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1. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Duncan Pritchard The Opacity of Knowledge
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Here is a common ‘intuition’ that you’ll often find expressed regarding the epistemological externalism/internalism distinction. It is the thought that epistemological internalism, whatever its other faults, at least leaves the possession of knowledge a transparent matter; whereas epistemological externalism, whatever its other merits, at least makes the possession of knowledge opaque. It is the status of this view of the externalism/internalism contrast that I wish to evaluate in this paper. In particular, I argue that on the most credible interpretation of this ‘transparency’ thesis it is in fact inconsistent with even a minimal version of epistemological internalism. I conclude that knowledge is opaque on any plausible construal of knowledge, and consider some implications that this result has for the contemporary epistemological debate.
2. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
H. Benjamin Shaeffer Review of Considered Judgment, by Catherin Z. Elgin
3. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
David Boersema Review of Metaphysics and Its Task, by Jorge J. E. Gracia
4. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
David Guetter Review of A History of Ancient Philosophy: From the Beginnings to Augustine, by Karsten Friis Johansen, trans. Hendrik Rosenmeier
5. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
David Guetter Review of The Legacy of Parmenides, by Patricia Curd
6. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Simon Trepanier The Structure of Empedocles’ Fragment 17
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Fragment 17 of Empedocles has long been recognized as the most important in the corpus. In 1998, the significance of this 35-line fragment was further increased by the publication of the Strasbourg papyrus, containing roughly 74 lines of Empedocles.
7. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
David Boersema Review of The Philosophy of Biology, ed. David L. Hull and Michael Ruse and Sex and Death: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Biology, by Kim Sterelny and Paul E. Griffiths
8. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Paola Cavalieri Silent Parties: A Problem for Liberalism?
9. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Susan J. Armstrong Introduction
10. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Bart Gruzalski The Ability To Be Moral Fails To Show That Humans are More Valuable Than Nonhuman Animals
11. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Andrew Linzey ‘The Powers That Be’: Mechanisms that Prevent us Recognising Animal Sentience
12. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Dan Perry Animal Rights and Environmental Wrongs: The Case of the Grey Squirrel in Northern Italy
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Alien species are considered by conservation biologists to be a major threat to biodiversity. To deal with alien invasions, they often recommend completely eradicating the invasive species. Animal rights groups have continually opposed eradication campaigns, sometimes successfully. One such case was the attempted eradication of the grey squirrel from northern Italy.
13. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Steven F. Sapontzis What’s More Important?
14. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Elisa Aaltola The Moral Value of Animals: Three Versions Based on Altruism
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As it comes to animal ethics, broad versions of contractualism are often used as a reason for excluding animals from the category of those with moral value in the individualistic sense. Ideas of “reciprocity” and “moral agency” are invoked to show that only those capable of understanding and respecting the value of others may have value themselves. Because of this, possible duties toward animals are often made dependent upon altruism: to pay regard to animals is to act in an other-regarding manner instead of mutual benefit. There are three main versions of altruism in animal ethics. The first one of these is the most traditional, and emphasises benevolence as a source of moral regard. The second concentrates on the notion of value, and claims that animals have value in the individualistic sense despite being incapable of moral agency. The third resists overt theory-dependency, often included in the second version, and concentrates more on the elements of “context” and “identification”. Out of these, a combination of the last two is identified as the most fruitful basis for altruistic animal ethics.
15. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Heike Baranzke Does Beast Suffering Count for Kant: A Contextual Examination of §17 in The Doctrine of Virtue
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Ever since Schopenhauer´s accusation, it has been disputed whether Kant´s few remarks concerning the ethical human-animal-relationship in the Lectures and in the Doctrine of Virtue fail to support ethical arguments on behalf of animals. One critique that plays a central role is whether Kant would have forbidden cruelty to brutes for educational purposes. In addition to these old objections, Kant´s ethics is charged to be speciesistic by animal ethicists and animal rights philosophers at present.The following article examines especially §17 of the Doctrine of Virtue, which is the only animal ethical text authorized by Kant himself. The interpretation starts by taking the context of §17 into account, particularly the “Episodic Section on an Amphiboly in Moral Concepts”. The systematic output of the cruelty-account and of the duty classes is then analyzed. Central for the understanding of Kant´s argumentation relating to animals are the perfect duties to oneself, which are linked to Kant´s foundation of human dignity. Finally the roles of the physical and emotional needs of brutes and humans in Kant´s ethics are compared with each other. Some conclusions are then drawn concerning human and animal rights in relation to a duty-based argumentation. The article therefore appreciates Kant´s integration of animal suffering into the very core of his virtue ethics, an integration that may be able to open the door for an enlightened animal ethics based on human responsibility.
16. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Angela Ballantyne Humans and Hybrids: A Critique of the Western Moral Framework
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This paper uses the advent of human-animal hybrids, created though somatic cell nuclear transfer experiments in America and Australia, as a tool to deconstruct and challenge the dualistic belief that humans are morally distinct and superior to animals. The view that moral value corresponds to species membership creates a scientific and cultural environment that prohibits or restricts human embryo experimentation whilst permitting the extensive use of animals for research. The dualistic premise therefore motivates the creation of human-animal hybrids for research as a way for scientists to side-step restrictive legislation. Furthermore, ethical frameworks that incorporate the dualistic assumption have been incapable of objectively assessing the moral value of hybrid embryos. This failure indicates the arbitrariness of the moral dichotomy between animals and humans. Moral dualism, based on species membership, should be replaced with a liberal ethical framework based on a consistent standard such as interests.
17. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
C. C. Croney, B. Gardner, S. Baggot Beyond Animal Husbandry: The Study of Farm Animal Cognition and Ensuing Ethical Issues
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Concerns about the welfare of agricultural animals in corporate or “factory farming” systems are growing. Increasingly, it is suggested that modem farm animal production practices are morally objectionable, causing physical and mental suffering to animals. Such criticisms are premised on beliefs about the mental capacities of farm animals that are not wholly supported by scientific evidence, for little is known about farm animal cognition. Some animal scientists, realizing that concerns about the treatment of agricultural animals cannot be addressed in absence of knowledge about farm animal mentality, have begun cognitive studies of farm animals. Subsequently, several ethical problems have emerged. In this paper it is argued that while farm animal cognition studies are needed, scientists must consider the moral problems and implications of the research, and must devise empirically testable hypotheses about those aspects of cognitive behavior that are relevant to discussions about moral treatment of farm animals.
18. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
David Fraser, Rod Preece Animal Ethics and the Scientific Study of Animals: Bridging the “Is” and the “Ought”
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From ancient Greece to the present, philosophers have variously emphasized either the similarities or the differences between humans and nonhuman animals as a basis for ethical conclusions. Thus animal ethics has traditionally involved both factual claims, usually about animals’ mental states and capacities, and ethical claims about their moral standing. However, even in modern animal ethics the factual claims are often scientifically uninformed, involve broad generalizations about diverse taxonomic groups, and show little agreement about how to resolve the contradictions. Research in cognitive ethology and animal welfare science provides empirical material and a set of emerging methods for testing the plausibility of claims about animal mentation and thus for clarifying the interests and needs of animals. We suggest that progress in animal ethics requires both philosophically informed science to provide an empirically grounded understanding of animals, and scientifically informed philosophy to explore the ethical implications that follow.
19. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Monica L. Gerrek Hume and Our Treatment of Animals
20. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Eli Kanon Can Animals Attain Membership Within a Human Social/Moral Group?
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Justice is illustrated by how humans treat others. Human society can no longer be considered just if it continues to treat animals instrumentally, disregarding the moral worth of each individual creature. Emile Durkheim's division of labor theory offers a groundwork for providing animals limited rights within a human-dominated society. Solidarity can be fostered between animals and humans by internalizing the principle that all organisms are interdependent. This principle is the foundation for granting animals moral status. By recognizing the role animals play in our society, we can acknowledge our obligations to them. Utilizing a mechaorganic solidarity, humans can establish justification for moral treatment of animals.