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1. Eco-ethica: Volume > 1
Josef Simon Anerkennung als eco-ethischer Begriff
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The overpopulation of the earth and the increasing consumption of its life ressources implies new risks and damages for mankind. The awareness of this facts has turned Ethics, formerly conceived of primarily as one among other philosophical disciplines, into a fundamental one. Ethics has become, in some sense, a “first philosophy”.This has opened new object fields for it. In the past Ethics was mainly concerned with the “good” life and the “good” behavior of the single subject. Now it aims to support behavior kinds making possible the survival of mankind under globalized life conditions. “Good” life presupposes surviving.Ethical reflections aimed formerly to guarantee that human beings keep able to live together even if they don’t share the same “values”. Now they have to face the problem of the living together of human beings belonging to different cultures and social forms. The main question is no more what ethical fundamentals would best enable human beings to live together, but what are the conditions for a coexistence of values which enables a good living together of human beings with diverse ethical orientations.Often it is said that Hegel did not develop an Ethics of his own. This paper would like to show that Hegel’s philosophy is, on the contrary, an excellent tool for facing such kinds of questions. His main ethical concept is “recognition”. But he is not concerned with the recognition or rejection of concrete ethical principles. His concept of recognition focuses on the individual in its absolute singularity, in his being absolutely unique in and through himself. His consciousness as self-consciousness gets thus particular in the sense of being definitely individual. Hegel calls the reciprocal recognition of individually conscious subjects the “absolute spirit”.This unusual terminology has made an adequate reception of Hegel’s thinking quite difficult. But there can be no doubt that his very rich and deep elaboration of the phenomenology of such recognition among factual subjects provides extremely productive tools to face eco-ethical reflections in our days. This paper tries to show in presently understandable terms Hegel’s reflections on the very nature of language as the place in which the subjects experience both their absolute individuality and their community, i. e. their singularity and the generality of their institutions, in a simultaneously paradox and coherent way. Recognition becomes in Hegel the inner structure of pardon and reconciliation. Its dependence on languages both diverse and shared makes this concept particularly productive for shaping the living together of human beings belonging to diverse cultures and following diverse ethical orientations.
2. Eco-ethica: Volume > 2
Tilman Borsche Überlegungen zu einer kosmopolitischen Kultur im Umgang mit unterschiedlichen Tugendlehren
3. Eco-ethica: Volume > 4
Karen Joisten Der Mensch zwischen Oikos und Polis?: Eine Herausforderung fur die narrative Philosophie
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Ziel des Beitrages ist es, ein Oikos- und Polisverständnis vorzustellen, das sich widerständig und sperrig zu einem gängigen Politikverständnis verhält, da es entpolitisiert und jenseits eines Macht- und Herrschaftsdenkens situiert ist. Auf diese Weise gelangt man zugleich zu einer Herausforderung für die narrative Philosophie, die darin besteht, die narrative Differenz, die aus der menschlichen Grundbefmdlichkeit des Menschen als Heim-weg entspringt, wach zu halten und um das Verständnis eines ‘Ortes des Wohnens und Unterwegsseins’ zu ringen, das es zu bewahren und weiter zu entfalten gilt. Dieser, Ort seines Wohnens und Unterwegsseins’ ist ein lebendiges Geschichtenbezugsgewebe, in dem die Erzählfäden aus dem Oikos und der Polis eingewoben sind und immer wieder neu wieder eingesponnen werden.
4. Eco-ethica: Volume > 5
Tilman Borsche (Wie) lässt sich ethische Verantwortung für die natürliche Umwelt begründen?
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Nature doesn’t need our care, the environment does. “Our” environment is a relational term implying surroundings that are inhabitable, allowing us not only to survive but to live good lives. For ages our “natural” environment was understood as that part of our environment that was given by nature and, therefore, not accessible to human actions as are our cultural and social environments. We had to accept it and adapt to it. Nowadays we are faced with the fact that more and more parts of our natural environment can be and are altered or prevented from altering by human manipulations. So ethical responsibility is extending beyond the traditional fields of social and cultural environmental conditions. We will have to find answers to the new question of what kind of nature we want to preserve, to cultivate, and to build, and for whom and to whom we are responsible.
5. Eco-ethica: Volume > 6
Tilman Borsche Aequitas — Abbild der unendlichen Gerechtigkeit im Recht
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Enquiring the sources and the legitimacy of Derrida’s statement “Law {droit) is not justice” from his essay “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’ ” (1990), the paper analyses the three notions of “justice”, “equity” and “concordantia” (in Cusanus). Part I explains historically how the difference between the limited and changing human laws and the eternal justice of God was gradually being perceived and acknowledged in Antiquity. Part II illustrates how the virtue of equity was called upon to compensate for the insufficiencies and contradictions of human laws, mainly by Aristotle. Part III explores the conditions how and argues for the possibility that the notion of “concordantia” as developed by Nicolaus Cusanus for the Council of Basle could work as a mediating principle of legislation among conflicting interests and thus provide for temporary justice by means of an equitable procedure of legislation.
6. Eco-ethica: Volume > 7
Karen Joisten Homo relationalis: Der Mensch, die Anderen und das In-Bezug-sein
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Given an ethic of interdependence in the different dimensions between global and interpersonal/individual, the article focuses on the individual human being under the guiding principle of interdependencies. Apart from blocking interdependencies, primarily promoting interdependencies are exhibited. That means those that awake and promote the creative abilities, and enable individuals to introduce their original values and norms into existing moral contexts and also to change them. The thesis examines the effect of interdependencies in an inner-individual (and ultimately also in interpersonal) dimension. With respect to border cases a new and unusual value setting emerges which requires an approach that justifies a temporal dependency. Accordingly, referring to the individual, the question is: How can values and standards emerge in the moral context that differ from the established ones? How can new values be initiated in violation of prevailing values, which are regarded as first and mute values which rely on other actors and listeners who respond to and accept them?
7. Eco-ethica: Volume > 7
Tilman Borsche Ein neuer Begriff von Individualität im Anschluss an Wilhelm von Humboldt als Grundlage für eine Ethik der Individualtät
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This paper takes Wilhelm von Humboldt seriously—as a philosopher. It does so by exploring Humboldt’s central notion of “Individuum/Individualität,” which does not coincide with the philosophical usage of “individual/individuality” in English. It is closer related to Leibniz’s notion of the “monad,” being characterized by infinity, totality and ineffability. Humboldt’s focus on the philosophical role of language does not primarily aim at an analysis of the system(s) of language(s), but rather at an hermeneutical investigation of actual thinking and speaking among thinking and speaking individuals, every one of them being characterized by infinity, totality and ineffability. This analysis eventually leads to a new approach to ethics. It circumscribes an ethics without universal truths, guided by the respect of the words of the others even if we cannot ever fully understand them. But it is necessarily their words which co-constitute our mentally framed perception of the world.
8. Eco-ethica: Volume > 7
Nam-In Lee Phänomenologische Interpretation der Phronesis bei Aristoteles
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It is the aim of this paper to develop the phenomenology of phronesis through a phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of phronesis by employing different kinds of phenomenological reductions. In section 1, I will show that phenomenological reduction is identical with a change of attitude and that we have to employ different kinds of phenomenological reductions in order to interpret Aristotle’s theory of phronesis phenomenologically. In section 2, employing different kinds of phenomenological reductions, I will attempt to develop the phenomenological psychology of phronesis through a phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of phronesis. In section 3, employing different kinds of intersubjective reductions, I will clarify intersubjective aspects of phronesis. In section 4, adopting these insights, I will try to resolve two of the many difficulties of Aristotle’s theory of phronesis. In section 5, I will conclude with two remarks concerning the future tasks of the phenomenology of phronesis.