421.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 61
Jerry J. Yang
楊景德
A Response to Rosenthal’s Arguments against the Intrinsic View of Consciousness
對羅森陶反意識本有主義論證之回應
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Rosenthal argues that if consciousness is seen as intrinsic, it will appear to be simple and unanalyzable, and therefore not amenable to scientific explanation, which requires a relational structure involving an extrinsic property of the mind. I shall first criticize Rosenthal's argument against intrinsicalism by way of conceptual analysis. I shall then examine three of his arguments against the intrinsic view of consciousness: the argument from the distinction between transitive and intransitive consciousness, the argument from reporting and expressing, and the argument of the individuation of mental states. I suggest that the content of a mental state can be considered to be an information space, which will allow for an explanation of consciousness. My rejection of Rosenthal's position relies on distinguishing two different forms of intrinsicalism: with and without self-representation. We shall find that both versions have explanatory traction from a naturalistic perspective.
羅森陶指出若意識被當作一種本有性質,它就會是單純與不可分析的,並且因此無法提供科學性的說明,因為科學性說明要求一種具有心靈的外在性質的關係式架構。我首先從概念分析的角度批評羅森陶反本有主義的論證。接著,逐一檢視羅森陶三個反本有主義的論證:及物與非及物意識區分的論證、報告與表達的論證,與個別化心靈狀態的論證。我建議將單一心靈狀態的內容視為一個訊息空間,可以用之來說明意識。我依據兩種不同型態的本有主義來反對羅森陶的立場:一種是包含自我表徵,另一種則不包含。我們將會發現這兩種類型的理論,在自然主義的視角下都擁有解釋的力量。
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422.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 61
Tsung-Hsing Ho
何宗興
How to Locate Pain in Mandarin:
Reply to Liu and Klein
如何在中文裡定位疼痛
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Some philosophers argue that pain is an object located in bodily parts because the locative form of pain report is permissible in English. To examine this argument, Liu and Klein recently argue that the linguistic argument cannot work because the locative form is impermissible in Mandarin. They are wrong, however. I demonstrate that the locative form in Mandarin is not only permissible but also common.
有些哲學家主張疼痛是一種處於身體部位的對象,理由是英文可以用定位句式說明疼痛是允許的。最近,Liu 與Klein 檢視中文對於說明疼痛的用法,指出中文不允許用定位句式說明疼痛。然而,我主張他們是錯的,我提供實例來論證如何在中文裡使用定位句式來說明疼痛。
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423.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2021 >
Issue: 61
劉吉宴
Chi Yen Liu
合理性推論的兩個準則
Two Criteria of Reasonable Inferences
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亞當斯和史東內克在傳統的有效性觀點之外,對指示條件句的推論提出了合理性這樣的概念,並對這樣的概念提出了兩個不同的準則。本文從可斷說性的概念分別來對兩者提出形式上的刻畫,以檢視這兩者的關係。本文把亞當斯支持的準則稱為「可斷說性的證成性」,而把史東內克支持的準則稱為「嚴格的證成性」,並認為這兩個準則可以幫助我們釐清條件句推論中的爭議。本文用這兩個準則來重新分析麥基對肯定前件律所提出的反例,試圖說明為何麥基提出的是一個可斷說證成性的反例,而不是嚴格證成性的反例。接著,本文對這個現象提出一個診斷,說明為何這兩個準則只會在條件句的推論中產生實質的分歧。最後,本文論證可斷說性的證成性太過於嚴格而難以成立,主張嚴格的證成性才是一個較好的準則。
Validity is an orthodox way to distinguish between good and bad inferences, which says that when inferences are valid, we can derive true conclusions from true premises. But when inferences involve conditionals, validity does not seem to be a good criterion. Unsatisfied with the traditional view of validity, Adams(1965) and Stalnaker(1975) propose their modified criteria, which are called “reasonable inference” in this paper, to evaluate inferences involving conditionals. In this paper, Adams’ criterion is called “justification of assertibility”, which can derive a highly assertible conclusion from highly assertible premises. Stalnaker’s criterion is called “justification of strictness” in this paper, which can derive a strictly assertible conclusion from strictly assertible premises. This paper examines these two criteria and their consequences. First, by reexamining McGee’s(1985) counterexample to modus ponens, I argue that McGee’s example is an assertibility-justified but not a strictness-justified counterexample to modus ponens. Second, I explain why these two criteria have such a substantial divergence when inferences have conditional conclusions. Third, if my diagnosis is correct and complicated conditionals are allowed in inferences, then the justification of assertibility is too rigid to be satisfied. I conclude that the justification of strictness is a better criterionthan the justification of assertibility.
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424.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 62
熊偉均
Wei-Chun Hsiung
「不形於內」的「德之行」:
郭店楚簡《五行》首章的文義商榷
The Virtuous Conduct “Not Forming Inwardly”
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本文之研究目標是試圖解決郭店竹簡《五行》首章之詮釋困難,並以竹簡《五行》自身的內容做為首要的證據來源。首先,筆者整理帛書派、竹簡派與調和派對首章爭議的不同見解,並點出竹簡派導致詮釋困難的思維架構;接著釐清竹簡《五行》「德之行」、「行」與「德」三者之別,以及考察竹簡《五行》「形」與「聖」之用例,發掘「聖」兼具兩種意涵之「形」,據此為竹簡《五行》首章提供更為全面且融貫之詮釋:作為最高意義的「聖」,必然在「形於內」的基礎上,兼具了內在轉化層面「形於無形」與人倫教化層面「形於眾人」此雙重意義。竹簡《五行》首章據此主張唯有「聖」無論「形於內」或「不形於內」皆可以稱為「德之行」,並確立「聖」具備超越「仁義禮智」四者的獨特地位。
This paper aims at solving the interpretive problem in the first chapter of Wu Xing of Guodian bamboo texts, majorly based on the text itself. It starts by categorizing different interpretations into three groups (the for-silk-texts, the for-bamboo-texts, and the reconciliatory), and points out the thinking patterns which have led the for-bamboo-texts to misinterpretation. It also analyzes the distinction among the virtuous conduct (dezhixing), conduct (xing), and virtue (de), and reexamines usages of the forming (xing) and sageness (sheng) of the Wu Xing to conclude that the concept of sageness includes two different meanings of forming. Therefore, the reason why the conduct of sageness should be regarded as virtuous conduct regardless of whether or not it forms “inwardly” is that the sageness, the supreme virtue, possesses both “imperceivable forming” (personal self-cultivation and transformation) and “societal forming” (interpersonal enlightenment and amelioration), which establishes the virtue of sageness in a unique position superior to the four cardinal virtues.
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425.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 62
鍾振宇
Chen-Yu Chung
無用與有用的弔詭:論「莊惠之辯」的現代意義
The Paradox of Non-Usefulness and Usefulness
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海德格在二次大戰德國戰敗之日(1945 年5 月8 日),寫了一篇對話式文章紀念此一日子,文章區分兩種用:無用與有用,最後引用了莊惠對話,提出德國要成為「無用的民族」以引領未來世界。海德格認為大戰是現代性擴張精神的結果,而其中最關鍵的就是「有用」的思考與世界觀。本文將莊惠兩種存有論的重點放在「用」的兩種差異上,視莊子為「無用的存有論」,視惠施為「有用的存有論」。這點除了文本根據外,更具有當代意義。透過海德格對於兩種用的區分,筆者試圖闡發莊惠辯論的當代意義。
At the time when Germany was defeated in the World War 2 (May 8, 1945), Heidegger wrote a dialogic essay to memorize the event. In the essay he differentiated two kinds of usefulness: non-Usefulness and usefulness. What merits our attention is that at the end of the essay he quoted the conversation between Zhuangzi and Huishi and proposed that Germany be “the nationality of non-usefulness” so as to lead the world in the future. For him the War resulted from the spirit of expansion of which ideology and worldview of “usefulness” lies at the heart. It is against such a background that this essay attempts to construct an account of Zhuangzi’s and Huishi’s ontologies by differentiating their views on “usefulness”, whereby Zhuangzi is read to represent “the ontology of non-usefulness” and Huishi to stand for “the ontology of usefulness”. Viewed in light of Heidegger’s differentiation of two kinds of “usefulness”, the essay hopes to explicate the contemporary significance of the dispute between Zhuangzi and Huishi, particularly Huishi’s emphasis on usefulness which I suggest can be related to the modern pursuit of usefulness.
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426.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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朱弘道
Hung-Tao Chu
《莊子•養生主》中「薪火之喻」的意義再探
Reexamination of the Metaphor of “Faggots” and “Fire” in Yang Sheng Zhu
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以往研究對於《莊子•養生主》中「指窮於為薪,火傳也,不知其盡也」一句的詮釋基本上可分為兩種:其一是在標舉出形、神的對立作為詮釋工具,分別以此兩者比喻薪火,藉此提出「重神養神」的養生方針;其二則是以「事物自然地流轉變化」為分析脈絡,強調「火」的無窮無盡,並提出「勿使形體的存亡影響己心」的看法。筆者認為,以上兩詮釋各有其理據,亦有其源遠流長之歷史脈絡,因此才為學界所接受。然筆者認為,以往詮釋中,在通假字的使用、目標域與來源域的連結及字義解釋等處,尚有幾項值得討論的面向。本文將嘗試以高亨與劉武的注本作為基礎,轉換以往將「薪火之喻」作「正面」詮釋的共通點,而將其解釋為不應發生的「負面」情況。並嘗試指出,此詮釋除可在文本找到相應之說,亦能夠於以上癥結點給出回應,因此具有其獨特之價值。
This paper offers a new interpretation of the following Zhuangzi fragment: “What we can point to are the faggots that have been consumed; but the fire is transmitted (elsewhere), and we know not that it is over and ended” (Yang Sheng Zhu, chapter 3). There are two commonly accepted interpretations. One points out the opposition of form (xing 形) and spirit (shen 神) and suggests taking care of and preserving spirit as a regimen. The other interpretation focuses on the change of everything and the endlessness of fire and suggests that one’s mind should not be affected by the living or dying of things. Both interpretations have a long pedigree and enjoy their own internal support. However, in both interpretations, there are remaining issues related to the use of phonetic loan characters, the connection between source and target domains in the metaphors used, and the interpretation of some word meanings. On the basis of the commentaries of Gao Heng and Liu Wu, I attempt to develop an alternative interpretation. While both of the interpretations introduced above regard faggot and fire as positive metaphors, I instead argue that these metaphors portray negative situations that should be avoided. This novel interpretation has its own unique value because it finds support in Zhuangzi and because it meets the problems of the former two interpretations.
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427.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 62
佐藤將之
Masayuki Sato
近代日本中國哲學的誕生:
以明治一○年代在東京大學的課程為中心
The Birth of Chinese Philosophy in Meiji Japan
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本文是為了闡明目前學界所稱呼「中國哲學」或「東洋哲學」的學術領域在明治時期的日本如何誕生、如何形成之一番試論。所謂「中國哲學」這樣學術領域是以「哲學」這樣的概念和學科之引進為契機而形成,並且此契機的磁石場是當時剛創立的東京大學。本文經過其創立時期教授與中國哲學相關內容的課程之費諾羅薩(Ernest F. Fenollosa)、井上哲次郎以及島田重禮三位的上課內容之分析,勾勒出江戶時代以來經學或儒學的思想內容由「哲學」的分析框架來獲得新的思想涵義之過程。如此,在德川時代原來被視為經學上的內容逐漸轉換成「人格修養」、「國民道德」等具備近代特質的倫理主張。孔孟等經學上的聖人以及戰國諸子也皆變成了「哲學家」。
This article attempts to elucidate the origin and formation of the “Chinese philosophy” or “Oriental philosophy” as an academic field which took form during the Meiji Era of Japan. The academic field called “Chinese philosophy” originated mainly from the incorporation of the discipline of philosophy into Tokyo University during the 1870s. The main scholars who contributed to the formation of this scholarly field were Ernest Fenollosa, Inoue Tetsujirō, and Shimada Chōrei. Fenollosa was the first teacher who taught the contents of Chinese thought from the viewpoint of philosophy. Inoue Tetsujirō was also the first instructor who took charge of the seminar under the title of “Oriental philosophy” in which he compared the “philosophical significance” of those early Chinese thinkers with those of their counterparts in the Western philosophical tradition. Shimada, succeeding Inoue, was another pioneer because he first taught the whole history of Chinese thought from the ancient to the Manchurian period, though Shimada himself had not received philosophy education in his youth. Their seminars have strengthened the philosophical image of traditional Chinese thinkers, and as a result, those thinkers have been all considered to be “philosophers” by the time of the early twentieth century. It was by this re-interpretation of the significance of traditional thought, especially from the perspective of ethics, that the contents of Confucian canonical studies of the Tokugawa period have been transformed into a new ideological ground for advocating the necessity of self-cultivation and so-called “national morality” in the following Taishō and Shōwa periods.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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許詠晴
Yung-Ching Hsu
《論語》中的疾病及其隱喻
Illness and its Metaphor in The Analects of Confucius
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疾病是古今人類共通的生存挑戰,也是孔子謹慎面對的情況之一。《論語》屢論及疾病,扼要地記載古人面對疾病所採取的行動與態度。疾病作為非常事態,對個人生命造成危害,並影響人際互動。古人基於經驗發展出應對的衛生與治療措施,甚至求助於信仰活動,疾病可謂個人、人我、人與超越界的關係叢結點。疾病除作為身體疾病之外,也以隱喻的面貌出現於《論語》。孔子談論人的德行修養與道德議題時,數次以疾病為喻論人的道德缺失,不僅人的身體會生病,道德也可能生病,皆應謹慎應對。本文試就《論語》中的身體疾病解析其間開顯的關係向度,並援借當代隱喻理論,紬繹《論語》道德疾病的隱喻,推敲孔子德行修養之道。
Illness is a survival challenge for people at all times. It is also one of the situations Confucius cautiously dealt with. In The Analects of Confucius, illness was touched upon numerous times with brief documentation of the actions and attitude that ancients adopted in the face of it. Illness is an abnormal situation that threatens individual's life and affects interpersonal interactions. Based on experience, the ancients developed corresponding hygiene and treatment methods. They would even turn to religious activities for help. Hence illness could be considered as the confluence of person, others and self, and the human-transcendence relationship. In addition to physical diseases, illness presents itself as a metaphor in The Analects of Confucius. Confucius used illness as a metaphor for deficiency of virtue a few times when he talked about virtue cultivation and moral topics. It is not only the human body but virtue also can be affected by “illness.” Both must be treated with caution. This study shall analyze the dimensions of relationship presented by physical illness in The Analects of Confucius as well as to clarify the metaphor of moral illness in The Analects of Confucius with the help of modern metaphor theory in order to explain how virtue is cultivated according to Confucius.
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