obvious and commonsense truths.

In this paper, I have attempted to do two main things. First, I argue that Alvin Plantinga’s new argument against materialism, though interesting, shares the fate of his earlier arguments in that it is, in the end, unsuccessful. Secondly, I then argue, contrary to Plantinga’s view that there is no strong argument for materialism, that there is in fact very strong scientific support that can be offered against the hypothesis that the human mind is an immaterial substance, and hence in support of the conclusion that some form of materialism is true.

This essay introduces Michael Polanyi’s work through contrasting his innovative epistemology of subsidiary-focal integration with key distinctives of Christian analytic philosopher Alvin Plantinga. Polanyi’s contrasting proposals helpfully bring to light shaping assumptions of the analytic tradition, contributing creatively to a larger common agenda. Polanyi disputes the unexamined assumption that the simplest epistemic experience is a focally apprehended “find-myself-believing” that is explicitly and propositionally expressed. I also contrast the two regarding infallibilism, foundationalism, externalism, justification, epistemic duty, creative antirealism, and ways of tapping Calvin’s notion of the sensus divinitatis

My major dispute with Michael Tooley’s response (“Plantinga’s New Argument against Materialism”) to my original article is with his philosophy of mind. Tooley’s objection depends on a functionalist account of mental states such as beliefs, desires and intentions. I offer reasons to reject functionalism and, hence, the same goes for any objection to my argument that is based on or presupposes functionalism.

In this essay, I argue that both human souls and angels are hylomorphic, a position I dub “pneumatic hylomorphism” (PH). Following a sketch of the history of PH, I offer both an analytic and a confessional defense of PH. The former argues that PH is the most cogent anthropology/angelology, given the Christian understanding of the intermediate state and angels. My confessional defense shows that PH plays a crucial role in pro-Nicene theology. I close with an assessment of contemporary anthropological alternatives, and conclude these do not advance the discussion beyond the patristic and medieval alternatives; thus PH remains the most cogent and confessional sound option.

This paper proposes an answer to a puzzle regarding robust notions of forgiveness. Robust forgiveness occurs when victims extend grace to perpetrators in the absence of moral reparation or repentance. If unmerited grace is one of its necessary features, is robust forgiveness a moral and rational response to perpetrators? The paper sketches an empathetic model of forgiveness as a plausible candidate for answering this puzzle. However, this particular model must be refined to handle cases where resentment infiltrates and cements deeply in our motivational structures. Still working broadly within an empathetic framework, the paper proposes a modification aimed to alleviate worries about the dispersing and entrenchment of resentment.

Much has been made of the situationist argument against virtue ethics by Gilbert Harman and John Doris, an argument which draws on empirical results from social psychology. After presenting their argument as well as the most plausible reply, I turn to what I believe is the real challenge to virtue ethics in this area, a challenge that needs to be addressed by both philosophers and theologians alike. The paper ends by applying this challenge to the specific virtue of forgiveness.

This paper proposes four postulates for assessing, in the context of Buddhist-Christian dialogue, the respective understandings of the nature of the Metaphysical Ultimate (MU): the postulates of Internal Coherence; Depth of Soteric Efficacy; Breadth of Epistemic Warrant; and Breadth of Explanatory Power. It is argued that the application of these postulates supports the conclusion that the notion of the MU exemplified in Christian theism, where the MU is conceived of as being characterized (analogically) as personal in nature, not strictly and completely ineffable, and cognizable by conceptual distinctions, has stronger and broader. epistemic warrants than that concept of the MU exemplified in Zen Buddhism.

According to N. T. Wright, anyone who is a Christian should at least think twice before he or she speaks about the soul, especially as an entity that is distinct from its physical body and can survive death in a disembodied intermediate state until the resurrection and reembodiment. In Wright’s mind, talk of the soul is talk about soul-body substance dualism (dualism, for short), which is the villain in Christian anthropological thought. As far as Wright is concerned, it is time for Christians to renounce dualism once and for all. In this paper, I take issue with Wright’s position on substance dualism.