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Philosophia Christi:
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Benjamin C. F. Shaw, Gary Habermas
Miracles, Evidence, and Agent Causation:
A Review Article
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Here we interact critically with the volume The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in the Resurrection and the Supernatural Is Unjustified (Columbia University, 2016) by University of Wisconsin philosopher Lawrence Shapiro, who contends that even if miracles occur, proper epistemological justification is unattainable. In addition, he argues that the historical evidence for Jesus’s resurrection is deeply problematic. We engage Shapiro’s philosophical and historical arguments by raising several significant issues within his own arguments, while also briefly providing some positive reasons to think that if a miracle did occur, one may be epistemologically justified in believing it.
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Philosophia Christi:
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Kirk Lougheed
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement
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Philosophia Christi:
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Derek McAllister
The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays
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Philosophia Christi:
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Winfried Löffler
Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution
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Philosophia Christi:
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Paul Copan
The Allure of Gentleness: Defending the Faith in the Manner of Jesus
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Philosophia Christi:
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Erik Baldwin
The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy’s New Challenge to Belief in God
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Philosophia Christi:
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William Lane Craig
Necessary Beings: An Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the Relations between Them
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Philosophia Christi:
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Matthew D. Wright
Commentary on Thomas Aquinas’s Treatise on Law
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Philosophia Christi:
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Elijah Hess
The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence: A Time-Ordering Account
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Philosophia Christi:
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Michael T. McFall
Four Views on Christianity and Philosophy
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Philosophia Christi:
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Greg Ganssle
The Best Argument against God
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Philosophia Christi:
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Eric B. Oldenburg
Four Views on Hell
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Philosophia Christi:
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Loren Pankratz
Moral Responsibility and Desert of Praise and Blame
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Philosophia Christi:
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R. Scott Smith
The Knower and the Known: Physicalism, Dualism, and the Nature of Intelligibility
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Philosophia Christi:
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10 >
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William Lane Craig
Graham Oppy on Infinity:
A Review Essay on Philosophical Perspectives on Infinity
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Philosophia Christi:
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Issue: 1
William Lane Craig
Einführung in die Religionsphilosophie
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Philosophia Christi:
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Patrick T. Smith
Introducing Apologetics: Cultivating Christian Commitment
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18.
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Philosophia Christi:
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Issue: 1
Robert Llizo
The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy; The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Jewish Philosophy
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Philosophia Christi:
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Adam Barkman
Narnia, Cambridge, and Joy: 1950–1963. Volume 3 of The Collected Letters of C. S. Lewis
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Philosophia Christi:
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Issue: 2
David C. Cramer
Nancey Murphy on Personal Identity and Eschatological Resurrection:
A Review Essay of Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?
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In this paper I discuss Nancey Murphy’s nonreductive physicalist perspective on personal identity and eschatological resurrection offered in her recent work, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? I argue that if we take Murphy to be presenting actual metaphysical positions on these issues, it is very difficult to see how they go together coherently. Contrary to Murphy’s explicit claim to be presenting metaphysical criteria for personal identity, I argue that it appears she is instead offering an epistemological or psychological account of identity. I conclude that Murphy may need to modify or reject either her criteria for personal numerical identity or her view of the resurrection in order to consistently hold the other. Alternately, she could view this inconsistency as a failure of the underlying physicalist assumptions of her “scientific research program” and thus reject her physicalist assumptions altogether.
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